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1 
INTRODUCTION 
 Perhaps nowhere is accuracy and precision more important than in a criminal courtroom. 
In the United States, 2,366 individuals have been exonerated after being convicted of crimes they 
did not commit and serving more than 20,735 years in prison (National Registry of 
Exonerations). Over the years, recognition of the enormity of the potential consequences of a 
criminal conviction has been the catalyst for a number of legal provisions designed to help 
ensure just outcomes in criminal cases. This dissertation examines the effects of various aspects 
of defendant appearance on criminal case outcomes to help further this important mission. The 
subtlety of appearance bias makes it particularly important to examine empirically and prevent 
ex-ante, as case-by-case litigations and ex-post corrections are likely to be plagued by 
evidentiary issues.   
 Chapter One begins by examining the effect of one of the most widely litigated and 
researched aspects of defendant appearance—race. Using an experimental vignette study 
involving two different nonviolent property crimes, I show that white defendants are convicted 
more often and receive longer prison sentences in these types of criminal trials. In part, this 
surprising result stems from race-based jury nullification. Mock jurors who distrust the justice 
system disproportionately acquit black defendants, and when mock jurors who would have 
acquitted a black defendant are asked to assign a sentence, they assign a disproportionately lesser 
sentence than similarly situated mock jurors who would have acquitted a white defendant. 
Additionally, despite the overarching results, there are racial stereotypes disadvantaging black 
defendants that affect both verdict and sentencing decisions. Mock jurors believe that black 
defendants have a higher propensity to commit crime, and black defendants are 
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disproportionately punished (in terms of longer prison sentences) for being perceived as likely to 
reoffend, receiving significantly longer sentences from mock jurors who convicted.  
 Chapter Two uses the same experimental vignette study to examine the impact of 
defendant dress and shackling. While these aspects of appearance have been virtually unexplored 
in the existing literature, they have both received attention from the Supreme Court. In Deck v. 
Missouri, the Court held that adult defendants cannot be shackled in front of a jury without a 
compelling state justification,1 and in Estelle v. Williams, the Court held that defendants can 
never be forced to appear before a jury in identifiable prison garb.2 At least in the context of 
trials for nonviolent property crimes, the results provide some support for the Estelle decision. 
Certain subgroups of mock jurors convict defendants in institutional garb at higher rates than 
defendants in civilian clothing. Additionally, defendants in institutional garb receive significantly 
longer prison sentences than defendants in casual civilian clothing. In contrast, the results 
indicate that shackling usually only affects case outcomes when considered in combination with 
defendant dress—defendants in casual civilian clothing are convicted the least and receive the 
shortest prison sentences, especially when they are not shackled.  
Finally, Chapter Three provides the first empirical evidence on the effect of 
indiscriminate juvenile shackling on case outcomes. Since 2007, thirty-two states and the District 
of Columbia have put policies in place to limit the circumstances under which juveniles can be 
shackled in court, and many more states are currently considering bans on indiscriminate 
juvenile shackling. Using double-difference and triple-difference analyses and juvenile case data 
from North Carolina (where a ban on indiscriminate juvenile shackling was passed in 2007) and 
Tennessee (where no ban was passed until 2016) spanning 2004 through 2012, this Chapter 
                                                             
1 544 U.S. 622 (2005). 
2 425 U.S. 501 (1976). 
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sheds light on the effects of such bans. The results indicate that North Carolina’s ban on 
indiscriminate juvenile shackling resulted in more favorable outcomes for juvenile defendants, 
including a 3-4 percentage point decrease in the probability of receiving a sentence involving 
detention and an equally large increase in the probability of receiving a treatment-based 
sentence, providing support for a nationwide ban on indiscriminate juvenile shackling.  
  
 
 
4 
CHAPTER ONE: RACE-BASED JURY NULLIFICATION AND OTHER EFFECTS OF RACE IN NONVIOLENT 
CRIMINAL CASES 
I. Introduction 
The right of adult criminal defendants to have their cases resolved absent the influence of 
racial bias is protected by three federal constitutional provisions. First, the Due Process Clauses 
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee the right to a fair trial, including the right to 
be presumed innocent and have one’s guilt established by probative evidence beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Second, the Sixth Amendment states, “In all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right to … an impartial jury.”3 Third, the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment promises defendants, “No state shall … deny any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” Similar protections are imposed on the federal 
government through the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.4  
Despite these protections, racial discrimination at a criminal trial or sentencing 
proceeding is very hard to prove. In the case of a jury trial or jury sentencing proceeding, the 
defendant’s first opportunity to discover racial bias by jurors is the jury selection process known 
as voir dire. During voir dire, if a potential juror admits to harboring racial prejudices or makes a 
statement illustrating a lack of impartiality, the defendant can move to have that juror dismissed 
for cause.5 However, courts often restrict the length and format of voir dire, limiting its 
effectiveness for identifying potential jurors with racial biases.6 Additionally, potential jurors are 
                                                             
3 The Supreme Court has also recognized the right to an impartial judge under the Due Process Clause. Ward v. 
Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972). 
4 Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (holding that the concept of equal protection is inherent in Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment). 
5 The court should grant such a motion if the juror’s views would “prevent or substantially impair the performance 
of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.” Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980). 
6 For example, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 47 permits judges to choose whether the attorneys or the judge 
will ask questions during voir dire, thereby allowing judges to control the tone and delivery of inquiry. 
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likely to experience social pressure not to admit to being racially biased, and even the most 
honest potential jurors cannot admit to being implicitly biased, because, by definition, 
individuals are not consciously aware of their implicit biases.7  
A defendant might also learn about racial bias after the jury has rendered a verdict. Since 
jury deliberations are private, this information usually comes in the form of an affidavit from one 
of the jurors. Unfortunately, such evidence may be inadmissible under no-impeachment rules, 
which limit the testimony that jurors can give about their deliberations in order to encourage 
vigorous deliberations and add finality to verdicts.8 Fearing that no-impeachment rules may be 
unduly restricting defendants’ Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury, the Supreme Court 
recently held that courts must consider juror affidavits reporting clearly racially biased 
statements made during jury deliberations.9 However, this is only the case when the statements 
tend to show that racial animus was a motivating factor in a juror’s ultimate vote to convict.10  
It may be even harder for a defendant to prove racial animus in the case of a bench trial 
or a judicial sentencing hearing. There is no voir dire process to determine which judge will hear 
the case, and since a judge makes his or her decision alone, there is no third party to report 
racially biased statements. Even if a defendant has evidence of racial animus, the judge being 
accused of bias will be the first to rule on the defendant’s motion to have him or her replaced. If 
the motion is denied, the defendant will have to wait until he or she is convicted or sentenced to 
appeal, absent “exceptional circumstances.”11 
                                                             
7 For a discussion of the scientific foundations of implicit bias, see Greenwald and Krieger (2006); for papers 
discussing implicit bias in the criminal context, see Ingriselli (2015); Levinson, Cai, and Young (2010); Page 
(2005); and Rachlinski and Johnson (2009).  
8 Every jurisdiction currently has a no-impeachment rule, but some are more restrictive than others. See Pena-
Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 865 (2017). 
9 Id. at 869. 
10 Id.  
11 See United States v. Gregory, 656 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that the denial of defendant’s motion to 
recuse was not immediately appealable under an exception to the typical rule that the defendant may only appeal 
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The fact that it is hard for defendants to prove racial prejudice on the part of a judge or 
jury could mean that constitutional violations are occurring without remedy. Empirically 
examining the effect of defendant race on case outcomes (and amending trial and sentencing 
procedures accordingly) can serve an important role in ensuring that all defendants are receiving 
their constitutionally guaranteed protections.12 The fact that the vast majority of cases are now 
resolved through plea bargaining13 in no way diminishes the importance of studying and 
remedying racial prejudice at trial and sentencing. The bargaining process itself is influenced by 
the parties’ expectations about what would happen at trial, and in cases where bargaining is 
affected by racial animus, trial may be the defendant’s only opportunity for a fair adjudication.   
A great deal of evidence already supports the concern that racial disparities exist within 
the criminal justice system. Black individuals, particularly young black men, are 
disproportionately represented at every stage of the criminal justice process (Blumstein 1993; 
Pope & Feyerherm 1995; Nellis 2016). In 2007, black individuals accounted for 38 percent of 
the United States jail and prison population and only 13 percent of the total population 
(Sentencing Project 2008).  However, these observational disparities are not necessarily 
attributable to bias within the criminal justice system. They could reflect the fact that black 
individuals commit more crimes overall, that they commit more serious crimes, or that the 
                                                             
after a final judgment is entered in the case and that there were no exceptional circumstances justifying review under 
a writ of mandamus). 
12 General empirical evidence like that presented here will not allow an individual defendant to prove that their case 
outcome has been influenced by race ex post. See McKleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (holding that state-wide 
statistics on the race of death penalty defendants and their alleged victims could not prove intentional racial 
discrimination on the part of the local prosecutor). However, such evidence can motivate changes in policies that can 
help prevent the influence of race ex ante.   
13 In 2014, 2.6 percent of federally adjudicated defendants received a bench or jury trial (Bureau of Justice Statistics 
2017). In 2009, 2 percent of state felony convictions in the 75 largest counties in the United States resulted from a 
bench or jury trial (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2013).  
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system places heavy weight on race-neutral factors, like socioeconomic status or past encounters 
with the criminal justice system, which tend to correlate highly with race.14  
In order to isolate the impact of defendant race on case outcomes, researchers often use 
experimental vignette studies that ask mock jurors to reach a verdict or recommend a sentence in 
a hypothetical criminal case. The results are mixed. Some studies have found no effect of 
defendant race (Bottoms, Davis, & Epstein 2004; Conley, Turnier, & Rose 2000; Hill & Pfeifer 
1992; Hymes et al. 1993; McGuire & Bermant 1977; Nemeth & Sosis 1973; Sunnafrank & 
Fontes 1983), some studies have found bias against white defendants (Abwender & Hough 2001; 
Conley, Turnier, & Rose 2000; Skolnick & Shaw 1997; Sommers & Ellsworth 2000), and some 
studies have found bias against black defendants (Bernard 1979; Cohn et al. 2009; DeSantis & 
Kayson 1997; Foley & Chamblin 1982; Gordon 1993; Gray & Ashmore 1976; Ingriselli 2015; 
Pfeifer & Ogloff 1991; Sommers & Ellsworth 2000).  
This Chapter will contribute to the existing literature using a pair of carefully designed 
experimental vignette studies to isolate the effect of defendant race on case outcomes in the 
context of a nonviolent property crime; the Chapter will further examine the source of any 
identified effect of defendant race. The results indicate that in the context of a trial and 
sentencing proceeding for a nonviolent property crime, decisionmakers convict white defendants 
significantly more often than black defendants and sentence white defendants significantly more 
harshly than black defendants. The bias against white defendants is at least partially the result of 
race-based jury nullification. Mock jurors’ beliefs about biases present at other stages of the 
criminal justice process lead them to provide a stronger presumption of innocence to black 
                                                             
14 These explanations could in turn be explained by racial bias outside of the criminal justice system. For example, 
racial bias in employment could lead to socioeconomic disparities by race and make criminal behavior a more 
attractive alternative for black individuals. 
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defendants and perceive the evidence presented against black defendants as less persuasive. 
Additionally, mock jurors who acquitted the defendant sentence black defendants to significantly 
less time in prison than white defendants, possibly in an attempt to correct for what they perceive 
as racially-motivated convictions. Nevertheless, racial stereotypes disadvantaging black 
defendants influence both verdict and sentencing decisions. Mock jurors view black defendants 
as having a higher propensity to commit crime, and mock jurors who convicted the defendant 
sentence black defendants to longer prison terms despite viewing white defendants as more 
likely to recidivate.   
II. Theoretical Foundations  
A number of theoretical models have been developed to analyze and predict the 
decisionmaking process of judges and jurors, most of which have the same basic structure. A 
judge or juror reaching a verdict at trial in a criminal case should begin by presuming that the 
defendant is innocent. In other words, before any evidence is presented, the judge or juror should 
believe that there is a very small probability (approaching zero) that the defendant is guilty.15 As 
evidence is presented, the judge or juror weighs the credibility and sufficiency of the evidence 
and updates his or her belief about the defendant’s likelihood of guilt. A number of mechanisms 
for this updating process have been proposed, perhaps the most widely accepted of which is 
often referred to as the story model (Pennington & Hastie 1991).16 Under this model, jurors 
assign meaning to trial evidence through the development of competing stories (Pennington & 
                                                             
15 Even absent racial bias, prior beliefs may stray from zero based on the difficulty of presuming innocence. For 
example, judges or jurors may improperly consider an indictment as evidence of guilt. A similar model of jury 
decisionmaking is discussed and tested in Ostrom et al. (1978).  
16 Alternative models include information integration models, Bayesian models, Poisson models, sequential 
weighting models, and others (Pennington & Hastie 1981).  
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Hastie 1991). These stories are then judged based on pre-existing world knowledge to eliminate 
all but the “best” story (Pennington & Hastie 1991). 
Whatever the precise mechanism for processing the information presented at trial, the 
judge or juror ultimately applies the jury instructions to their final belief about the likelihood of 
guilt in order to reach a verdict decision. There are two main ways to conceptualize this 
conviction decision task. First, a juror may translate the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of 
proof into a concrete percentage of guilt, such as 95 percent. If his or her post-evidence 
assessment of guilt is above that threshold, he or she will convict. Otherwise, he or she will not. 
Under this conceptualization, the threshold will be consistent across cases absent the influence of 
bias. Alternatively, the judge or juror might reach his or her verdict by weighing the costs of a 
wrongful conviction and wrongful acquittal. The weights that he or she assigns to each cost will 
depend on his or her post-evidence assessment of the defendant’s guilt and the size of the costs 
will depend on his or her personal beliefs and interpretation of the legal instructions. Under this 
conceptualization, the burden of proof threshold may vary between cases even absent bias. This 
is the conceptualization that best aligns with story model of jury decisionmaking. Under that 
model, the decisionmaker must decide whether the “best” story contains all the attributes 
necessary for a guilty verdict beyond a reasonable doubt (Pennington & Hastie 1991).17 This 
decision will depend on the decisionmakers prior ideas about crime categories, intuition, and 
interpretation of the legal instructions (Cheng 2013; Pennington & Hastie 1991).  
                                                             
17 Alternatively, jurors might convict if they believe that the prosecutor’s story is the most convincing and acquit 
otherwise, failing to consider the burden of proof in a third step. If this is the case, the burden of proof results 
presented here may not correlate with actual verdict decisions.  
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An unbiased judge or juror’s pre-evidence belief, belief updating, and verdict 
determination will not be influenced by the defendant’s race.18 In contrast, a biased judge or 
juror may—consciously or unconsciously—be influenced by the defendant’s race in one of three 
different ways. First, before any evidence is presented, a biased judge or juror may allow racial 
stereotypes to influence his or her belief about the probability of the defendant’s guilt. The judge 
or juror might associate members of a particular race with the crime charged, associate members 
of a particular race with criminal behavior more generally, or assign greater meaning to the 
charging of defendants of a particular race based on perceived biases in the system. Whatever the 
source of the stereotype, it will result in different initial probabilities of guilt for different 
defendants, in contravention of the presumption of innocence instruction.  
A biased judge or juror may also be influenced—consciously or unconsciously—by the 
defendant’s race during the presentation of evidence. He or she may find certain types of 
evidence more credible based on the defendant’s race or weigh the evidence differently. Finally, 
a biased judge or juror may—consciously or unconsciously—allow the defendant’s race to affect 
his or her interpretation of the burden of proof. Beyond a reasonable doubt may be a more 
demanding standard for defendants of a certain race or the costs of a wrongful conviction and 
wrongful acquittal may differ based on the race of the defendant.  
As Figure 1 illustrates, all of these forms of racial bias combine to influence aggregate 
differences in verdicts, and they may work in opposite directions. For example, it is possible that 
typical judges and jurors associate black individuals with criminal behavior and are therefore 
biased against black defendants even before any evidence is admitted. However, they may also 
find the evidence presented against white defendants more credible because they perceive no risk 
                                                             
18 Of course, even an unbiased judge or juror will consider race in cases where it is a relevant piece of evidence. 
Examples include hate crime cases and cases where the defendant claims bias on the part of police officers. 
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that the evidence has been influenced by racial prejudice. If they apply the same beyond a 
reasonable doubt standard in every case, it is not clear whether black or white defendants will be 
found guilty more often. 
Figure 1. Mechanisms Through Which Race May Impact Verdict Decisions 
 
Sentencing provides the judge or jury with much more discretion than the determination 
of guilt or innocence.19 The defendant has already been found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, 
and the goals are to rehabilitate the defendant, deter future crime, incapacitate the defendant 
while he or she is a danger to the community, and obtain retribution. The judge or jury will 
                                                             
19 Most sentencing decisions are made by judges, but some sentencing decisions are left to juries, even outside the 
capital murder context. States that allow for jury sentencing in noncapital cases are Arkansas (ARK. CODE ANN. § 
16-97-101), Kentucky (KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.055), Missouri (MO. ANN. STAT. § 557.036), Oklahoma (OKLA. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 926.1), Texas (TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07, § 2), and Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. § 
19.2-295). 
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weigh these various goals based on their personal preferences and beliefs about the defendant 
and determine the optimal sentence within the statutorily permissible range. Sometimes, judges 
are provided with statutory sentencing guidelines to help them weigh various factors in coming 
to their decision.20 Such guidelines are typically advisory and can be very complex.   
An unbiased judge or juror will not consider the defendant’s race in selecting the 
appropriate sentence. All else equal, black and white defendants will receive the same sentence 
for the same crime committed under similar circumstances. Conversely, a biased judge or juror 
may—consciously or unconsciously—think that defendants of a particular race are more capable 
of rehabilitation, more likely to reoffend, or more blameworthy. This will lead to aggregate 
differences in the sentences received by black and white defendants, absent any other differences 
in their cases or relevant personal circumstances. 
III. Existing Literature 
The generalized models of verdict determination and sentencing presented above lead to 
clear, testable hypotheses. If judges and jurors are influenced by defendant race, all else equal, 
defendants of a particular race will be convicted more often or sentenced more harshly than 
defendants of other races. Researchers have attempted to test these hypotheses using both real 
world observational data and experimental vignette studies. In both instances, the results are 
mixed.  
 
 
                                                             
20 For a model of judicial sentencing incorporating sentencing guidelines and discussing the implications for racial 
sentencing disparities, see Sorenson et al. (2014).  
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A. Observational Studies 
Many scholars have used data from real criminal cases to examine the effect of defendant 
race on case outcomes. Most of this research has used multivariate regression analysis to control 
for demographic characteristics and crime characteristics. Remaining racial disparities in case 
outcomes are typically presumed to be the result of racial bias. Primarily, these studies look at 
the effect of race on sentencing decisions (see Spohn 2000 for a review) and pretrial release and 
bail determinations (see Free 2001 for a review). Some studies have also looked at the effect of 
defendant race on dismissal decisions (Adams & Cutshall 1987; Myers 1982), decisions to seek 
the death penalty (Baldus, Woodworth, & Pulaski 1990; Nakell & Hardy 1987), and bindover 
decisions at preliminary hearings (Baumer, Messner, & Felson 2000).  
Many of these studies find that after controlling for demographic and case characteristics, 
there is no effect of defendant race, indicating a lack of racial bias. Of the studies that do find 
evidence of racial bias, the majority find that black defendants are disadvantaged as compared to 
white defendants. However, these studies are all subject to the criticism that they may suffer 
from omitted variables bias because they can only control for the incomplete demographic and 
case characteristics that are observable in their data.  
In order to avoid this criticism, a few researchers have used natural experiments or other 
unique methodological designs to analyze real world criminal case data. Alesina and Ferrara 
(2014) model trial courts as minimizing Type I (false positives, i.e. wrongfully sentencing a 
defendant to death) and Type II (false negatives, i.e. wrongfully failing to sentence a defendant 
to death) errors in the context of capital sentencing. This model leads to a testable hypothesis 
about racial bias—the rate at which death sentences are overturned during direct appeal and 
habeas corpus proceedings should not differ by the race of the defendant absent racial bias. The 
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authors find that the rate of reversal for death sentencing is higher for black defendants convicted 
of murdering white victims but only when those trials occur in the South. They conclude that 
trial judges in the South are racially biased against black defendants charged with murdering 
white victims. However, that conclusion relies on a few potentially problematic assumptions. 
First, the model assumes that appellate courts are not biased in favor of minority defendants 
when reviewing capital cases, which could be the case if appellate judges believe the outcomes 
of cases with minority defendants are more likely to be affected by racial bias. Second, the model 
assumes that there are no relevant unobservable case characteristics correlated with both 
defendant and victim race in the South that could serve as an alternative explanation for the 
different rates of reversal. 
Abrams, Bertrand, and Mullainathan (2012) use the random assignment of cases to 
judges in Cook County, Illinois to examine whether defendant race impacts sentencing decisions. 
They find that the difference between a black defendant’s and a white defendant’s probability of 
incarceration when they are assigned to a judge who falls at the tenth percentile of judges in 
terms of racial disparities in incarceration decisions is eighteen percentage points greater than if 
they are assigned to a judge who falls at the ninetieth percentile of judges. They also find that the 
difference in the average incarceration sentence for those defendants increases by 10.47 
percentage points when they move between the same two judges. A major limitation of their 
study is that they do not have a large enough sample to break down the results by crime type. 
Natural experiments have also allowed researchers to examine a related question—how 
does the race of the judge or juror affect racial disparities in the criminal justice system? Anwar, 
Bayer, and Hjalmarsson (2012) use the random variation in jury pools to examine how the racial 
diversity of the jury pool interacts with defendant race to affect determinations of guilt. They 
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find that all-white jury pools convict black defendants sixteen percentage points more often than 
white defendants, and this gap is entirely eliminated when the jury pool contains at least one 
black individual. When they divide their sample by crime type, the effect goes away for property 
crimes. One limitation is that the study is somewhat confined in its scope. The data come 
exclusively from felony trials in two counties in Florida, each with a population of less than 
500,000. Out of jury pools for 785 felony trials with an average size of 27 people, only 64 
percent contained at least one black individual. As a result, the findings may only be 
representative of similarly small and non-diverse areas.21  
Lee (2017) uses a difference-in-differences analysis to analyze the effect of policies that 
limit the discretion of jury commissioners to exclude black individuals from jury service. She 
finds that these reforms lead to a 5–6 percentage point drop in the share of new prison 
admissions accounted for by minority defendants. These results, while national in scope, could 
be driven by a particular type of case; the study focuses only on aggregate prison admissions, 
and the results are not broken down by type of crime charged. These natural experiments and 
related methodologies provide the most convincing results using real world data, but, as the 
discussion above suggests, each suffers from methodological and data-related limitations.  
B. Experimental Studies 
Many scholars have instead used experimental vignette studies to examine the effect of 
defendant race on criminal case outcomes. Typically, these studies ask jury-eligible subjects to 
read a written description of a criminal case or watch a video clip portraying a criminal case in 
which the race of the defendant is randomly assigned. Afterward, subjects are asked to determine 
                                                             
21 Florida is also unique in that it is one of only two states to allow for six-person juries in serious felony cases. FLA. 
R. CRIM. P. 3.720. The other is Connecticut. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-82. 
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guilt or recommend a sentence. This methodology has several benefits over observational 
studies. First, it allows the researcher to hold all case characteristics (other than defendant race) 
constant rather than having to measure and control for them to avoid omitted variables bias. 
Second, it allows researchers to easily collect data from a more demographically diverse sample. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it allows researchers to examine the heterogeneous effect 
of defendant race across different types of cases, in terms of the crime charged, the evidence 
presented, and the courtroom procedures used.  
Like studies using real-world case data, the results of these experimental studies are 
mixed. A number of experimental vignette studies find no effect of defendant race (Bottoms, 
Davis, & Epstein 2004; Conley, Turnier, & Rose 2000; Elek & Hannaford-Agor 2014; Hill & 
Pfeifer 1992; Hymes et al. 1993; McGuire & Bermant 1977; Nemeth & Sosis 1973; Sunnafrank 
& Fontes 1983), some find bias against white defendants (Abwender & Hough 2001; Conley, 
Turnier, & Rose 2000; Skolnick & Shaw 1997; Sommers & Ellsworth 2000), and some find bias 
against black defendants (Bernard 1979; Cohn et al. 2009; DeSantis & Kayson 1997; Foley & 
Chamblin 1982; Gordon 1993; Gray & Ashmore 1976; Ingriselli 2015; Pfeifer & Ogloff 1991; 
Sommers & Ellsworth 2000). 
When studies find a bias against white defendants, it is typically concentrated among 
black respondents (Abwender & Hough 2001; Skolnick & Shaw 1997; Sommers & Ellsworth 
2000). Studies have also found that the salience of race—measured by explicit discussion of race 
at trial—can increase racial bias (Cohn et al. 2009; Sommers & Ellsworth 2000), the provision of 
jury instructions can decrease racial bias (Hill & Pfeifer 1992; Mitchell et al. 2005), and the race 
of the victim can interact with the race of the defendant to influence racial bias (Bottoms, Davis, 
& Epstein 2004; Hymes et al. 1993). Table 1 summarizes the existing literature chronologically. 
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Table 1. Experimental Vignette Literature Examining the Effects of Race on Criminal Case 
Outcomes 
Author(s) Date of Publication Crime 
Mock 
Juror 
Sample 
Size 
Outcome of 
Interest Result 
Studies Finding Bias Against Black Defendants 
Gray and 
Ashmore 1976 Manslaughter 380 
Continuous 
sentencing 
determination 
Bias against black 
defendants 
Bernard 1979 
Assault and 
battery of a 
police officer 
115 Dichotomous assessment of guilt 
Bias against black 
defendants 
Field 1979 Rape 896 
Continuous 
sentencing 
determination 
Bias against black 
defendants 
Foley and 
Chamblin 1982 
Sexual battery 
on a child 191 
Continuous 
assessment of guilt 
Bias against black 
defendants by white 
participants 
Pfeifer and 
Ogloff 1991 Rape 247 
Dichotomous and 
continuous 
assessments of 
guilt 
Bias against black 
defendants 
Gordon 1993 
Assault, 
embezzlement, 
and vehicular 
manslaughter 
144 Continuous assessment of guilt 
Bias against black 
defendants in assault 
cases 
DeSantis and 
Kayson 1997 Burglary 160 
Continuous 
sentencing 
determination 
Bias against black 
defendants 
Sommers and 
Ellsworth 2000 
Assault, 
robbery, and 
arson 
273 
Continuous 
assessment of guilt 
and continuous 
sentencing 
determination 
Bias against white 
defendants by black 
respondents and bias 
against black 
defendants by white 
respondents when 
race was salient 
Cohn et al. 2009 
Attempted 
vehicular 
homicide 
176 Dichotomous assessment of guilt 
Bias against black 
defendants when 
race was salient 
Ingreselli 2015 Assault 412 Continuous assessment of guilt 
Bias against black 
defendants 
Studies Finding No Racial Bias 
Nemeth and 
Sosis 1973 
Negligent 
vehicular 
homicide 
80 
Continuous 
sentencing 
determination 
No significant effect 
of defendant race 
McGuire and 
Bermant 1977 Murder 226 
Dichotomous 
assessment of guilt 
No significant effect 
of defendant race 
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Sunnafrank 
and Fontes 1983 
Vehicular 
manslaughter 75 
Dichotomous 
assessment of guilt 
No significant effect 
of defendant race 
Hill and 
Pfeifer 1992 Rape 125 
Continuous 
assessment of guilt 
No significant effect 
of defendant race 
once jury 
instructions were 
given 
Hymes et al. 1993 Rape 78 Continuous assessment of guilt 
No significant effect 
of defendant race 
Conley, 
Turnier, and 
Rose 
2000 Vandalism 551 Dichotomous assessment of guilt 
Bias against white 
defendants that is 
eliminated in a 
follow-up study 
Bottoms, 
Davis, and 
Epstein 
2004 Sexual assault on a child 228 
Dichotomous 
assessment of guilt 
No significant effect 
of defendant race 
Elek and 
Hannaford-
Agor 
2014 Assault and Battery 561 
Dichotomous 
assessment of guilt 
and continuous 
sentencing 
determination 
No significant effect 
of defendant race 
Studies Finding Bias Against White Defendants 
Skolnick and 
Shaw 1997 Murder 213 
Continuous 
assessment of guilt 
and continuous 
sentencing 
determination 
Bias against white 
defendants by black 
participants 
Conley, 
Turnier, and 
Rose 
2000 Vandalism 551 Dichotomous assessment of guilt 
Bias against white 
defendants that is 
eliminated in a 
follow-up study 
Sommers and 
Ellsworth 2000 
Assault, 
robbery, and 
arson 
273 
Continuous 
assessment of guilt 
and continuous 
sentencing 
determination 
Bias against white 
defendants by black 
respondents and bias 
against black 
defendants by white 
respondents when 
race was salient 
Abwender 
and Hough 2001 
Negligent 
vehicular 
homicide 
207 
Continuous 
assessment of guilt 
and continuous 
sentencing 
determination 
Bias against white 
defendants by black 
participants 
These results illustrate the strength of the experimental vignette methodology—racial 
bias differs based on case-specific characteristics that are necessarily glossed over in studies 
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using real world criminal case data.22 However, existing experimental vignette studies are not 
without their own limitations. Most notably, researchers have thus far failed to meaningfully 
vary the crime type examined. Despite the fact that violent crimes account for only 5 percent of 
all arrests23 and the fact that previous experimental vignette studies have illustrated that the race 
of the victim influences the effect of defendant race on case outcomes (Bottoms, Davis, & 
Epstein 2004; Hymes et al. 1993), only two experimental vignette studies have examined the 
effect of defendant race using a nonviolent crime. Importantly, there are reasons to suspect that 
the effect of race might be different in violent crime cases. Previous studies note that black 
defendants are often portrayed as more menacing and dangerous by the media (Dixon & Maddox 
2005; Peffley, Shields, & Williams 1996), and a study by Hurwitz and Peffley (1997) finds that a 
strong relationship between whites’ views on African-Americans and their assessments of a 
black defendant’s likelihood of guilt (knowing only the race of the defendant and the crime 
charged) exists only when the crime charged is violent. 
The two experimental studies that have not used a violent crime find either no racial bias 
or bias against white defendants. Gordon (1993) examines an embezzlement scenario. He finds 
no effect of defendant race on perceptions of guilt, but he does not provide any jury instructions, 
which have been found to influence racial bias (Hill & Pfeifer 1992; Mitchell et al. 2005). 
Conley, Turnier, and Rose (2000) examine a vandalism scenario and find mixed evidence, 
suggesting a possible bias against white defendants. Their experiment uses a group of released 
jury-pool members in an actual courtroom setting. The videotape of the trial includes jury 
                                                             
22 In some instances, these characteristics can be controlled for, but available samples of real world cases are 
typically not large enough for analyses of all potentially relevant subsamples of cases.  
23 This number was calculated using the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s definition of violent crime, which 
includes murder and nonnegligent manslaughter, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault (Federal Bureau of 
Investigation 2017).  
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instructions, witness testimony, and attorney arguments, and the defendant is either black or 
white and either upper or lower class, as signaled by his clothing and his testimony about his 
education, career, and upbringing. Initially, the researchers found that the white defendant is 
convicted at a significantly higher rate than his black counterpart in both the upper- and lower- 
class versions of the study. In order to examine whether this effect is due to the fact that the 
black defendant was the only black individual in the tape, the authors then reran the study, 
substituting in black actors for some of the witnesses. In this second study, they find no 
significant effect of defendant race.  
Additionally, Sommers and Ellsworth use a hypothetical arson scenario (along with a 
robbery scenario and an assault scenario) and find bias against white defendants by black mock 
jurors and bias against black defendants by white mock jurors when race is salient. However, 
their arson scenario could arguably be considered a violent hate crime, as it involves the burning 
down of a church with a congregation that is primarily of the opposite race of the defendant.  
This study will contribute to the existing literature on the effect of defendant race on case 
outcomes using a pair of carefully designed experimental vignette studies involving nonviolent 
property crimes. This study will also examine how race is impacting case outcomes by 
examining the mechanisms illustrated in Figure 1. 
IV. Study Design 
This project was conducted using two experimental vignette studies. The main goals of 
the first study were to determine (1) whether defendant race significantly impacts conviction and 
sentencing results in cases involving nonviolent crimes, (2) whether the effects of defendant race 
differ based on the characteristics of the decisionmaker, (3) whether differences in mock jurors’ 
perceptions of the evidence explain the effects of defendant race on verdict decisions (see Figure 
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1), and (4) whether differences in mock jurors’ perceptions of the defendant’s likelihood of 
recidivating explain the effects of defendant race on sentencing. A second study was conducted 
in order to (1) ensure that race, rather than differences in attractiveness, is the source of the racial 
disparities discovered in the first study, (2) determine whether differences in the presumption of 
innocence explain the effects of defendant race on verdict decisions (see Figure 1), and (3) 
determine whether differences in the burden of proof explain the effects of defendant race on 
verdict decisions (see Figure 1). The methodology used to conduct each of these experimental 
vignette studies is described in detail below. 
A. First Study: Case-Specific Biases 
The first experimental vignette study was conducted using Qualtrics survey technology 
and the Amazon Mechanical Turk (mTurk) survey platform. This platform provides access to a 
diverse nationwide sample of individuals who have signed up to take surveys for compensation. 
In total, 8,070 respondents participated in the survey, which included two separate vignette 
studies24 and took about fifteen minutes to complete. Participants were only allowed to complete 
the survey once25 and were compensated $1.50 upon successful completion. All subjects were 
over eighteen, resided within the United States, and spoke English. Demographic characteristics 
of the sample are provided in Table 2 alongside U.S. population demographics from the 2016 
Census. In general, the mTurk sample is somewhat younger, more educated, and more employed 
than the United States population. The mTurk sample also has a slight overrepresentation of 
women, an underrepresentation of racial and ethnic minorities, and is more urban than the United 
                                                             
24 The other vignette study, which was not related to this project, involved employee hiring scenarios. 
25 This requirement is easily enforced since each participant must be signed up as an mTurk worker and each worker 
is assigned a unique worker ID. 
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States population.26 Appendix Table A1 contains the first study subject demographics broken 
down by the race and ethnicity of subjects.  
Table 2. First Vignette Study Subject Demographics 
Characteristic mTurk Sample U.S. Population (2016) 
Female 55.3% 51.1% 
Age 35.4 41.8 
US Native 95.0% 86.8% 
Hispanic 8.1% 14.4% 
White 79.0% 76.4% 
Black 8.7% 10.2% 
Asian 6.3% 5.4% 
Married 41.1% 42.6% 
B.A. or Higher (If 25+) 57.7% 31.4% 
Employed 82.3% 46.2% 
Median Household Income ($2017) $52,500 $58,844 
Urban 33.7% 21.8% 
Northeast 19.1% 17.7% 
Midwest 21.3% 21.5% 
South 38.5% 37.3% 
West 20.9% 23.4% 
Democrat 43.3% N/A 
Republican 22.4% N/A 
Religious  23.6% N/A 
Prior Jury Service 13.6% N/A 
Criminal History 17.0% N/A 
Criminal Victimization 41.4% N/A 
Distrusts Justice System 44.0% N/A 
Notes: Mean values for the mTurk sample are calculated using the entire sample of mock jurors from the first 
experimental vignette study. Mean values for the U.S. population are calculated using the 2016 U.S. Census 
Bureau ACS sample. Age is calculated using employed persons only; race is calculated using only individuals 
who report a single race. Individuals who attend church at least once a month are considered religious. 
Individuals who have a prior criminal conviction or have been arrested are considered to have a criminal history. 
Individuals are considered to distrust the justice system if they strongly disagreed or somewhat disagreed with the 
statement that the criminal justice system works well in the United States. 
One concern with the use of mTurk workers is that they may be systematically different 
from the general population. While this is certainly a possibility, previous use of mTurk workers 
by a number of other scholars (Balganesh, Manta, & Wilkinson-Ryan 2014; Ingriselli 2015; 
Ginther et al. 2014; Hersch & Moran 2015; Hersch & Shinall 2017; Wilkinson-Ryan & Baron 
                                                             
26 These demographic characteristics are typical of mTurk samples (see Ginther et al. 2014; Hersch & Shinall 2017). 
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2008), including some that have directly compared mTurk workers to other validated panels 
(Kuziemko et al. 2015), some who have examined juror decisionmaking in the criminal context 
(Ingriselli 2015; Ginther et al. 2014), and some who have examined bias against historically 
disadvantaged groups (Hersch & Moran 2015; Hersch & Shinall 2017) diminishes the concern. 
Ginther et al. (2014) uses an mTurk sample to examine assessments of culpability and the 
application of jury instructions in mock criminal cases. The study involves a follow-up 
experiment to an original study that uses a nationally representative sample. Using the mTurk 
sample does not change the overall pattern of responses by participants.  
Each respondent in the first study was presented with one vandalism case scenario and 
one arson case scenario. As noted above, very few studies have examined the effect of defendant 
race on case outcomes in the context of a nonviolent crime. The vandalism and arson cases had 
two principal variations: an eyewitness variation and a motive variation. Two variations were 
included to ensure that the results were not driven by a particular aspect of the criminal scenario. 
Subjects were randomly assigned to see either the eyewitness or motive variation of the 
vandalism scenario, and then they saw the opposite variation of the arson scenario.  
At the beginning of each scenario, subjects saw the following prompt: 
You have been selected to serve on a jury in a criminal trial. The 
defendant is [Michael Jones/ James Williams/ Joshua Thomas/ 
David Jackson], pictured below as he appears in court on the day 
of trial. The sole charge against Mr. [Jones/ Williams/ Thomas/ 
Jackson] is [vandalism/ arson]. He has pleaded not guilty. After 
reading the trial material, you will be asked to decide whether the 
prosecution has proven that Mr. [Jones/ Williams/ Thomas/ 
Jackson] is guilty of [vandalism/ arson] beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
The surnames used are the four within the top 20 most common surnames from the 2000 Census 
that had the closest population-representative racial mix (U.S. Census Bureau a). First names 
were selected to be as familiar and race-neutral as possible. 
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In the eyewitness variation (whether vandalism or arson), subjects read a trial summary 
for a case in which an eyewitness description of the suspect’s clothing and vehicle led to a 
neighborhood canvas by police; that canvas eventually turned up a matching suspect with 
relevant evidence in his home. The main defense was an alibi; two of the defendant’s friends 
claimed to have been hanging out with him all night. The motive variation (whether vandalism or 
arson) revolved around a potential insurance fraud scheme. Evidence existed to suggest the 
defendant needed to pay off credit card debt, stood to gain money from the alleged crime, and 
relevant evidence linking the defendant to the crime was uncovered in the defendant’s home. 
Here again, the defendant’s main defense was an alibi; the defendant’s wife claimed to have been 
home with him all night on the night of the crime. These scenarios were extensively pretested to 
ensure a mix of guilty and not guilty verdicts.  
Most importantly for this experiment, each scenario was accompanied by a picture of 
either a black or white defendant. Pictures of two different white defendants and two different 
black defendants were used. The defendant’s clothing and the presence or absence of shackles 
was also randomly varied. The effects of the clothing and shackles manipulations are discussed 
in Chapter Two. No respondent ever saw the same defendant in both scenarios.  
Only two races were included in the study for better precision. There were already 24 
different variations of the arson and vandalism questions (2 variations x 2 races x 2 shackling 
conditions x 3 clothing conditions), necessitating a large sample size. Including additional races 
or ethnicities would have increased the necessary sample size, the cost, and the complexity of the 
study significantly. Black individuals were selected for study because they experience the largest 
disparities in terms of their representation in the criminal justice system (Nellis 2016). 
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Differential treatment of members of other races and ethnicities, however, remains an important 
area for future research.  
Each scenario concluded with jury instructions about the burden of proof, the standard of 
proof, the presumption of innocence, the elements of the crime charged, and the right to remain 
silent. These jury instructions were modeled primarily after Illinois’s model criminal jury 
instructions for the crimes of arson and criminal damage to property.  The elements of vandalism 
were: (1) that the defendant, (2) knowingly, (3) damaged property of another, (4) without the 
owner’s consent. The elements of arson were: (1) that the defendant, (2) by means of fire or 
explosives, (3) knowingly, (4) damaged property of another, (5) without the owner’s consent. 
After viewing each scenario, respondents were asked to find the defendant either guilty or 
not guilty, rate their confidence in their guilt determination on a five point Likert scale, rate the 
believability of each witness and each party’s version of events on a five point Likert scale, 
recommend a sentence, rate their confidence in their sentence determination on a five point 
Likert scale, and rate the likelihood that the defendant would reoffend in the next five years if 
acquitted on a five point Likert scale.  The questions were asked in this order on separate 
screens, and respondents could not go back and change a previous answer.  
For the sentencing determination, participants were asked to assume the role of a judge 
and, regardless of their answers to the previous questions, assume the defendant had been found 
guilty. They were told that the defendant’s criminal history consisted of one misdemeanor theft 
conviction as a juvenile, and their answers were restricted to between one and five years 
(inclusive) for vandalism and between one and ten years (inclusive) for arson. These sentencing 
ranges are roughly representative of state sentencing ranges for these charges. To simplify the 
decision, there was not an option to impose a non-incarceration sentence, such as probation. At 
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the end of the survey, respondents were asked a variety of demographic questions. A complete 
survey outline is attached as Appendix A. 
B. Second Study: Pre-Existing Biases 
In order to explore whether pre-existing race-related beliefs influence the presumption of 
innocence and the burden of proof and to ensure that race rather than attractiveness is responsible 
for the racial disparities in the first study, a second study was conducted, again using Qualtrics 
survey technology and the mTurk survey platform. In total, 2,561 individuals participated, and 
they were compensated $0.25 for about 2.5 minutes of their time. Again, all of the subjects were 
over eighteen, resided within the United States, and spoke English. Demographic characteristics 
of the sample are provided in Table 3, alongside those of the first mTurk sample and U.S. 
population demographics from the 2016 Census. For the most part, the demographic 
characteristics of the second sample mirror those of the first sample. One notable difference is a 
more representative proportion of Hispanic individuals (bringing the percent closer to that of the 
U.S. population). Additionally, as compared to the first study, a greater percentage of the second 
study respondents live in urban areas, identify as Republican, identify as religious, have prior 
jury experience, and trust the justice system. While these differences are large, they are not a 
major concern. The samples are drawn from the same population of mTurk workers, and—as 
discussed in more detail below—when the samples are analyzed together, the demographic 
characteristics of each sample and the results from the second study are used to predict values for 
the first sample, effectively controlling for any meaningful demographic differences between the 
samples. Appendix Table A2 contains the second study subject demographics broken down by 
the race and ethnicity of the subject.  
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Table 3. Second Vignette Study Subject Demographics 
Characteristic Second mTurk Sample 
First mTurk 
Sample 
U.S. Population 
(2016) 
Female 54.5% 55.3% 51.1% 
Age 35.3 35.4 41.8 
US Native 94.4% 95.0% 86.8% 
Hispanic 12.1% 8.1% 14.4% 
White 79.2% 79.0% 76.4% 
Black 8.5% 8.7% 10.2% 
Asian 6.7% 6.3% 5.4% 
Married 46.6% 41.1% 42.6% 
B.A. or Higher (If 25+) 60.7% 57.7% 31.4% 
Employed 84.9% 82.3% 46.2% 
Median Household Income ($2017) $52,500 $52,500 $58,844 
Urban 39.5% 33.7% 21.8% 
Northeast 17.0% 19.1% 17.7% 
Midwest 19.3% 21.3% 21.5% 
South 42.6% 38.5% 37.3% 
West 20.9% 20.9% 23.4% 
Democrat 40.2% 43.3% N/A 
Republican 30.5% 22.4% N/A 
Religious  34.7% 23.6% N/A 
Prior Jury Service 16.7% 13.6% N/A 
Criminal History 18.8% 17.0% N/A 
Criminal Victimization 41.9% 41.4% N/A 
Distrusts Justice System 31.9% 44.0% N/A 
Notes: Mean values for the first mTurk sample are calculated using the entire sample of mock jurors from the 
first experimental vignette study. Mean values for the second mTurk sample are calculated using the entire 
sample of mock jurors from the second experimental vignette study. Mean values for the U.S. population are 
calculated using the 2016 U.S. Census Bureau ACS sample. Age is calculated using employed persons only; race 
is calculated using only individuals who report a single race. Individuals who attend church at least once a month 
are considered religious. Individuals who have a prior criminal conviction or have been arrested are considered to 
have a criminal history. Individuals are considered to distrust the justice system if they strongly disagreed or 
somewhat disagreed with the statement that the criminal justice system works well in the United States. 
Each respondent was presented with one criminal case scenario (either arson or 
vandalism) and then one attractiveness question. The criminal case scenarios began with the 
following prompt 
You have been selected to serve on a jury in a criminal trial. The 
defendant is [Michael Jones/ James Williams/ Joshua Thomas/ 
David Jackson], pictured below as he appears in court on the day 
of trial. The sole charge against Mr. [Jones/ Williams/ Thomas/ 
Jackson] is [vandalism/ arson], and he has pleaded not guilty. At 
the end of the trial, you will be asked to apply the following rules 
of law: 
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1. Every person charged with a crime is presumed 
innocent. 
2. You may decide what testimony to believe. You may 
believe all of the testimony of a witness, or part of it, or 
none of it. 
3. The prosecution has the burden of proving every 
element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 
4. The elements of the crime of [vandalism/ arson] are: 
1. That the defendant, 
2. [By means of fire or explosives,] 
3. Knowingly, 
4. Damaged property of another, 
5. Without the owner’s consent. 
 
This prompt was accompanied by a randomly assigned picture of either a black or white 
defendant. The same pictures of the same two white and black defendants were used as in the 
first study. Participants were first asked how likely they thought it was that the defendant was 
guilty, on a scale of 0 to 100 percent, before seeing any evidence. Participants were then asked to 
rate the importance of (1) the crime charged, (2) the defendant’s propensity to commit crime, and 
(3) their opinions about the criminal justice system to that rating of pre-evidence guilt on a five 
point Likert scale. Next, participants were asked how certain they would need to be of the 
defendant’s guilt, on a scale of 0 to 100 percent, after hearing the evidence in order to return a 
guilty verdict. Participants were also asked to rate how important (1) fear of a wrongful 
conviction, (2) fear of a wrongful acquittal, and (3) whether the prosecution has met the burden 
of proof would be in deciding whether to convict on a five point Likert scale.  
After the criminal case scenario, participants were asked to rate the attractiveness of a 
different defendant on a five point Likert scale. Like the criminal case scenarios, this question 
included a randomly assigned picture of a black or white defendant. The study concluded with a 
series of demographic questions. A complete survey outline is attached as Appendix B.  
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V. White Defendants Are Convicted More Often Than Black Defendants 
In all of the case scenarios, white defendants are significantly more likely to be convicted 
than black defendants. Table 4 summarizes the conviction rates for each of the case scenarios in 
the first study and illustrates how they differ based on the race of the defendant. Arson cases 
result in higher conviction rates than vandalism cases and eyewitness variations result in higher 
conviction rates than motive variations. Eighty percent of participants are either somewhat 
confident or very confident that they have reached the legally correct verdict. Among those who 
convict the defendant, about 84 percent are somewhat or very confident about their decision, 
statistically significantly more than the approximately 77 percent of participants who feel the 
same after acquitting the defendant. 
The biggest racial disparity occurs in eyewitness arson case scenario, where white 
defendants are about 10 percentage points more likely to be convicted than black defendants, and 
the smallest disparity occurs in eyewitness vandalism case scenario, where white defendants are 
about 4 percentage points more likely to be convicted than black defendants. Figure 2 illustrates 
average conviction probabilities by defendant race.  
Table 4. Conviction Rates by Defendant Race 
Case Scenario All Defendants White Defendants Black Defendants 
All Case Scenarios 35.82% 39.14%*** 32.54% 
Eyewitness Vandalism 34.94% 36.72%** 33.05% 
Motive Vandalism 29.08% 31.54%*** 26.76% 
Eyewitness Arson 46.30% 51.33%*** 41.46% 
Motive Arson 33.06% 37.12%*** 29.02% 
Notes: Stars indicate significant differences between the conviction rates of black and white defendants. *p<0.1 
**p<0.05 ***p<0.01. 
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Figure 2. Conviction Rates by Defendant Race 
 
A. Mock Juror Heterogeneity: The Effect of Defendant Race Differs Based on the Race of 
the Mock Juror  
Other experimental studies find that the effect of defendant race differs by the race of the 
mock juror (Abwender & Hough 2001; Skolnick & Shaw 1997; Sommers & Ellsworth 2000), 
and in an observational study, Alesina and Ferrara (2014) find that defendant race only has a 
significant effect on case outcomes in cases decided in the South. In order to test whether similar 
heterogeneity exists among mock jurors who participated in the first study, Table 5 contains the 
differences in white and black defendants’ conviction rates by the race, ethnicity, and southern 
residency of the mock juror. While the racial disparities in each case scenario are not always 
significant, all of the subgroups of mock jurors convict white defendants significantly more often 
than black defendants when all of the case scenarios are pooled.  
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Table 5. Differences in White and Black Defendants’ Conviction Rates by Mock Juror 
Race, Ethnicity, and Residence in the South Census Region 
 All Case Scenarios 
Eyewitness 
Vandalism 
Motive 
Vandalism 
Eyewitness 
Arson 
Motive 
Arson Observations 
White Only 4.77%*** 2.45% 3.35%** 6.70%*** 6.46%*** 12,630 
Black Only 16.92%*** 9.44%* 17.98%*** 28.36%*** 14.09%*** 1,396 
Asian Only 11.25%*** 9.88% 5.16% 12.16%** 18.60%*** 1,012 
Hispanic 7.82%*** 5.40% 7.86% 9.11% 8.66% 1,268 
Non-Hispanic 6.50%*** 3.55%** 4.18%*** 10.70%*** 7.62%*** 14,472 
Southern  7.53%*** 5.58%** 4.74%** 11.42%*** 8.37%*** 6,220 
Not Southern 6.05%*** 2.51% 4.88%*** 8.96%*** 7.93%*** 9,920 
Notes: Numbers represent conviction rates for white defendants minus conviction rates for black defendants 
rendered by respondents of the given race, ethnicity, or Census region in the given case scenario. Only 
individuals who report a single race are included in this analysis. Individuals are considered southern if their 
state of residence is in the south Census region and not southern otherwise. *p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01. 
In order to determine whether the magnitude of the bias against white defendants differs 
significantly by race, ethnicity, or southern residency, the following equation is estimated using a 
linear probability model for the subgroups of mock jurors listed in Table 5. 𝐺𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑦' = 𝛼 + 𝛽,𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑡' + 𝛽5𝐴𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛' + 𝛽:𝐸𝑦𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠' + 𝜖' (1) 𝐺𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑦' is a dummy variable equal to one for a guilty verdict, 𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑡' is a dummy 
variable equal to one when the defendant is white, 𝐴𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛' is a dummy variable equal to one 
when the crime charged is arson, and 𝐸𝑦𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠' is a dummy variable equal to one when the 
case scenario involves eyewitness testimony rather than centering around a motive. Standard 
errors are clustered at the individual level.   
Once these regressions are estimated, the 𝛽, coefficients for related groups of mock 
jurors are tested for equivalency. The magnitude of the bias against white defendants differs 
significantly by the race of the mock juror, but it does not differ significantly by the ethnicity or 
southern residency of the mock juror.27 As illustrated by the values in Table 5, black respondents 
                                                             
27 Even though the magnitude of the race coefficient is not significantly different based on the ethnicity or southern 
residency of the mock juror, likelihood ratio tests indicate that including mock juror ethnicity and southern residency 
as explanatory variables in Equation 1 does significantly increase the fit of the model. 
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exhibit the strongest bias against white defendants, followed by Asian respondents and then 
white respondents. These results are depicted in Figure 3.  
Figure 3. Conviction Rates by Defendant Race and Mock Juror Race 
 
Even though the bias against white defendants appears robust—it is present in every case 
scenario and exists regardless of the race of the mock jurors—it is important to ensure that this 
bias is not driven by individuals in the sample who are unrepresentative of actual judges and 
jurors. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Occupational Employment Statistics survey, 
most, but not all, judicial positions require a law degree, and the median income for a judge or 
hearing officer in 2017 was $115,520 per year (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2018).  
Demographic characteristics of seated jurors are harder to come by, but Hannaford-Agor 
et al. (2003) collected demographic information on seated jurors via a juror survey in four courts 
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hearing non-capital felony cases during 2000 and 2001. The courts—the Los Angeles County 
Superior Court in California, Maricopa County Superior Court in Arizona, Bronx County 
Supreme Court in New York, and District of Columbia Superior Court in Washington, DC—
were selected because each had a sufficiently high volume of felony trials to permit data 
collection within a reasonable period of time and court personnel were willing to cooperate with 
data collection procedures. The response rate among jurors was about 80 percent. The data were 
downloaded from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research.  
Table 6 presents the demographic characteristics of seated jurors in the Hannaford-Agor 
et al. (2003) survey alongside U.S. population demographics from the 2016 Census and the 
demographic characteristics of individuals who report previous jury service in the first survey. 
Characteristics often differ between the Hannaford-Agor et al. (2003) sample and the mTurk 
prior juror sample,28 but a few characteristics are consistent. In both samples of jurors, the highly 
educated are overrepresented, and the vast majority of individuals are employed.  
Table 6. Demographic Characteristics of Actual and Prior Jurors 
Characteristic 
Hannaford-Agor et 
al. (2003) Actual 
Juror Sample 
mTurk Prior 
Juror Sample 
U.S. Population 
(2016) 
Female 57.0% 54.1% 51.1% 
Age 40.4 41.1 41.8 
US Native N/A 97.0% 86.8% 
Hispanic 21.8% 7.7% 14.4% 
White 59.0% 78.5% 76.4% 
Black 26.4% 10.6% 10.2% 
Asian 4.8% 5.3% 5.4% 
Married N/A 47.9% 42.6% 
B.A. or Higher (If 25 or 26 +) 46.5% 62.1% 31.4% 
Employed 85.7% 85.5% 46.2% 
                                                             
28 There are particularly stark differences between the Hannaford-Agor et al. sample and the mTurk sample in terms 
of percent black, percent Hispanic, median household income, and religiosity. The differences in percent black and 
percent Hispanic might result from the fact that the Hannaford-Agor et al. sample is drawn only from urban 
populations, where minority populations are likely to be larger. The difference in religiosity might result from the 
different survey questions (see Table 6 notes). People who do not report attending church at least once a month may 
still identify as religious or very religious. The difference in income is harder to explain, especially given that the 
Hannaford-Agor et al. sample, which has a higher median income, is on average less educated.  
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Median Household Income ($2017) $88,966 $52,500 $58,844 
Urban N/A 34.1% 21.8% 
Northeast 23.0% 17.5% 17.7% 
Midwest 0.0% 19.4% 21.5% 
South 27.0% 40.0% 37.3% 
West 50.0% 23.1% 23.4% 
Democrat N/A 41.1% N/A 
Republican N/A 26.7% N/A 
Religious  65.7% 26.7% N/A 
Criminal History N/A 19.6% N/A 
Criminal Victimization N/A 53.3% N/A 
Distrusts Justice System N/A 37.1% N/A 
Notes: Mean values for the U.S. population are calculated using the 2016 U.S. Census Bureau ACS sample. Age is 
calculated for employed persons only; race values are calculated for individuals who report only a single race. 
B.A. or higher is calculated for people 25+ in the mTurk prior juror sample and the U.S. population sample and for 
people 26+ in the Hannaford-Agor et al. (2003) sample. In the mTurk prior juror sample, individuals who attend 
church at least once a month are considered religious, and in the Hannaford-Agor et al. (2003) sample, individuals 
who reported being “religious” or “very religious” rather than “neither,” “somewhat nonreligious,” or “very  
nonreligious” are considered religious. Individuals who have a prior criminal conviction or have been arrested are 
considered to have a criminal history. Individuals are considered to distrust the justice system if they strongly 
disagree or somewhat disagree with the statement that the criminal justice system works well in the United States. 
Table 7 uses this demographic information to present the differences in conviction rates 
between white and black defendants by those with and without the education level and 
approximate income level of judges, those with and without the most common characteristics of 
seated jurors, and those who have and have not previously served on a jury. Individuals are 
considered to have the education level and approximate income level of judges if they have a 
doctoral or professional degree and an income above $75,000 per year. Individuals are 
considered to have the most common characteristics of seated jurors if they have at least some 
college education and are employed.  
Table 7. Differences in White and Black Defendants’ Conviction Rates by Judicial and 
Juror Demographics and Prior Jury Service 
 All Case Scenarios 
Eyewitness 
Vandalism 
Motive 
Vandalism 
Eyewitness 
Arson 
Motive 
Arson Observations 
Prior Jury 
Service 
6.83%*** 3.04% 11.04%*** 7.27%* 6.31% 2,200 
No Prior Jury 
Service 
6.57%*** 3.77%** 3.71%** 10.31%*** 8.38%*** 13,940 
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Characteristics 
Similar to 
Seated Jurors 
6.30%*** 3.71%** 4.40%*** 9.68%*** 7.39%*** 12,260 
Characteristics 
Distinct from 
Seated Jurors 
7.59%*** 3.69% 5.99%** 10.55%*** 10.20%*** 3,880 
Education and 
Income Similar 
to Judges 
5.31%* 6.11% 7.11% 3.91% 3.85% 1,186 
Education or 
Income 
Distinct from 
Judges 
6.70%*** 3.58%** 4.55%*** 10.39%*** 8.40%*** 14,880 
Notes: Numbers represent conviction rates for white defendants minus conviction rates for black defendants 
rendered by respondents with the listed characteristic in the given case scenario. Individuals are considered to 
have education and income similar to a judge if they have a doctoral or professional degree and if their income is 
$75,000 per year or more. Individuals are considered to have characteristics similar to seated jurors if they have 
at least some college education and are employed. Mock jurors who elect not to report their income are not 
included in either the group of mock jurors with education and income similar to judges or the group of mock 
jurors with education and income distinct from judges. *p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01. 
Those with education and income levels similar to judges do not convict white and black 
defendants at significantly different rates in any individual case scenario. However, this lack of 
significance could be due to reduced sample sizes. This is especially likely given that the 
magnitude of the differences in conviction rates by race are still large and positive in each case 
scenario, and there is a marginally significant bias against white defendants when all of the case 
scenarios are combined. No clear pattern emerges in terms of prior jury service. While those with 
prior jury service exhibit significant racial biases less often than those without prior jury service, 
they exhibit a significant bias against white defendants in the motive vandalism case scenario 
that is larger than the bias against white defendants exhibited by those without prior jury service. 
Those with common juror characteristics exhibit slightly less of a bias against white defendants 
than those without these characteristics, but the bias is usually significant in both samples. These 
results constitute minimal evidence that the jury selection process and background experiences of 
judges help to decrease racial bias. Juror bias is never completely eliminated, and in some cases 
the bias against white defendants may actually be larger among seated jurors and judges.  
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B. Case-Specific Biases: Defendant Race Affects the Perceived Credibility of the 
Evidence and the Weight Assigned to Evidence Credibility 
At least some of the racial bias exhibited by mock jurors may be case-specific in terms of 
being significantly correlated with the believability of the evidence and attorney arguments. 
Recall that after rendering a verdict, participants in the first study were asked to rate the 
believability of each witness and each party’s version of events. As we might expect from the 
conviction rates, significantly fewer participants find the prosecution’s version of events and the 
testimony of the prosecution’s witnesses very believable or somewhat believable when the 
defendant is black. Paralleling these results, significantly more participants find the defense’s 
version of events and the testimony of the defense’s witnesses very believable or somewhat 
believable when the defendant is black. Table 8 summarizes participants’ assessments of these 
aspects of the trial by the race of the defendant. 
Table 8. Trial Evidence Believability by Defendant Race 
Scenario All Defendants White Defendants Black Defendants 
Eyewitness Vandalism 
Testimony of Eyewitness 69.88% 71.12%* 68.57% 
Testimony of Police Officer 75.96% 77.25%** 74.38% 
Testimony of Defendant’s Friends 46.66% 43.34%*** 50.18% 
Prosecution’s Version of Events 75.52% 77.83%*** 73.07% 
Defense’s Version of Events 57.93% 55.33%*** 60.69% 
Motive Vandalism 
Testimony of Police Officer 75.83% 78.13%*** 73.67% 
Testimony of Insurance Agent 75.28% 76.53%* 74.11% 
Testimony of Defendant’s Wife 51.64% 47.36%*** 55.67% 
Testimony of Defendant 51.29% 46.85%*** 55.47% 
Prosecution’s Version of Events 70.74% 74.25%*** 67.45% 
Defense’s Version of Events 56.93% 53.83%*** 59.85% 
Eyewitness Arson 
Testimony of Eyewitness 76.69% 79.78%*** 73.71% 
Testimony of Police Officer 80.77% 83.25%*** 78.19% 
Testimony of Defendant’s Friends 44.87% 40.96%*** 48.65% 
Prosecution’s Version of Events 78.54% 81.26%*** 75.92% 
Defense’s Version of Events 54.12% 50.92%*** 57.21% 
Motive Arson 
Testimony of Police Officer 75.28% 76.91%** 73.66% 
Testimony of Insurance Agent 76.18% 78.29%*** 74.10% 
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Testimony of Defendant’s Wife 54.08% 51.50%*** 56.63% 
Testimony of Defendant 54.47% 51.35%*** 57.56% 
Prosecution’s Version of Events 73.12% 75.28%*** 70.98% 
Defense’s Version of Events 61.41% 58.54%*** 64.24% 
Notes: Respondents are considered to find an aspect of the trial believable if they said it was very believable or 
somewhat believable on a five point Likert scale. Stars indicate significant differences in the percentages of 
respondents who found the aspect of the trial believable for black and white defendants. *p<0.1 **p<0.05 
***p<0.01. 
In order to determine whether the differences in perceived credibility of the witnesses and 
case theories account for any of the disparity in conviction rates between white and black 
defendants, the following equations are estimated using linear probability models.  𝐺𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑦' = 𝛼 + 𝛽,𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑡' + 𝛽5𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠' + 𝜖' (2) 
 𝐺𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑦' = 𝛼 + 𝛽,𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑡' + 𝛽5𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠'+ 𝛽:𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑡' ∗ 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠' + 𝜖' (3) 𝐺𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑦' is a dummy variable equal to one for a guilty verdict, 𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑡' is a dummy 
variable equal to one when the defendant is white, 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠' is a vector including 
dummy variables equal to one if the respondent found each witness and theory of the case very 
believable or somewhat believable in the particular case scenario, and 𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑡' ∗𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠' is a vector including interactions between 𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑡' and 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠'. Table 9 contains the regression results for Equation 2, and Table 10 
contains the regression results for Equation 3. 
Table 9. Regression Analyses of Defendant Race and Evidence Believability on Conviction 
Rates 
 Eyewitness Vandalism 
Motive 
Vandalism 
Eyewitness 
Arson 
Motive 
Arson 
White Defendant -0.01 -0.001 0.04*** 0.04*** 
Prosecutor’s Version of Events 0.12*** 0.13*** 0.19*** 0.17*** 
Defense’s Version of Events -0.33*** -0.23*** -0.32*** -0.26*** 
Testimony of Eyewitness 0.13*** — 0.13*** — 
Testimony of Insurance Agent — 0.03 — 0.05*** 
Testimony of Police Officer 0.09*** 0.04** 0.05** 0.07*** 
Testimony of Defendant’s Friends -0.24*** — -0.24*** — 
Testimony of Defendant’s Wife — -0.11*** — -0.10*** 
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Testimony of Defendant — -0.16**** — -0.19*** 
Observations 4,081 3,989 3,989 4,081 
R-squared 0.331 0.273 0.357 0.316 
Notes: Standard ordinary least squares regressions are used. The outcome variable is a dummy variable equal to 
one if the defendant is found guilty. White defendant is a dummy variable equal to one when the defendant is 
white. Each of the other variables is a dummy variable equal to one if the participant rates that aspect of trial very 
believable or somewhat believable on a five point Likert scale. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Table 10. Regression Analyses of Defendant Race, Evidence Believability, and Race-Based 
Weighing of Evidence Believability on Conviction Rates 
 Eyewitness Vandalism 
Motive 
Vandalism 
Eyewitness 
Arson 
Motive 
Arson 
White Defendant 0.03 0.01 -0.04 0.02 
Prosecutor’s Version of Events 0.15*** 0.12*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 
Defense’s Version of Events -0.34*** -0.20*** -0.31*** -0.27*** 
Testimony of Eyewitness 0.14*** — 0.13*** — 
Testimony of Insurance Agent — 0.03 — 0.08*** 
Testimony of Police Officer 0.06** 0.05* 0.04 0.04* 
Testimony of Defendant’s Friends -0.21*** — -0.30*** — 
Testimony of Defendant’s Wife — -0.09** — -0.06 
Testimony of Defendant — -0.20*** — -0.23*** 
White Defendant * Prosecutor’s 
Version of Events -0.07** 0.02 0.05 0.03 
White Defendant * Defense’s Version 
of Events 0.03 -0.05 -0.01 0.02 
White Defendant * Testimony of 
Eyewitness -0.02 — 0.002 — 
White Defendant * Testimony of 
Insurance Agent — 0.02 — -0.02 
White Defendant * Testimony of 
Police Officer 0.06 -0.04 0.02 0.01 
White Defendant * Testimony of 
Defendant’s Friends -0.05 — 0.06 — 
White Defendant * Testimony of 
Defendant’s Wife — -0.04 — -0.09 
White Defendant * Testimony of 
Defendant — 0.08 — 0.07 
Observations 4,081 3,989 3,989 4,081 
R-Squared   0.332   0.274   0.359   0.317 
Notes: Standard ordinary least squares regressions are used. The outcome variable is a dummy variable equal to 
one if the defendant is found guilty. White defendant is a dummy variable equal to one when the defendant is 
white. Each of the other variables is either a dummy variable equal to one if the participant rates that aspect of trial 
very believable or somewhat believable on a five point Likert scale or an interaction of two prior variables. 
Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
The results in Table 9 illustrate that controlling for perceived differences in the credibility 
of the evidence eliminates the significant effect of defendant race on conviction rates in 
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vandalism cases. Some significant effect of defendant race remains in the arson cases. However, 
when interaction effects are included to allow perceived credibility to affect case outcomes 
differently depending on the race of the defendant (see Table 10), defendant race fails to have a 
significant effect in any of the case scenarios. This indicates that the bias against white 
defendants in terms of conviction rates is primarily accounted for by race-based differences in 
perceptions of the evidence and race-based differences in the weight that those perceptions are 
given when deciding whether to convict. It is important to recognize that the evidence does not 
vary based on the race of the defendant, so the different perceptions of the credibility of the 
evidence that account for the differences in conviction rates are entirely race-based. Furthermore, 
it is still possible that pre-existing race-related beliefs also account for some of racial disparities 
in conviction rates. The next Part explores this possibility using the data from the second study. 
C. Pre-Existing Biases 
As illustrated in Figure 1, theory provides three major avenues through which the race of 
the defendant could influence verdict determinations—by affecting the presumption of 
innocence, by affecting perceptions of the evidence presented at trial, and by affecting the 
application of the burden of proof. The results in the previous Part illustrate that race influences 
perceptions of the evidence and weighing of evidence credibility such that controlling for mock 
jurors’ perceptions of the evidence and the interaction between these perceptions and defendant 
race eliminates the significant effect of defendant race on convictions. This Part uses data from 
the second study to examine the influence of pre-existing biases on the presumption of innocence 
and the burden of proof. 
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1. White Defendants Are Presumed Less Innocent Than Black Defendants 
Recall that in the second study participants were asked how likely they thought it was 
that the defendant was guilty before seeing any evidence. Consistent with the conviction and 
evidence credibility results, regardless of the crime charged, respondents believe white 
defendants are significantly more likely to be guilty. The difference in the pre-evidence 
assessments of guilt assigned to black and white defendants is consistently between 6 and 7 
percentage points. Table 11 presents and Figure 4 depicts the presumption of innocence results 
from the second study by defendant race. 
Table 11. Pre-Evidence Assessments of Guilt by Defendant Race 
Case Scenario All Defendants White Defendants Black Defendants 
All Cases 42.01% 45.25%*** 38.92% 
Vandalism 42.73% 45.91%*** 39.66% 
Arson 41.31% 44.59%*** 38.18% 
Notes: Numbers represent average estimates of the defendant’s guilt on a scale from 0 to 100, inclusive, based 
only on a picture of the defendant, the crime charged, and the jury instructions. Stars indicate significant 
differences between the pre-evidence guilt assessments for black and white defendants. *p<0.1 **p<0.05 
***p<0.01. 
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Figure 4. Presumption of Innocence by Defendant Race 
 
As Figure 1 illustrates, these differences in pre-evidence assessments of guilt by 
defendant race could be the result of beliefs about the crime charged—for example, if 
respondents believe that vandalism and arson are crimes committed primarily by white 
defendants; beliefs about the association of race and criminal activity generally—for example, if 
respondents think that white defendants are more prone to committing crime; or beliefs about 
racial biases affecting other aspects of the criminal justice process—for example, if respondents 
believe that police officers or prosecutors exhibit racial bias against black individuals and they 
want to counteract those biases.  
In order to explore these possibilities, the following equations are estimated using linear 
regression models. For these analyses, all of the cases are combined. 
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𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑓𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒' = 𝛼 + 𝛽,𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑡' +𝛽5𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒' + 𝛽:𝐴𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛' +𝛽I𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚' + 𝜖'	 (4) 
 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑓𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒' = 𝛼 + 𝛽,𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑡' +𝛽5𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒' + 𝛽:𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑡' ∗𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒' + 𝛽I𝐴𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛' + 𝛽L𝐴𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛' ∗𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡' + 𝛽M𝐴𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛' ∗𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑡' + 𝛽N𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚' +𝛽O𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚' ∗𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑚𝐽𝑢𝑠𝑡𝐵𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑓𝑠𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡' +𝛽R𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚' ∗ 𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑡' + 𝜖'  
(5) 
 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑓𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒' = 𝛼 + 𝛽,𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑡' +𝛽5𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒' + 𝛽:𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑡' ∗𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒' + 𝛽I𝐴𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛' + 𝛽L𝐴𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛' ∗𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡' + 𝛽M𝐴𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛' ∗𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑡' + 𝛽N𝐴𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛' ∗𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡' ∗ 𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑡' +𝛽O𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚' + 𝛽R𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚' ∗𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑚𝐽𝑢𝑠𝑡𝐵𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑓𝑠𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡' +𝛽,S𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚' ∗ 𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑡' +𝛽,,𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚' ∗𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑚𝐽𝑢𝑠𝑡𝐵𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑓𝑠𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡' ∗𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑡' + 𝜖'  
(6) 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑓𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒' is a variable equal to the respondents’ pre-evidence guilt 
assessment. 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒' is a vector that includes three dummy variables equal to one if 
the respondent said the crime charged, the defendant’s propensity to commit crime, and the 
respondent’s beliefs about the criminal justice system are very or somewhat important on a five 
point Likert scale, respectively. 𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑡' ∗ 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒'	is a vector that 
contains the interactions of 𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑡' and 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒'.	𝐴𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛' is a dummy 
variable equal to one when the crime charged is arson.	𝐴𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛' ∗ 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡' is the 
interaction between 𝐴𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛' and a dummy variable equal to one if the respondent said that the 
crime charged is somewhat or very important. 𝐴𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛' ∗ 𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑡' is the interaction 
between 𝐴𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛' and 𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑡'. 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚' is a variable equal to one if the 
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respondent strongly or somewhat disagrees with the statement that the criminal justice system 
works well in the United States. 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚' ∗ 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑚𝐽𝑢𝑠𝑡𝐵𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑓𝑠𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡' is the 
interaction of 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚' and a dummy variable equal to one if the respondent said that 
their beliefs about the criminal justice system are somewhat or very important. 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚' ∗ 𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑡' is the interaction between 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚' and 𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑡'. Finally, 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚' ∗ 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑚𝐽𝑢𝑠𝑡𝐵𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑓𝑠𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡' ∗𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑡' and 𝐴𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛' ∗ 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡' ∗ 𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑡' are triple-
interactions between 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚', 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝐽𝑢𝑠𝑡𝐵𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑓𝑠𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡', and 𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑡', and 𝐴𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛', 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡', and 𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑡', respectively.  
Of course, it is possible that respondents are not aware of, or do not want to admit, how 
important each of these factors is to their decision; these regressions only capture the conscious, 
reported effect of these various factors. Regression results are presented in Table 12. 
Table 12. Regression Analyses of Defendant Race and Beliefs About the Crime Charged, 
the Defendant’s Propensity to Commit Crime, and the Criminal Justice System on Pre-
Evidence Assessments of Guilt 
 Equation 4 Equation 5 Equation 6 
White Defendant 6.02*** 2.99 5.83** 
Crime Important -0.74 -2.85 -1.64 
Propensity Important 3.74*** 5.77*** 5.70*** 
System Beliefs Important 1.97* 2.22 4.05** 
White Defendant * Crime Important — 4.27** 1.76 
White Defendant * Propensity Important — -4.53** -4.52** 
White Defendant * System Beliefs Important — -0.74 -4.55* 
Distrusts System -6.97*** -11.50*** -9.38*** 
Distrusts System * System Beliefs Important — 0.52 -5.03* 
Distrusts System * White Defendant — 8.98*** 4.53* 
Distrusts System * System Beliefs Important * 
White Defendant — — 11.72*** 
Arson -1.43 -1.65 -0.14 
Arson * Crime Important — -0.02 -2.55 
Arson * White Defendant — 0.40 -2.82 
Arson * Crime Important * White Defendant — — 5.45 
Observations 2,512 2,512 2,512 
R-Squared 0.042 0.052 0.055 
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Notes: Standard ordinary least squares regressions are used. The outcome variable is the respondent’s estimate of 
the defendant’s guilt on a scale from 0 to 100, inclusive, based only on a picture of the defendant, the crime 
charged, and the jury instructions. White defendant is a dummy variable equal to one when the defendant is 
white. Crime Important is a dummy variable equal to one if the respondent said the crime charged is very 
important or somewhat important in determining pre-evidence guilt on a five point Likert scale. Propensity 
important is a dummy variable equal to one if the respondent said the defendant’s propensity to commit crime is 
very important or somewhat important in determining pre-evidence guilt on a five point Likert scale. System 
Beliefs Important is a dummy variable equal to one if the respondent said that their beliefs about the criminal 
justice system are very important or somewhat important in determining pre-evidence guilt on a five point Likert 
scale. Distrusts System is a dummy variable equal to one if the respondent said they strongly or somewhat 
disagree that the justice system works well in the United States on a five point Likert scale. Arson is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the crime charged is arson. The remaining variables are interactions of the prior variables. 
Robust standard errors are used. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
The results suggest that there is a conscious effect of the respondent’s beliefs regarding 
the defendant’s propensity to commit crime and the criminal justice system, but not the crime 
charged. The results also illustrate that these conscious effects fail to account for all of the 
difference in the presumptions of innocence assigned to black and white defendants.  
First, the results in Table 12 indicate that there is no significant impact of the 
respondent’s beliefs about crime charged, suggesting that respondents do not view arson and 
vandalism as crimes that are more or less likely to be committed by white individuals as 
compared to black individuals. However, the results tend toward showing that respondents view 
vandalism and arson as crimes committed more often by white individuals.  
The Equation 4 results show that respondents who said the crime charged is important do 
not assign pre-evidence assessments of guilt that are significantly different from those assigned 
by respondents who said the crime charged is not important. Pre-evidence assessments of guilt 
also do not differ significantly between arson and vandalism cases. Equation 5 allows the effect 
of the importance of the crime charged to differ by the race of the defendant and the crime 
charged. It also allows the effect of the crime charged to differ based on the race of the 
defendant. The results illustrate that the effect of the importance of the crime charged differs 
significantly by the race of the defendant—finding the crime charged important increases the 
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pre-evidence assessment of guilt significantly more when the defendant is white. However, the 
effect of finding the crime charged important is insignificant for both white and black 
defendants. In other words, when the defendant is black, finding the crime charged important 
tends towards decreasing the pre-evidence assessment of guilt (but the effect is not significant), 
and when the defendant is white, finding the crime charged important tends towards increasing 
the pre-evidence assessment of guilt (but the effect is not significant). There are no significant 
effects related to the crime charged in the Equation 6 results, when the effect of defendant race 
on the impact of the importance of the crime charged is allowed to differ by the crime charged. 
Therefore, while there is a suggestion that respondents tend towards viewing arson and 
vandalism as crimes committed more often by white individuals, there is no significant impact of 
beliefs about the crime charged.   
The Crime in the United States Report, published by the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
each year, contains information on the racial composition of arson and vandalism arrests, which 
can shed some light on the validity of respondents’ beliefs. In 2017, there were a total of 842,976 
adult arrests for property crime arson (Federal Bureau of Investigation 2017). Of these, 69.3 
percent were of white individuals and 27.6 percent were of black individuals (Federal Bureau of 
Investigation 2017). That same year, there were 117,599 adult arrests for vandalism (Federal 
Bureau of Investigation 2017). Of these, 68.2 percent were of white individuals and 28 percent 
were of black individuals (Federal Bureau of Investigation 2017). In 2017, white individuals 
made up 76.6 percent of the United States population, and black individuals accounted for 13.4 
percent of the United States population (U.S. Census Bureau d). These numbers illustrate that 
black individuals actually made up a disproportionate amount of arrests for property crime arson 
and vandalism in 2017.  
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However, because black individuals account for a disproportionate number of all arrests, 
it is arguably more illustrative to compare to the racial composition of all arrests rather than the 
racial composition of the population. In 2017, 7,537,750 adult arrests were made (Federal 
Bureau of Investigation 2017). White individuals accounted for 69.5 percent of those arrests, and 
black individuals accounted for 26.6 percent (Federal Bureau of Investigation 2017). Comparing 
these numbers to those for property crime arson and vandalism arrests illustrates that these 
crimes are actually fairly representative in terms of the racial composition of arrests. Therefore, 
respondents may correctly believe that white and black defendants are equally likely to commit 
the crimes of arson and vandalism. It is important to note, however, that there is a clear 
difference between arrests and crimes committed. The racial composition of actual crimes 
committed could be different from that of arrests, as arrests are influenced by victim reporting 
and police behavior.  
The results in Table 12 also illustrate that the respondent’s beliefs regarding the 
defendant’s propensity to commit crime have a significant impact on the presumption of 
innocence. The Equation 4 results illustrate that individuals who think the defendant’s propensity 
to commit crime is important assign significantly higher pre-evidence assessments of guilt than 
those who do not think that the defendant’s propensity to commit crime is important.  
The Equation 5 results, which allow the importance of the defendant’s perceived 
propensity to commit crime to have a different effect based on the race of the defendant, reveal a 
surprising interaction effect. If the defendant is black, respondents who say that the defendant’s 
propensity to commit crime is important give a significantly higher pre-evidence assessment of 
guilt (by about 6 percentage points) than those who say the defendant’s propensity to commit 
crime is not important. However, when the defendant is white, respondents who say that the 
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defendant’s propensity to commit crime is important do not significantly differ in their pre-
evidence assessments of guilt from respondents who say the defendant’s propensity to commit 
crime is not important. This result is surprising, because it works against the overarching 
result—that white defendants are given higher pre-evidence assessments of guilt than black 
defendants. That is, after accounting for the effect of differences in perceived propensity to 
commit crime, the effect of defendant race on the presumption of innocence is even greater, 
suggesting that mock jurors believe black defendants have a higher propensity to commit crime 
than white defendants. No new variables related to the propensity to commit crime are 
introduced in Equation 6, and the results do not meaningfully change. 
Finally, the results in Table 12 illustrate that respondents’ beliefs about the criminal 
justice system contribute to the differences in the presumptions of innocence given to white and 
black defendants. The Equation 4 results illustrate that individuals who say that their beliefs 
about the criminal justice system are very or somewhat important assign significantly higher pre-
evidence assessments of guilt than those who do not, and individuals who distrust the justice 
system assign significantly lower pre-evidence assessments of guilt than those who do not. 
Equation 5 adds interaction effects to allow the importance of the respondent’s beliefs 
about the criminal justice system to have a different effect based on the race of the defendant and 
whether the respondent distrusts the justice system. It also allows the effect of distrusting the 
justice system to differ based on the race of the defendant. The results illustrate that distrusting 
the justice system decreases pre-evidence assessments of guilt significantly more when the 
defendant is black.  
Equation 6 is the most complete specification because it additionally allows the effect of 
distrusting the justice system to differ based on the interaction of the race of the defendant and 
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the importance of justice system beliefs. The results illustrate that white defendants receive 
significantly higher pre-evidence assessments of guilt than black defendants from respondents 
who distrust the justice system: Those who think their opinions about the criminal justice system 
are important predict that white defendants are about 20 percentage points more likely to be 
guilty than black defendants, and those who do not think their criminal justice system beliefs are 
important predict that white defendants are about 10 percentage points more likely to be guilty 
than black defendants. However, the pre-evidence assessments of guilt assigned by respondents 
who do not distrust the justice system—regardless of whether they think their beliefs about the 
criminal justice system are important in assessing guilt pre-trial—do not differ significantly by 
the race of the defendant.   
This suggests that some mock jurors may exhibit a bias against white defendants in order 
to correct for racial biases that they believe occur at other steps in the criminal justice process, a 
form of race-based jury nullification. This could be related to recent increases in media attention 
surrounding violent confrontations between black suspects of nonviolent crimes and police 
officers29 or mock jurors own experiences or the experiences of their friends or family.30 As a 
result of experience or exposure to such media coverage, jurors may believe, before hearing any 
evidence, that a black defendant charged with a nonviolent crime is less likely to be guilty than a 
white defendant.   
Even after controlling for the conscious impact of the respondent’s beliefs about the 
crime charged, the defendant’s propensity to commit crime, and the criminal justice system, 
                                                             
29 For example, in the highly publicized death of Eric Garner, the police approached Mr. Garner, a black man, on 
suspicion that he was selling individual cigarettes from packs without tax stamps and put him in a chokehold for 
about 15 to 19 seconds, resulting in his death (Baker, Goodman, & Mueller 2015). Similarly, the highly publicized 
shooting of Walter Scott occurred after a police officer pulled Mr. Scott over for a non-functioning brake light 
(Swaine 2015).  
30 Research has found that a number of characteristics including race, the level of neighborhood crime, and the 
reported quality of police-citizen encounters are related to trust and confidence in the police (Weitzer & Tuch 2005).  
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there remains a significant effect of defendant race on the presumption of innocence. This could 
be due to the fact that respondents are unconsciously influenced by one of these three factors, or 
it could be the result of an additional, unexplored factor. 
2. Defendant Race Does Not Affect the Burden of Proof 
Pre-existing racial biases may also affect the interpretation of the burden of proof. Recall 
that in the second study mock jurors were asked how sure they would need to be about the 
defendant’s guilt in order to convict. Respondents’ numerical interpretations of the burden of 
proof are not significantly affected by the defendant’s race regardless of the crime charged. 
Table 13 presents and Figure 5 depicts the burden of proof results by defendant race. 
Table 13. Burden of Proof Interpretations by Defendant Race 
Case Scenario All Defendants White Defendants Black Defendants 
All Case Scenarios 80.95% 80.51% 81.37% 
Vandalism  80.53% 81.12% 79.92% 
Arson  81.36% 80.10% 81.61% 
Notes: Numbers represent how sure mock jurors would need to be of the defendant’s guilt, on a scale of 0 to 100, 
inclusive, in order to return a verdict of guilty. Stars indicate significant differences between the numerical 
interpretations of the burden of proof for black and white defendants. *p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01. 
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Figure 5. Burden of Proof by Defendant Race 
 
As illustrated in Figure 1, theory suggests that mock jurors’ conceptualizations of the 
burden of proof may be influenced by their beliefs about the costs of wrongful acquittals, their 
beliefs about the costs of wrongful convictions, and their beliefs about the importance of the 
burden of proof. In order to explore the importance of these factors, the following equations are 
estimated using linear regression models. Again, all of the case scenarios are combined for these 
analyses. 𝐵𝑂𝑃𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛' = 𝛼 + 𝛽,𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑡' + 𝛽5𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒' +𝛽:𝐴𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛' + 𝜖'  (7) 
 𝐵𝑂𝑃𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛' = 𝛼 + 𝛽,𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑡' + 𝛽5𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒' +𝛽:𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑡' ∗ 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒' +𝛽I𝐴𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛' + 𝜖'  (8) 
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𝐵𝑂𝑃𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛' is a variable equal to the respondent’s numerical interpretation of the 
burden of proof. 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒' is a vector that includes three dummy variables equal to 
one if the respondent said the cost of a wrongful conviction, the cost of a wrongful acquittal, and 
whether the prosecutor has met the burden of proof are very important or somewhat important on 
a five point Likert scale, respectively. 𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑡' ∗ 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒'	is a vector that 
contains the interactions of 𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑡' and 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒'. 𝐴𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛' is a dummy 
variable equal to one when the crime charged is arson.  
Of course, it is possible that respondents are not aware of how important these factors are 
to their decision; these regressions will only capture the conscious, reported effects of these 
various factors. Regression results are presented in Table 14. 
Table 14. Regression Analyses of Defendant Race, Perceived Importance of a Wrongful 
Conviction, Perceived Importance of a Wrongful Acquittal, and Perceived Importance of 
the Burden of Proof on Numerical Interpretations of the Burden of Proof 
 Equation 7 Equation 8 
White Defendant -0.54 0.35 
Wrongful Conviction Cost Important 4.48*** 7.22*** 
Wrongful Acquittal Cost Important -1.57 -3.29** 
Burden of Proof Important 20.53*** 19.91*** 
White Defendant * Wrongful Conviction Cost Important — -5.49** 
White Defendant * Wrongful Acquittal Cost Important — 3.47* 
White Defendant * Burden of Proof Important — 1.26 
Arson 0.79 0.75 
Observations 2,512 2,512 
R-Squared 0.154 0.156 
Notes: Standard ordinary least squares regressions are used. The outcome variable is the respondent’s numerical 
interpretation of the burden of proof (i.e., how certain they said they would need to be of the defendant’s guilt in 
order to convict), which is restricted to between 0 and 100, inclusive. White defendant is a dummy variable equal 
to one when the defendant is white. Wrongful Conviction Cost Important is a dummy variable equal to one if the 
respondent said the cost of a wrongful conviction is very important or somewhat important on a five point Likert 
scale. Wrongful Acquittal Cost Important is a dummy variable equal to one if the respondent said the cost of a 
wrongful acquittal is very important or somewhat important on a five point Likert scale. Burden of Proof 
Important is a dummy variable equal to one if the respondent said that whether the prosecutor meets the burden of 
proof is very important or somewhat important on a five point Likert scale. Arson is a dummy variable equal to 
one if the crime charged is arson. The remaining variables are interactions of the prior variables. Robust standard 
errors are used. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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 The Equation 7 results illustrate that, overall, caring about the costs of a wrongful 
conviction is associated with a significantly higher numerical interpretation of the burden of 
proof (by about 4 percentage points) and believing that the burden of proof is important is also 
associated with a significantly higher numerical interpretation of the burden of proof (by about 
21 percentage points).  
The Equation 8 results illustrate that, even though there is not a significant difference in 
the numerical interpretation of the burden of proof based on the race of the defendant, the costs 
of wrongful acquittals and convictions correlate differently with the numerical interpretation of 
the burden of proof based on the race of the defendant. If the defendant is black, viewing the 
possibility of a wrongful conviction as important is associated with a significantly higher 
numerical interpretation of the burden of proof (by about 7 percentage points). If the defendant is 
white, however, viewing a wrongful conviction as important is not significantly associated with 
the numerical interpretation of the burden of proof. If the defendant is black, viewing a wrongful 
acquittal as important is associated with a significantly lower numerical interpretation of the 
burden of proof (by about 3 percentage points). If the defendant is white, however, there is again 
no significant relationship. Caring about whether the prosecutor has met the burden of proof is 
associated with a significantly higher numerical interpretation of the burden of proof, but the 
effect does not differ significantly based on the race of the defendant.  
These results suggest that, in the case of nonviolent property crimes, decisionmakers’ 
race-based concerns about wrongful convictions and acquittals may cancel each other out, 
resulting in no significant differences in interpretations of the burden of proof by the race of the 
defendant.   
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D. Putting It All Together 
Together, the results from the two experimental vignette studies suggest that in the 
context of a trial for a nonviolent property crime, decisionmakers exhibit a bias against white 
defendants when applying the presumption of innocence and when interpreting the evidence 
presented at trial, but not when interpreting the burden of proof. The presumption of innocence 
results are at least partially explained by race-based jury nullification. Controlling for evidence 
credibility and race-based weighing of evidence credibility eliminates the significant effect of 
race on conviction rates. This Part examines whether additionally controlling for the presumption 
of innocence and the burden of proof actually results in black defendants being worse off than 
white defendants or whether the impact of pre-existing racial biases overlaps with the impact of 
case-specific biases. In order to do this, the following equation is estimated using a linear 
probability model and the data from the first study, once for each criminal case scenario. 𝐺𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑦' = 𝛼 + 𝛽,𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑡' + 𝛽5𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠'+ 𝛽:𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑡' ∗ 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠'+ 𝛽I𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑃𝑟𝑒-𝐸𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝐺𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑡' + 𝛽L𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑡'∗ 𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑃𝑟𝑒-𝐸𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝐺𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑡' + 𝛽L𝐸𝑠𝑡𝐵𝑂𝑃𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛'+ 𝛽M𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑡' ∗ 𝐸𝑠𝑡𝐵𝑂𝑃𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛' + 𝜖' (9) 𝐺𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑦', 𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑡', 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠', and 𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑡' ∗𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠' are defined as in Equation 3. 𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑓𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒' is the pre-
evidence guilt assessment that the respondent in the first study would likely have chosen, based 
on their demographic characteristics and the responses in the second study.31 
                                                             
31 Specifically, the predicted pre-evidence assessments of guilt were calculated by estimating an ordinary least 
squares regression of the following form using the data from the second study: 𝑃𝑟𝑒-𝐸𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝐺𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑡' = 𝛼 +𝛽𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑠' + 𝜖, where 𝑃𝑟𝑒-𝐸𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝐺𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑡 is a variable equal to the pre-evidence guilt assessment and 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑠' is a vector that includes dummy variables for being female; being married; having at least a 
bachelor’s degree; being employed; living the Northeast, Midwest, or West; being a democrat or republican; 
attending religious services at least once a month; identifying as black, Asian, another non-white race, or Hispanic; 
living in an urban area; having been the victim of a crime; having served on a jury; having been arrested or 
convicted of a felony or misdemeanor; and strongly or somewhat disagreeing that the justice system in the United 
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𝐸𝑠𝑡𝐵𝑂𝑃𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛'	is the numeric interpretation of the burden of proof that the respondent 
in the first study would likely have chosen, based on their demographic characteristics and the 
responses in the second study.32 𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑡' ∗ 𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑓𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒' is the 
interaction of 𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑡' and 𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑓𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒', and 𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑡' ∗ 𝐸𝑠𝑡𝐵𝑂𝑃𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛' is the interaction between 𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑡' 
and 𝐸𝑠𝑡𝐵𝑂𝑃𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛'. The results are presented in Table 15. 
Table 15. Regression Analyses of Defendant Race, Evidence Believability, Pre-Evidence 
Guilt Assessments, and Burden of Proof Interpretations on Conviction Rates 
 Eyewitness Vandalism 
Motive 
Vandalism 
Eyewitness 
Arson Motive Arson 
White Defendant -1.32 0.74 2.65 -0.51 
Prosecutor’s Version of Events 0.16*** 0.12*** 0.17*** 0.15*** 
Defense’s Version of Events -0.35*** -0.22*** -0.32*** -0.28*** 
Testimony of Eyewitness 0.14*** — 0.12*** — 
Testimony of Insurance Agent — 0.06** — 0.03* 
Testimony of Police Officer 0.05* 0.03 0.05 0.10*** 
Testimony of Defendant’s 
Friends -0.21*** — -0.29*** — 
Testimony of Defendant’s Wife — -0.08* — -0.06 
Testimony of Defendant — -0.19*** — -0.21*** 
White Defendant * Prosecutor’s 
Version of Events -0.09** 0.02 0.04 0.04 
White Defendant * Defense’s 
Version of Events 0.02 -0.06 -0.01 0.01 
White Defendant * Testimony of 
Eyewitness -0.02 — 0.01 — 
White Defendant * Testimony of 
Insurance Agent — -0.07* — 0.02 
White Defendant * Testimony of 
Police Officer 0.07* 0.05 0.04 -0.04 
                                                             
States works well. The same demographic characteristics were then plugged into the resulting estimated equation to 
predict pre-evidence assessments of guilt for respondents in the first study.  
32 Specifically, the predicted burden of proof interpretations were calculated by estimating an ordinary least squares 
regression of the following form using data from the second study: 𝐵𝑂𝑃𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛' = 𝛼 +𝛽𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑠' + 𝜖, where 𝐵𝑂𝑃𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 is a variable equal to the numerical interpretation of the burden 
of proof and 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑠' is a vector that includes dummy variables for being female; being married; having at 
least a bachelor’s degree; being employed; living the Northeast, Midwest, or West; being a democrat or republican; 
attending religious services at least once a month; identifying as black, Asian, another non-white race, or Hispanic; 
living in an urban area; having been the victim of a crime; having served on a jury; having been arrested or 
convicted of a felony or misdemeanor; and strongly or somewhat disagreeing that the justice system in the United 
States works well. The same demographic characteristics were then plugged into the resulting estimated equation to 
predict burden of proof interpretations for respondents in the first study. 
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White Defendant * Testimony of 
Defendant’s Friends -0.06* — 0.04 — 
White Defendant * Testimony of 
Defendant’s Wife — -0.02 — -0.09 
White Defendant * Testimony of 
Defendant — 0.06 — 0.06 
Estimated Pre-Evidence Guilt 
Assessment  -0.01 0.02 0.04** 0.04** 
White Defendant * Estimated 
Pre-Evidence Guilt Assessment 0.002 0.001 -0.03 0.0003 
Estimated Burden of Proof  -0.04*** -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 
White Defendant * Estimated 
Burden of Proof  0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 
Observations 3,653 3,569 3,569 3,653 
R-Squared 0.342 0.297 0.375 0.332 
Notes: Standard ordinary least squares regressions are used. The outcome variable is a dummy variable equal to 
one if the defendant is found guilty. White defendant is a dummy variable equal to one if the defendant is white. 
Prosecutor’s Version of Events, Defense’s Version of Events, and all of the variables beginning with Testimony 
are dummy variables equal to one if the participant rated that aspect of trial very believable or somewhat 
believable on a five point Likert scale. Estimated Pre-Evidence Guilt Assessment is a predicted value of the 
respondent’s pre-evidence assessment of the defendant’s guilt. Estimated Burden of Proof is a predicted value of 
the respondent’s numerical interpretation of the burden of proof. For more information on how these predicted 
values are calculated, see footnotes 31 and 32. The other variables are interactions. Standard errors are clustered 
at the individual level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
The results in Table 15 illustrate that the effects of differences in the presumption of 
innocence and the effects of differences in the credibility and weighing of the evidence are 
overlapping. After controlling for both, there is no significant effect of defendant race on 
conviction rates in any of the four criminal case scenarios.  
Overall, the conviction results illustrate that in the context of trials for nonviolent 
property crimes, white defendants are between 4 and 10 percentage points more likely to be 
convicted. This bias is present among all racial and ethnic subgroups of mock jurors, but it is 
significantly larger among minority mock jurors. There is also evidence that the bias is not 
concentrated solely among mock jurors with characteristics distinct from actual judges and 
jurors.  
Race-based jury nullification explains at least some of the difference in the conviction 
rates of black and white defendants. Defendant race significantly effects perceptions of the 
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credibility of the evidence and pre-evidence assessments of the defendant’s guilt. Specifically, 
mock jurors who distrust the justice system assign a higher presumption of innocence to black 
defendants as compared to white defendants. The next Section will explore the effect of 
defendant race on sentencing.  
VI. White Defendants Are Sentenced More Harshly Than Black Defendants When Mock 
Jurors Are Pooled 
After rendering a verdict, all mock jurors in the first study were asked to assume the role 
of a sentencing judge, assume a jury had found the defendant guilty, and select a nonzero 
sentence for the defendant, regardless of their verdict decision. In vandalism cases, mock jurors 
rendered a sentence between one and five years, inclusive, and in arson cases, mock jurors 
rendered a sentence between one and ten years, inclusive. This Section will examine the impact 
of defendant race on assigned sentence length. 
The motive scenarios result in greater sentences than the eyewitness scenarios, and, 
unsurprisingly, arson cases result in higher sentences than vandalism cases.33 Figures 6 and 7 
display the distribution of sentences in each of the four case scenarios. In all of the case 
scenarios, the distribution is left-skewed, indicating a preference for lighter sentences. In the 
eyewitness vandalism case scenario, around 70 percent of respondents assign the minimum 
sentence of one year. In the motive vandalism case scenario, just over 60 percent of respondents 
assign the minimum sentence of one year. Among mock jurors who found the defendant guilty, 
just over 60 percent return the minimum sentence in the eyewitness vandalism case scenario, and 
about 45 percent return the minimum sentence in the motive vandalism case scenario.  
                                                             
33 Some of this difference could be due to an anchoring effect because the maximum sentence was higher for arson 
than for vandalism (Enough & Mussweiler 2001). Such an anchoring effect is not unique to the experimental 
vignette study context, however, as judges are also exposed to minimum and maximum sentences imposed by 
Congress and sentence recommendations presented by the defense and prosecution. 
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There is significantly more variation in the sentences assigned in arson cases. In the 
eyewitness arson case scenario, just under 25 percent of respondents assign the minimum 
sentence of a year, and the median sentence is two years. In the motive arson case scenario, 
around 16 percent of respondents assign the minimum sentence of a year, and the median 
sentence is 2.9 years. Of the jurors that returned a verdict of guilty, about 14 percent assign the 
minimum sentence in the eyewitness arson case scenario, and about 5 percent assign the 
minimum sentence in the motive arson case scenario. About 68 percent of participants feel 
somewhat confident or very confident in their sentencing decision. 
Figure 6. Distribution of Sentences Assigned in Vandalism Cases 
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Figure 7. Distribution of Sentences Assigned in Arson Cases 
 
Despite the large number of mock jurors who return the minimum sentence, there is a 
significant effect of defendant race on sentence length in arson cases. In the motive arson case 
scenario, white defendants are sentenced to an average of 95 more days in prison than black 
defendants. In the eyewitness arson case scenario, white defendants are sentenced to an average 
of 47 more days in prison than black defendants. Table 16 summarizes sentencing decisions by 
defendant race for each of the case scenarios in the first study. 
Table 16. Sentence Length by Defendant Race 
Case Scenario All Defendants White Defendants Black Defendants 
All Case Scenarios 2.14 2.19*** 2.10 
Eyewitness Vandalism 1.31 1.30 1.32 
Motive Vandalism 1.45 1.47 1.43 
Eyewitness Arson 2.62 2.69** 2.56 
Motive Arson 3.19 3.32*** 3.06 
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Notes: In vandalism cases, participants were restricted to sentences between 1 and 5 years, inclusive; in arson 
cases, participants were restricted to sentences between 1 and 10 years, inclusive. Stars indicate significant 
differences between the average sentences assigned to black and white defendants. *p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01.  
A. Mock Juror Heterogeneity: White Defendants Are Sentenced More Harshly Than Black 
Defendants by Mock Jurors Who Acquitted and Black Defendants Are Sometimes 
Sentenced More Harshly Than White Defendants by Mock Jurors Who Convicted 
The effect of defendant race on verdict determinations differs significantly by the race of 
the mock juror. In order to explore whether the effect of race on sentencing decisions is similarly 
heterogeneous, Table 17 contains the differences in average sentences assigned to white and 
black defendants by mock juror race, ethnicity, and southern residency. Only white mock jurors 
exhibit a significant racial bias in the eyewitness vandalism case scenario, and this bias, though 
only marginally significant, is against black defendants rather than white defendants. Black, 
Hispanic, and southern mock jurors exhibit a significant bias against white defendants in the 
motive vandalism case scenario. White, non-Hispanic, and non-southern mock jurors exhibit a 
bias against white defendants in the eyewitness arson case scenario. Finally, white, Asian, non-
Hispanic, southern, and non-southern mock jurors all exhibit a significant bias against white 
defendants in the motive arson case scenario.  
Table 17. Disparities in Sentences Given to White and Black Defendants by Mock Juror 
Race, Ethnicity, and Residence in the South Census Region 
 All Case Scenarios 
Eyewitness 
Vandalism 
Motive 
Vandalism 
Eyewitness 
Arson 
Motive 
Arson Observations 
White Only 0.08*** -0.04* 0.02 0.15** 0.22*** 12,630 
Black Only 0.18* 0.06 0.19** 0.26 0.35 1,396 
Asian Only 0.13 0.04 0.004 0.13 0.53** 1,012 
Hispanic 0.02 -0.06 0.23** -0.29 0.15 1,268 
Non-Hispanic 0.11*** -0.02 0.03 0.19*** 0.26*** 14,472 
Southern 0.15*** -0.01 0.09** 0.15 0.36*** 6,220 
Not Southern 0.07* -0.02 0.01 0.13* 0.20** 9,920 
Notes: Numbers represent the average sentence for white defendants minus the average sentence for black 
defendants assigned by respondents of the given race, ethnicity, or Census region in the given case scenario. Only 
individuals who report a single race are included in this analysis. Individuals are considered southern if their state 
of residence is in the south Census region and not southern otherwise. *p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01. 
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In order to verify whether racial sentencing disparities differ significantly by the race, 
ethnicity, or southern residency of the mock juror, Equation 10 is estimated for the subgroups of 
mock jurors listed in Table 17.  𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒' = 𝛼 + 𝛽,𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑡' + 𝛽5𝐴𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛' + 𝛽:𝐸𝑦𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠' + 𝜖' (10) 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒' is equal to the sentence assigned by the mock juror, 𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑡' is a dummy 
variable equal to one when the defendant is white, 𝐴𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛' is a dummy variable equal to one 
when the crime charged is arson, and 𝐸𝑦𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠' is a dummy variable equal to one when the 
case scenario involves eyewitness testimony rather than centering around a motive. In order to 
maintain adequate sample sizes, all four case scenarios are pooled for this analysis. Standard 
errors are clustered at the individual level.  
Once these regressions are estimated, the 𝛽, coefficients for related groups of mock 
jurors are tested for equivalency. Unlike conviction rates, sentence disparities do not differ 
significantly by the race of the mock juror. They also do not differ significantly by mock juror 
ethnicity or southern residency.34  
It is also important to determine whether the bias against white defendants in sentencing 
is concentrated among individuals with characteristics distinct from actual judges and jurors. 
Table 18 reports the differences in average sentences given to white and black defendants by 
those with and without the education level and approximate income level of judges, those with 
and without the characteristics most common among seated jurors, and those who have and have 
not previously served on a jury. As before, based on data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ 
Occupational Employment Statistics survey, individuals are considered to have the education 
                                                             
34 Even though the magnitude of the race coefficient is not significantly different based on the race, ethnicity, or 
southern residency of the mock juror, likelihood ratio tests indicate that including mock juror race and southern 
residency (but not mock juror ethnicity) as explanatory variables in Equation 10 does significantly increase the fit of 
the model. 
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level and approximate income level of judges if they have a doctoral or professional degree and 
an income above $75,000 per year (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2018). Based on data from a 
survey administered to seated jurors in four courts by Hannaford-Agor et al. (2003) and the 
demographic characteristics of participants who report prior jury service in this study (presented 
in Table 6), individuals are considered to have the most common characteristics of seated jurors 
if they have at least some college education and are employed.  
Table 18. Disparities in Sentences Given to White and Black Defendants by Judicial and 
Juror Demographics and Prior Jury Service 
 All Case Scenarios 
Eyewitness 
Vandalism 
Motive 
Vandalism 
Eyewitness 
Arson 
Motive 
Arson Observations 
Prior Jury 
Service 0.06 -0.001 0.13** -0.15 0.33* 2,200 
No Prior Jury 
Service 0.10*** -0.02 0.02 0.19*** 0.25*** 13,940 
Characteristics 
Similar to Seated 
Jurors 0.09*** -0.02 0.03 0.11 0.31*** 12,260 
Characteristics 
Distinct from 
Seated Jurors 0.11** 0.004 0.07 0.24** 0.09 3,880 
Education and 
Income Similar 
to a Judge 0.15 0.02 0.12 0.25 0.39 1,186 
Education or 
Income Distinct 
from a Judge 0.09*** -0.02 0.03 0.13** 0.25*** 14,880 
Notes: Numbers represent the average sentence for white defendants minus the average sentence for black 
defendants assigned by respondents with the listed characteristic in the given case scenario. Individuals are 
considered to have education and income similar to a judge if they have a doctoral or professional degree and if 
their income is $75,000 per year or more. Individuals are considered to have characteristics similar to seated 
jurors if they have at least some college education and are employed. Mock jurors who elect not to report their 
income are not included in either the group of mock jurors with education and income similar to judges or the 
group of mock jurors with education and income distinct from judges. *p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01. 
Those with income and education levels similar to judges do not assign significantly 
different sentences based on the race of the defendant. However, as before, the lack of 
significance could be related to reduced sample sizes. In fact, the raw disparities in the average 
sentences assigned to white and black defendants are actually larger in magnitude among those 
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with education and income levels similar to judges. In the motive variations, those who have 
served on a jury exhibit a greater bias against white defendants than those who have not, possibly 
indicating that motive is a more salient issue to prior jurors; in the eyewitness vandalism case 
scenario, the opposite is true. Those with characteristics similar to seated jurors exhibit a greater 
bias against white defendants in the motive arson case scenario but exhibit a smaller bias against 
white defendants in the eyewitness arson case scenario. These results do not provide strong 
evidence that the bias against white defendants in terms of sentencing is concentrated only 
among mock jurors who are dissimilar from judges and actual jurors.   
Finally, it is important to explore whether the effects of defendant race on sentencing 
differ based on the verdict rendered. While it may seem strange to ask mock jurors who acquitted 
the defendant to assign a nonzero prison sentence, this is a situation that many real-world judges 
may face. In a case where a defendant is found guilty by a jury, the judge might think that, had 
the trial been a bench trial, he or she would have acquitted. Nevertheless, if the verdict is 
reasonable, the judge will need to accept the verdict and assign a sentence.  
It is possible, however, that judges assign sentences differently in cases where they 
believe that the defendant is guilty and cases where they would have acquitted the defendant.35 In 
the context of this study, this may translate into defendant race having a different effect on the 
assigned sentence depending on mock jurors’ beliefs about the defendant’s guilt, especially 
given that the burden of proof results indicate mock jurors are more worried about both wrongful 
convictions and wrongful acquittals when the defendant is black.  
                                                             
35 This idea is related to the residual doubt doctrine, which in some cases may allow juries to consider residual doubt 
about the defendant’s guilt in determining whether to impose the death penalty, even after they have found the 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt (Fisher 2012; Koosed 2001).  
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In fact, in all of the case scenarios except eyewitness vandalism and when all of the case 
scenarios are combined, mock jurors who found the defendant not guilty sentence white 
defendants significantly more harshly than black defendants (by 15 days in motive vandalism 
cases, 84 days in eyewitness arson cases, 99 days in motive arson cases, and 37 days when all of 
the case scenarios are combined). Conversely, in the eyewitness variations, mock jurors who 
found the defendant guilty sentence black defendants significantly more harshly than white 
defendants (by 33 days in vandalism cases and 58 days in arson cases). Table 19 contains and 
Figure 8 depicts the racial sentencing disparities by verdict rendered. The next Part will examine 
one mechanism through which race may affect sentence length—recidivism predictions. 
Table 19. Disparities in Sentences Given to White and Black Defendants by Verdict 
Rendered 
 Found Defendant Guilty Found Defendant Not Guilty 
All Case Scenarios -0.06 0.10*** 
Eyewitness Vandalism -0.09* 0.01 
Motive Vandalism -0.04 0.04* 
Eyewitness Arson -0.16* 0.23*** 
Motive Arson -0.04 0.27*** 
Observations 5,782 10,358 
Notes: Numbers represent the average sentence for white defendants minus the average sentence for black 
defendants assigned by respondents who returned the particular verdict. *p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01. 
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Figure 8. Sentence Length by Defendant Race and Verdict Rendered 
 
B. Race-Based Differences in Perceptions About Recidivism Account for Sentencing 
Disparities Among Mock Jurors Who Convicted but Not Among Mock Jurors Who 
Acquitted 
The sentencing results illustrate that white defendants receive significantly longer prison 
sentences than black defendants from mock jurors who acquitted, and black defendants 
sometimes receive significantly longer prison sentences than white defendants from mock jurors 
who convicted. Because decisionmakers are typically given more discretion when assigning a 
sentence than when reaching a verdict, identifying the mechanism through which race is 
impacting sentencing requires sifting through many possible explanations. One such explanation 
 
 
65 
is recidivism predictions. Decisionmakers might believe that defendants of a particular race are 
more likely to reoffend and sentence them to longer prison terms as a result.  
Recall that after sentencing the defendant, participants in the first study were asked to 
rate how likely they thought it was that the defendant would commit a crime in the next five 
years if acquitted. In all of the case scenarios—even the vandalism cases where there was not a 
significant difference in the sentences assigned to black and white defendants—and when all of 
the case scenarios are combined, participants predict that white defendants would commit a 
crime significantly more than they predict black defendants would commit a crime. The largest 
disparity occurs in the eyewitness arson case scenario, where about 41 percent of participants 
predict that white defendants will commit a crime in the next five years if acquitted and only 
about 30 percent of participants predict that black defendants will commit a crime in the next 
five years if acquitted. The smallest disparity occurs in the motive vandalism case scenario 
where about 19 percent of participants predict that white defendants will commit a crime in the 
next five years if acquitted and about 17 percent of participants predict that black defendants will 
commit a crime in the next five years if acquitted. Table 20 summarizes and Figure 9 depicts 
these predictions by defendant race. 
Table 20. Recidivism Predictions by Defendant Race 
Case Scenario All Defendants White Defendants Black Defendants 
All Case Scenarios 25.86% 28.41%*** 23.33% 
Eyewitness Vandalism 29.43% 31.35%*** 27.39% 
Motive Vandalism 17.57% 18.61%* 16.59% 
Eyewitness Arson 35.00% 40.60%*** 29.59% 
Motive Arson 21.44% 22.94%** 19.95% 
Notes: Stars indicate significant differences in the percent of respondents who predict that the defendant is very 
likely or somewhat likely to recidivate in the next five years if acquitted on a five point Likert scale for black 
and white defendants. *p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01. 
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Figure 9. Recidivism Predictions by Defendant Race 
 
While the effect of defendant race on sentencing differs based on the verdict rendered, 
the effect of defendant race on recidivism predictions does not. Among mock jurors who found 
the defendant guilty and mock jurors who found the defendant not guilty, white defendants are 
seen as significantly more likely to reoffend, particularly in the eyewitness arson case scenario. 
Table 21 contains the racial disparities in recidivism predictions by the verdict rendered. 
Table 21. Racial Disparities in the Percent of Mock Jurors Predicting That the Defendant 
Will Recidivate by Verdict Rendered  
 Found Defendant Guilty Found Defendant Not Guilty 
All Case Scenarios 0.03** 0.02*** 
Eyewitness Vandalism 0.02 0.03* 
Motive Vandalism -0.01 0.01 
Eyewitness Arson 0.08*** 0.06*** 
Motive Arson 0.01 0.003 
N 5,782 10,358 
Notes: Numbers represent the difference in the percent of respondents who predict that white defendants are very 
or somewhat likely to reoffend in the next five years if acquitted on a five point Likert scale and the percent of 
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respondents who predict that black defendants are very or somewhat likely to reoffend in the next five years if 
acquitted on a five point Likert scale by verdict rendered. *p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01. 
These results indicate that mock jurors who found the defendant guilty sentence black 
defendants more harshly despite viewing white defendants as more likely to reoffend. They also 
indicate that mock jurors who found the defendant not guilty may sentence white defendants 
more harshly based on a perception that white defendant are more likely to reoffend than black 
defendants. In order to determine how much the racial disparities in sentencing are accounted for 
by the racial disparities in recidivism predictions, the following equations are estimated using 
linear regression models, once for mock jurors who found the defendant guilty and once for 
mock jurors who found the defendant not guilty.  𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒' = 𝛼 + 𝛽,𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑡' + 𝛽5𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑑𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑡' ++𝛽:𝐴𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛' + 𝛽I𝐸𝑦𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠' + 𝜖'  (11) 
 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒' = 𝛼 + 𝛽,𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑡' + 𝛽5𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑑𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑡' +𝛽:𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑡' ∗ 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑑𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑡' + 𝛽I𝐴𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛' +𝛽L𝐸𝑦𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠' + 𝜖'  (12) 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒' is equal to the sentence assigned by the mock juror and 𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑡' is a 
dummy variable equal to one when the defendant is white. 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑑𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑡' is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the respondent predicted that the defendant is very likely or somewhat 
likely to commit a crime in the next five years if acquitted. 𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑡' ∗𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑑𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑡' is the interaction of 𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑡' and 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑑𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑡'. 𝐴𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛' is a dummy variable equal to one when the crime charged is arson, and 𝐸𝑦𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠' is a 
dummy variable equal to one when the case scenario involves eyewitness testimony rather than 
centering around a motive. In order to maintain adequate sample sizes, all four case scenarios are 
pooled for this analysis. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.  
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Table 22 contains the regression results for Equation 11, and Table 23 contains the regression 
results for Equation 12. 
Table 22. Regression Analyses of Defendant Race and Recidivism Predictions on Sentence 
Length by Verdict Rendered 
 Found Defendant Guilty Found Defendant Not Guilty 
White Defendant -0.11** 0.13*** 
Perceived Recidivist 0.64*** 0.62*** 
Arson 1.82*** 1.28*** 
Eyewitness -0.68*** -0.38*** 
Observations 5,782 10,358 
R-Squared 0.260 0.236 
Notes: Standard ordinary least squares regressions are used. The outcome variable is the sentence assigned, 
which is restricted to between one and five years, inclusive, for vandalism cases and between one and ten years, 
inclusive, for arson cases. White defendant is a dummy variable equal to one when the defendant is white. 
Perceived recidivist is a dummy variable equal to one if the participant predicted that the defendant is very likely 
or somewhat likely to commit a crime in the next five years if acquitted on a five point Likert scale. Arson is a 
dummy variable equal to one when the crime charged is arson, and eyewitness is a dummy variable equal to one 
when the case revolves around the testimony of an eyewitness rather than a motive. Standard errors are clustered 
at the individual level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Table 23. Regression Analyses of Defendant Race, Recidivism Predictions, and Race-Based 
Weighing of Recidivism Predictions on Sentence Length by Verdict Rendered 
 Found Defendant Guilty Found Defendant Not Guilty 
White Defendant 0.04 0.14*** 
Perceived Recidivist 0.81*** 0.67*** 
White Defendant * Perceived 
Recidivist -0.30*** -0.11 
Arson 1.82*** 1.28*** 
Eyewitness -0.67*** -0.38*** 
Observations 5,782 10,358 
R-Squared 0.262 0.236 
Notes: Standard ordinary least squares regressions are used. The outcome variable is the sentence assigned, 
which is restricted to between one and five years, inclusive, for vandalism cases and between one and ten years, 
inclusive, for arson cases. White defendant is a dummy variable equal to one when the defendant is white. 
Perceived recidivist is a dummy variable equal to one if the participant predicted that the defendant is very likely 
or somewhat likely to commit a crime in the next five years if acquitted on a five point Likert scale. White 
Defendant * Perceived Recidivist is the interaction of these variables. Arson is a dummy variable equal to one 
when the crime charged is arson, and eyewitness is a dummy variable equal to one when the case revolves 
around the testimony of an eyewitness rather than a motive. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Unsurprisingly, the results in the first column of Table 22 indicate that the bias against 
black defendants by mock jurors who found the defendant guilty becomes larger and more 
significant after controlling for recidivism predictions. Even though these mock jurors view 
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white defendants as more likely to recidivate, they sentence black defendants to longer prison 
terms. The results in the second column are more surprising. Controlling for recidivism 
predictions does not decrease the size or significance of the effect of defendant race among mock 
jurors who found the defendant not guilty; if anything, it increases the size of the effect. This 
means that mock jurors who found the defendant not guilty are sentencing white defendants 
significantly more harshly than black defendants for some reason other than perceiving them as 
more likely to recidivate. 
The results in Table 23, which allow the effect of recidivism predictions on sentence 
length to differ based on the race of the defendant, provide some additional insight. The 
significant effect of defendant race on sentence length among mock jurors who found the 
defendant guilty is accounted for by differences in the weighing of recidivism predictions: These 
mock jurors believe that white defendants are more likely to reoffend, but they sentence black 
defendants to longer prison terms because they punish black defendants for a given perceived 
likelihood of recidivism significantly more harshly than white defendants. This is not the case 
among mock jurors who found the defendant not guilty. Those mock jurors weigh the likelihood 
of recidivism the same regardless of the race of the defendant. 
If mock jurors who found the defendant not guilty are making sentencing decisions in 
order to rehabilitate the defendant, deter future crime, or obtain retribution, the residual bias 
against white defendants in sentencing could be based on a belief that white defendants are more 
blameworthy or a belief that white defendants need to be sentenced to a greater amount of time 
in prison to be properly rehabilitated or deterred. It is also possible that the remaining disparity in 
sentencing represents another form of race-based jury nullification. Participants who found black 
defendants not guilty may believe that those defendants were convicted based on their race. If 
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this is the case, they may sentence these black defendant to less time than they would an equally 
situated white defendant in order to correct for what they perceive to be a racial injustice. This 
study is not able tease out these potential sources of the residual bias, but it is important to note 
that whatever the source of the bias, it—as well as the bias exhibited by mock jurors who found 
the defendant guilty—is entirely race-based; the facts of the case and the background facts about 
the defendant in this experiment do not vary based on the race of the defendant.  
VII. Ruling Out the Attractiveness Alternative 
Recall that participants in the second study were also asked an attractiveness question, 
which was designed to test whether attractiveness could serve as alternative explanation for the 
effects of race discussed above. The percent of respondents who found defendants to be 
attractive and unattractive does not differ significantly by the race of the defendant. Table 24 
presents and Figure 10 illustrates second study participants’ assessments of defendant 
attractiveness and unattractiveness by race. A respondent is coded as having found a defendant 
unattractive if he or she said the defendant was very or somewhat unattractive on a five point 
Likert scale and as having found a defendant attractive if he or she said the defendant was very 
or somewhat attractive on a five point Likert scale.  
Table 24. Perceptions of Defendant Attractiveness by Defendant Race 
 All Defendants White Defendants Black Defendants 
Attractive 37.41% 38.50% 36.30% 
Unattractive 20.65% 20.79% 20.51% 
Notes: Respondents who find the defendant very or somewhat attractive are coded as finding the defendant 
attractive and respondents who find the defendant very or somewhat unattractive are coded as finding the 
defendant unattractive. The differences between white and black defendants are not significant. 
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Figure 10. Perceived Attractiveness by Defendant Race 
 
In order to ensure that differences in defendant attractiveness do not account for the racial 
biases presented above, the following equations are estimated using linear probability and linear 
regression models. 𝐺𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑦' = 𝛼 + 𝛽,𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑡' + 𝛽5𝐴𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛' + 𝛽:𝐸𝑦𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠' + 𝜖' (13) 
 𝐺𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑦' = 𝛼 + 𝛽,𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑡' + 𝛽5𝐴𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛' + 𝛽:𝐸𝑦𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠'+ 𝛽I𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒' + 𝜖' (14) 
 𝐺𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑦' = 𝛼 + 𝛽,𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑡' + 𝛽5𝐴𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛' + 𝛽:𝐸𝑦𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠'+ 𝛽I𝑈𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒' + 𝜖' (15) 
 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒' = 𝛼 + 𝛽,𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑡' + 𝛽5𝐴𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛' + 𝛽:𝐸𝑦𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠' + 𝜖' (16) 
 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒' = 𝛼 + 𝛽,𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑡' + 𝛽5𝐴𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛' + 𝛽:𝐸𝑦𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠' +𝛽I𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒' + 𝜖'  (17) 
 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒' = 𝛼 + 𝛽,𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑡' + 𝛽5𝐴𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛' + 𝛽:𝐸𝑦𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠' +𝛽I𝑈𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒' + 𝜖'  (18) 
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The variables in Equation 13 are defined in the same manner as Equation 1, the variables in 
Equation 16 are defined in the same manner as Equation 10, 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒'	is a variable equal to 
the percent of respondents in the second study that find the defendant somewhat or very 
attractive on a five point Likert scale, and 𝑈𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒' is a variable equal to the percent of 
respondents in the second study that find the defendant somewhat or very unattractive on a five 
point Likert scale.36 The results are presented in Table 25. 
Table 25. Regression Analyses of Defendant Race and Perceived Defendant Attractiveness 
on Case Outcomes 
 Guilt  
Guilt 
Controlling 
for 
Attractive 
Guilt 
Controlling 
for 
Unattractive 
Sentence  
Sentence 
Controlling 
for 
Attractive 
Sentence 
Controlling 
for 
Unattractive 
White 
Defendant 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.11*** 
Arson 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 1.53*** 1.53*** 1.53*** 
Eyewitness 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** -0.35*** -0.33*** -0.32*** 
Attractive — -0.0002 — — 0.007* — 
Unattractive — — 0.0002 — — -0.01* 
Observations 16,140 16,140 16,140 16,140 16,140 16,140 
R-Squared 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.217 0.217 0.217 
Notes: Standard ordinary least squares regressions are used. The outcome variable is either a dummy variable 
equal to one if the defendant is found guilty or the sentence assigned, which is restricted to between one and five 
years, inclusive, for vandalism cases and between one and ten years, inclusive, for arson cases. White defendant 
is a dummy variable equal to one when the defendant is white. Arson is a dummy variable equal to one when the 
crime charged is arson. Eyewitness is a dummy variable equal to one when the case revolves around eyewitness 
testimony rather than a motive. Attractive is a variable equal to the percent of respondents in the second study 
that find the defendant somewhat or very attractive on a five point Likert scale. Unattractive is a variable equal to 
the percent of respondents in the second study that find the defendant somewhat or very unattractive on a five 
point Likert scale. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 Neither attractiveness nor unattractiveness is significantly correlated with conviction 
decisions, and including controls for them does not materially change the magnitude or the 
significance of the effect of defendant race. Attractiveness and unattractiveness are marginally 
                                                             
36 Controlling for attractiveness using the average scores assigned to pictures by a separate sample of respondents in 
this manner is consistent with other beauty literature (Biddle & Hamermesh 1998). This method assumes common 
standards of beauty in the population. Previous papers that have examined this assumption have found it to hold (see 
Hamermesh & Biddle 1994; Hatfield & Sprecher 1986; Biddle & Hamermesh 1998).  
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significantly correlated with sentencing decisions. However, including controls for them does not 
diminish the magnitude or significance of the effect of defendant race. Overall, these results 
confirm that race (rather than attractiveness) is the driving force behind the results presented 
above.  
VIII. Discussion and Conclusion 
The results in this Chapter illustrate that at trials for nonviolent property crimes, white 
defendants are convicted at significantly higher rates than black defendants. This discrepancy is 
at least partially accounted for by a form of race-based jury nullification—mock jurors’ beliefs 
about biases at other stages of the criminal justice system lead them to assign a stronger 
presumption of innocence to black defendants and view the evidence presented against black 
defendants more cautiously. Surprisingly, given the overarching result that white defendants are 
convicted more often than black defendants, mock jurors perceive that black defendants have a 
higher propensity to commit crime generally—the racial bias against white defendants is 
exaggerated by controlling for the importance of perceptions about the defendant’s propensity to 
commit crime.  
The results also illustrate that white defendants are sentenced significantly more harshly 
than black defendants by mock jurors who found the defendant not guilty, and black defendants 
are sometimes sentenced significantly more harshly than white defendants by mock jurors who 
found the defendant guilty. Differential weighing of recidivism predictions explains the bias 
against black defendants exhibited by mock jurors who rendered a guilty verdict: Even though 
these mock jurors view white defendants as more likely to reoffend, they punish black 
defendants significantly more for a given perception of recidivism likelihood. Conversely, the 
bias against white defendants exhibited by mock jurors who found the defendant not guilty 
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remains large and significant after controlling for recidivism predictions. This residual bias could 
be the result of race-based differences in perceived culpability or capacity for rehabilitation. 
Alternatively, it could be the result of more race-based jury nullification if mock jurors who 
found black defendants not guilty assume that those defendants could only have been convicted 
based on racism and sentence them particularly leniently to correct for this perceived injustice.  
In light of the fact that black individuals, particularly young black men, are 
disproportionately represented at every stage of the criminal justice system, these results are 
surprising. However, the apparent discrepancy between nationwide statistics and the results of 
this study can be explained in a number of ways. First, other biases in the system favoring white 
individuals may more than counteract the effect of any conviction or sentence disparities 
disfavoring them. For example, arrests and investigations by police, charging and plea decisions 
by prosecutors, and judicial decisions including setting bail, determining probable cause, and 
ruling on the admissibility of evidence could be influenced by defendant race. The apparent 
discrepancy could also result from the fact that racial disparities in conviction rates and 
sentencing in violent crime cases run in the opposite direction. It is also possible that black 
defendants commit more nonviolent crimes than white defendants (although arrest statistics seem 
to indicate that at least arson and vandalism are fairly race-neutral crimes). Finally, the apparent 
discrepancy could be based on the fact that criminal justice outcomes are heavily influenced by 
variables other than race that are not included in this study and that happen to be highly 
correlated with race, such as socioeconomic status.  
One potential limitation to consider is the external validity of the results. The mock jurors 
did not witness a real trial with all of its nuances or a real in-person defendant, nor did they 
deliberate with others. The existing evidence on the impact of jury deliberations on biases is 
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mixed. Bernard (1979) found white jurors exhibiting bias towards black defendants to be 
uncompromising during deliberations and Kramer, Kerr, and Carroll (1990) found that the 
biasing effect of emotional publicity increased following jury deliberations. Conversely, 
Sommers (2006) found that deliberations reduce bias against black defendants when the jury is 
racially mixed and others (Kerwin & Shaffer 1994, London & Nunez 2000, Ruva et al. 2007) 
have found that the biasing effect of inadmissible information is reduced following deliberations. 
The best evidence that pre-deliberation decisions made by mock jurors are representative of post-
deliberation jury decisions comes from a series of mock jury studies by Davis et al. (1975) that 
compared actual pre-deliberation verdict decisions in criminal cases with the jury verdicts 
reached after deliberations and found that the best way to transform pre-deliberation verdicts to 
post-deliberation verdicts is to predict that any verdict favored by two-thirds of the jurors pre-
deliberation would be returned by a jury post-deliberation and to predict a hung jury if no such 
verdict exists.  
Additionally, mock jurors may behave differently than real world judges. The sample of 
mock jurors with the education and income levels of judges in this study is small, making it hard 
to draw clear conclusions about whether bias among them differed significantly from bias among 
mock jurors as a whole. Moreover, there are ways in which real world judges differ even from 
mock jurors with similar demographic characteristics. For example, judges are repeat players in 
the criminal justice system. As a result, they can compare defendants and facts across cases. 
Nevertheless, there is some evidence that judges generally suffer from similar biases as jurors 
(Guthrie, Rachlinkski & Wistrich 2007; Rachlinski & Johnson 2009; Rachlinkski, Wistrich, & 
Guthrie 2015; Wistrich, Rachlinski, & Guthrie 2015).  
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Even acknowledging these potential limitations, this Chapter is one of the first studies to 
provide evidence about the effect of defendant race on nonviolent criminal case outcomes and 
the first to examine the possible mechanisms through which race could be influencing these case 
outcomes. The results clearly indicate that the effect of defendant race on case outcomes is case-
specific and can vary based on mock juror demographics. In some specifications, strong effects 
of race appeared in all of the case scenarios. Other models revealed that effects can depend on 
either the crime charged, the evidence presented, or both. In the future, experimental vignette 
studies examining the effect of defendant race on case outcomes should use a wider range of 
crimes and types of evidence.  
The fact that jury nullification is at least partially responsible for the effects of defendant 
race on verdict decisions, and may be responsible for the effect of defendant race on sentence 
length among mock jurors who acquitted the defendant, complicates the policy implications of 
the results. There is a hearty debate among legal scholars about the appropriateness of race-based 
jury nullification that corrects for perceived injustices at other stages of the criminal justice 
system (Butler 1997; Leipold 1996). Some scholars argue that it is dangerous to allow race to 
influence case outcomes—no matter the reason (Leipold 1996). Others argue that race-based jury 
nullification has an important role to play in correcting for the very real racial prejudices that 
exist in the criminal justice system, and nonviolent cases are the most appropriate forum (Butler 
1997). While a complete discussion of this debate is beyond the scope if this paper, it is 
important to note that no matter where one comes out on the issue of race-based jury 
nullification, it is clear that the best alternative world is one in which no race-based jury 
nullification is necessary to correct for biases at other stages of the criminal justice system. Not 
only would correcting for racial biases at other stages of the criminal justice system such as 
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policing, charging, and plea bargaining be a good result in and of itself, but this research 
suggests that it could have the additional positive impact of eliminating the effect of race in non-
violent property crime cases by increasing individuals’ faith in the justice system.  
Finally, even though the overarching results illustrate that white defendants are worse off 
in nonviolent property crime cases, some negative black stereotypes are creeping into conviction 
and sentencing decisions (albeit, they are outweighed here by other biases against white 
defendants). Subjects view black defendants as having higher propensities to commit crime, such 
that black defendants receive lower presumptions of innocence from mock jurors who think the 
defendant’s propensity to commit crime is important. Black defendants are also punished more 
severely for a given perceived recidivism likelihood, often receiving significantly longer 
sentences than white defendants from mock jurors who convicted. Both of these effects are 
clearly unconstitutional—neither a defendant’s sentence nor the presumption of innocence 
should be affected by race in this manner. Future research examining whether these effects are 
conscious and whether they can be corrected with things like specialized jury instructions and 
judicial training can help pinpoint the most effective policies to eliminate these biases.  
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CHAPTER TWO: THE EFFECTS OF DEFENDANT DRESS AND SHACKLING ON NONVIOLENT CRIMINAL 
CASE OUTCOMES 
I. Introduction 
It is often presumed that a defendant’s physical appearance at his or her criminal trial or 
sentencing hearing will matter. Lawyers advise clients not only about how to dress, but also 
about things like whether to chew gum and how to interact with family members in the audience 
(Broker & Reddington 2014). Public defender’s offices often provide clients who cannot afford 
formal attire with a suit or dress for court (Bischoff 2018). At times, defendants have even 
petitioned the court for protections related to their physical appearance, relying primarily on Due 
Process guarantees to a fair trial. These guarantees includes the right to be presumed innocent 
and have one’s guilt established by probative evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, and at times, 
the Supreme Court has interpreted this right to give defendants control over their physical 
appearance at trial. In Estelle v. Williams, the Court held that a defendant cannot be forced to 
appear at a jury trial in prison garb,37 and in Deck v. Missouri, the Court held that defendants 
should only be shackled at a jury trial upon a finding by the court that individual 
circumstances—usually a risk of flight or violence—warrant the restraints.38  
Yet the Court’s decisions in this area have not provided clear rules for lower courts to 
apply. Recognizing the difficulty of defining the scope of the presumption of innocence, the 
Court has noted that “the actual impact of a particular practice on the judgment of jurors cannot 
always be fully determined,” and “courts must do the best they can to evaluate the likely effects 
of a particular procedure, based on reason, principle, and common human experience.”39 
                                                             
37 425 U.S. 501 (1976). 
38 544 U.S. 622 (2005).  
39 Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 504 (1976). 
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Unsurprisingly, “reason, principle, and common human experiences” have not always resulted in 
consistent lower court rulings. Courts have divided over how to apply existing precedents to new 
technologies and unique circumstances, and courts remain divided over whether the defendant’s 
rights are the same during proceedings in front of a judge and proceedings before a jury. 
Despite common assumptions about the importance of courtroom appearance, the need 
for a well-founded principle to guide courts in protecting the right to a presumption of innocence, 
and well-established interest in the empirical effects of beauty, relatively little prior research has 
examined the effect of defendant appearance on criminal case outcomes. This Chapter 
contributes to the existing knowledge on appearance discrimination in criminal court using an 
experimental vignette study to examine the effects of clothing and shackling. In the context of a 
nonviolent property crime, the results confirm the Court’s assumptions about jury bias Estelle. 
Certain subgroups of mock jurors convict defendants in institutional garb at higher rates than 
defendants in civilian clothing. The results also provide new information about the effect of the 
defendants’ formality in terms of non-prison attire. Defendants in institutional garb receive 
significantly longer prison sentences than defendants in casual civilian clothing. In contrast, the 
results indicate that shackling usually only affects case outcomes when considered in 
combination with defendant dress. 
The fact that the vast majority of cases are now resolved through plea bargaining40 in no 
way diminishes the importance of studying appearance discrimination at trial and sentencing. 
The bargaining process itself is influenced by the parties’ expectations about what would happen 
at trial, and because defendants have historically received more protections at trial than any other 
                                                             
40 In 2014, 2.6 percent of federally adjudicated defendants received a bench or jury trial (Bureau of Justice Statistics 
2017). In 2009, 2 percent of state felony convictions in the 75 largest counties in the United States resulted from a 
bench or jury trial (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2013). 
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stage of the criminal process, policy changes are likely to occur there first. Additionally, judges 
often retain significant discretion when sentencing defendants who have plead guilty, so the 
sentencing results presented here have implications that reach beyond the small subset of cases 
that proceed to trial. 
II. Legal Background 
The first time that the U.S. Supreme Court spoke on an aspect of defendant appearance 
outside of race was Illinois v. Allen in 1970.41 In that case, a pro se defendant acted in an unruly 
and uncontrollable manner during trial, and the judge had him removed several times, allowing 
the trial to proceed in his absence. On appeal, the defendant challenged his conviction based on 
the Confrontation Clause. While the precise holding of the Court was unrelated to the issue of 
shackling, the Court reasoned that “binding and gagging” the defendant would have been one 
constitutional way that the judge could have dealt with the defendant’s unruliness.42 However, 
the Court also recognized that “[n]o person should be tried while shackled and gagged except as 
a last resort.”43 It justified this dicta by speculating that the restraints would likely bias the jury 
against the defendant, limit the defendant’s ability to assist his counsel, and harm the dignity of 
the courtroom.  
In 1976, the Court applied the logic from Allen in Estelle, a case in which the defendant 
was forced to appear at trial in identifiable prison garb.44 The Court held that defendants can 
never be forced to appear before a jury in identifiable prison clothing because, unlike in the 
shackling context, there is never a compelling state reason for making them do so. Nonetheless, 
                                                             
41 Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970). 
42 Id. at 344. 
43 Id. 
44 Estelle, 425 U.S. 501. 
 
 
81 
in 1986, the Court declined to extend the logic of Estelle to prevent uniformed officers from 
sitting behind the defendant in the front row at a trial. While “[o]ne accused of a crime is entitled 
to have his guilt or innocence determined solely on the basis of evidence introduced at trial … 
[t]his does not mean … that every practice tending to single out the accused from everyone else 
in the courtroom must be struck down.”45 Since there are many reasons for armed guards to be 
present in a courtroom, and the jury would not necessarily associate the uniformed officer with 
the defendant being tried, the Court decided that a showing of actual prejudice was necessary to 
prove a Due Process violation.  
Finally, in 2007, the Court heard a case that directly presented the issue of whether 
indiscriminate shackling of adult criminal defendants is permissible under the Due Process 
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. In Deck, the Court held, “The Constitution 
forbids the use of visible shackles during the penalty phase [of a capital case], as it forbids their 
use during the guilt phase [of any criminal trial], unless that use is justified by an essential state 
interest—such as the interest in the courtroom security—specific to the defendant on trial.”46 The 
Court based this decision on the same three risks discussed in Allen: (1) shackles would 
influence the jury to think that the defendant is dangerous and thereby undermine the 
presumption of innocence, (2) shackles would interfere with the right to effective assistance of 
counsel, and (3) shackles would decrease the dignity of the courtroom. When a court orders 
shackling in front of a jury without adequate justification, the Court held that the “defendant 
need not demonstrate actual prejudice…. The state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the shackling error did not contribute to the verdict obtained.”47  
                                                             
45 Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 567 (1986). 
46 Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 624 (2005). 
47 Id. at 635. 
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Courts have split on the issue of whether the Due Process protections outlined in Deck 
extend to bench trials and other judicial proceedings. The Supreme Courts of Illinois 
(considering shackling in the context of an adjudicatory hearing and sentencing in a juvenile 
case) and California (considering shackling in the context of a preliminary hearing) have applied 
the prohibition on indiscriminate shackling to proceedings before a judge, relying primarily on 
the defendant’s need to communicate with counsel and the potential of the shackles to undermine 
the dignity of the courtroom.48 The highest court of New York (considering shackling in the 
context of a bench trial) has also applied the prohibition to proceedings before a judge, relying 
instead on the potential for judges to be biased against the defendant in the same manner as 
jurors.49 “Judges are human, and the sight of a defendant in restraints may unconsciously 
influence even a judicial factfinder.”50 
Recently, the Ninth Circuit overruled its previous decision declining to extend the 
protection against indiscriminate shackling to proceedings before a judge,51 becoming the first 
federal circuit court to join these state courts.52 In holding that indiscriminate shackling was 
improper at any court proceeding, whether it be in front of a judge or jury, the court relied 
heavily on both the defendant’s right to a presumption of innocence and the dignity of the 
courtroom.53 Regarding the presumption of innocence, the court noted that “[i]t includes the 
perception of any person who may walk into a public courtroom, as well as those of the jury, the 
judge and court personnel. A presumptively innocent defendant has the right to be treated with 
                                                             
48 People v. Fierro, 821 P.2d 1302 (Cal. 1991); In Re Staley, 67 Ill.2d 33 (1977).  
49 People v. Best, 979 N.E.2d 1187 (N.Y. 2012). 
50 Id. at 1189. 
51 United States v. Howard, 480 F.3d 1005, 1012–14 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[A] judge in a pretrial hearing presumably 
will not be prejudiced by seeing the defendants in shackles.”). 
52 United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 859 F.3d 649 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc). 
53 Id. 
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respect and dignity in a public courtroom, not like a bear on a chain.”54 The dissent argued that 
the case should not have been decided because the issue was moot, and, on the merits, since there 
was no jury and no evidence that the restraint was intended to serve as a punishment, the test 
should simply be whether requiring detainees to wear the restraints “is reasonably related to a 
legitimate governmental objective.”55 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and recently vacated 
the Ninth Circuit’s opinion on the basis that the case was moot, leaving the issue of whether 
indiscriminate shackling is valid during judicial proceedings undecided.56  
Prior to the Ninth Circuit’s decision, the Second Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit declined 
to extend the prohibition on indiscriminate shackling to sentencing proceedings before a judge.57 
In reaching their decision, the Second Circuit explicitly stated that judges are not likely to 
experience the same biases as jurors. “We presume that where, as here, the court defers without 
further inquiry to the recommendation of the Marshal’s Service that a defendant be restrained at 
sentencing, the court will not permit the presence of the restraints to affect its sentencing 
decision.”58 The Eleventh Circuit avoided discussing the issue of bias, basing its opinion 
primarily on historical references indicating that the right to be free of restraints is only 
applicable at trial.59 The Ninth Circuit heavily criticized this historical account in Sanchez-
Gomez.60  
 
 
                                                             
54 Id. at 661. 
55 Id. at 683 (Ikuta, J., dissenting). 
56 United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 138 S. Ct. 1532 (2018). 
57 United States v. LaFond, 783 F.3d 1216 (11th Cir. 2015); United States v. Zuber, 118 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 1997). 
58 Zuber, 118 F.3d at 103–105. 
59 LaFond, 783 F.3d 1216. 
60 138 S. Ct. 1532. 
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III. Theoretical Foundations  
As discussed in Chapter One, a number of theorists have developed mathematical models 
to analyze and predict the decisionmaking process of judges and jurors. A judge or juror reaching 
a verdict at trial in a criminal case should begin by presuming that the defendant is innocent. In 
other words, before any evidence is presented, the judge or juror should believe that there is a 
very small probability (approaching zero) that the defendant is guilty.61 As evidence is presented, 
the judge or juror weighs the credibility and sufficiency of the evidence and updates his or her 
belief about the defendant’s likelihood of guilt. A number of mechanisms for this updating 
process have been proposed, perhaps the most widely accepted of which is often referred to as 
the story model (Pennington & Hastie 1991).62 Under this model, jurors assign meaning to trial 
evidence through the development of competing stories (Pennington & Hastie 1991). These 
stories are then judged based on pre-existing world knowledge to eliminate all but the “best” 
story (Pennington & Hastie 1991). 
Whatever the precise mechanism for processing the information presented at trial, the 
judge or juror ultimately applies the jury instructions to their final belief about the likelihood of 
the defendant’s guilt in order to reach a verdict decision. There are two main ways to 
conceptualize the ultimate verdict decision task. First, factfinders may translate the beyond a 
reasonable doubt standard of proof into a concrete percentage of guilt, such as 95 percent. If their 
post-evidence assessment of guilt is above that threshold, they will convict. Otherwise, they will 
not. The burden of proof threshold could be influenced by perceptions of the costs of a wrongful 
                                                             
61 Even absent appearance bias, prior beliefs may stray from zero based on the difficulty of presuming innocence. 
For example, judges or jurors may improperly consider the indictment as evidence of guilt. A similar model of jury 
decisionmaking is discussed and tested in Ostrom et al. (1978).  
62 Alternative models include information integration models, Bayesian models, Poisson models, sequential 
weighting models, and others (Pennington & Hastie 1981).  
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conviction and wrongful acquittal generally, but under this conceptualization, the threshold will 
be consistent across cases absent the influence of bias. Alternatively, the judge or juror may 
reach his or her verdict by directly comparing the costs of a wrongful conviction and wrongful 
acquittal. The weights that they assign to each cost will depend on their post-evidence 
assessment of the defendant’s guilt, and the size of the costs will depend on their personal beliefs 
and interpretations of the legal instructions. Under this conceptualization, the burden of proof 
threshold may vary between cases, even absent bias. This is the conceptualization that best aligns 
with the story model of jury decisionmaking. Under that model, the decisionmaker must decide 
whether the “best” story contains all the attributes necessary for a guilty verdict beyond a 
reasonable doubt (Pennington & Hastie 1991).63 This decision will depend on the 
decisionmakers prior ideas about crime categories, intuition, and interpretation of the legal 
instructions (Cheng 2013; Pennington & Hastie 1991).  
Similar to race, discussed in Chapter One, a judge or juror who is not biased by the 
defendant’s appearance will not allow his or her pre-evidence belief, belief updating, or verdict 
determination to be influenced by the defendant’s appearance. In contrast, a biased judge or juror 
may—consciously or unconsciously—be influenced by the defendant’s appearance in a number 
of ways.  
Before any evidence is presented, a biased judge or juror may allow stereotypes to 
influence his or her belief about the probability of the defendant’s guilt. Whatever the source of 
the stereotype, it will result in different initial probabilities of guilt for different defendants, in 
contravention of the presumption of innocence instruction. A biased judge or juror may also be 
                                                             
63 Alternatively, jurors might convict if they believe that the prosecutor’s story is the most convincing and acquit 
otherwise, failing to consider the burden of proof in a third step. If this is the case, the burden of proof results 
presented here may not correlate with actual verdict decisions. 
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influenced—consciously or unconsciously—by the defendant’s appearance during the 
presentation of evidence. He or she may find certain types of evidence more credible based on 
the defendant’s appearance or weigh the evidence differently. Finally, a biased judge or juror 
may—consciously or unconsciously—allow the defendant’s appearance to affect his or her 
interpretation of the burden of proof. Beyond a reasonable doubt may be a more demanding 
standard for defendants with a certain appearance, or the costs of a wrongful conviction and 
wrongful acquittal may differ based on the defendant’s appearance.  
As Figure 1 illustrates, all of these forms of appearance bias combine to influence 
aggregate differences in verdicts, and they may work in opposite directions. For example, it is 
theoretically possible that judges and jurors associate shackling with a propensity to commit 
crime and exhibit bias against shackled defendants even before viewing any evidence. However, 
judges and jurors may also find the evidence presented against shackled defendants less credible 
because the defendant was incarcerated and had less opportunity to find and present 
countervailing evidence. In this case, if their application of the burden of proof is not influenced 
by shackling, it is theoretically unclear whether shackled defendants will be found guilty more or 
less often than unshackled defendants.  
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Figure 1. Mechanisms Through Which Appearance May Impact Verdict Decisions 
 
Judges and juries exercise much more discretion when assigning sentences than when 
determining guilt or innocence.64 When a sentence is assigned, the defendant has already been 
found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and the goals are to rehabilitate the defendant, deter 
future crime, incapacitate the defendant while he or she is a danger to the community, and obtain 
retribution. The judge or jury will weigh these various goals based on their personal preferences 
and beliefs about the defendant and determine the optimal sentence within the statutorily 
permissible range. In doing so, the judge or jury may consider a wide range of factors, including 
the defendant’s probability of reoffending. Oftentimes, judges are provided with statutory 
                                                             
64 Most sentencing decisions are made by judges, but some sentencing decisions are left to juries, even outside the 
capital murder context. States that allow for jury sentencing in noncapital cases are Arkansas (ARK. CODE ANN. § 
16-97-101), Kentucky (KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.055), Missouri (MO. ANN. STAT. § 557.036), Oklahoma (OKLA. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 926.1), Texas (TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07, § 2), and Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. § 
19.2-295). 
 
 
88 
sentencing guidelines to help them weigh various factors in coming to their decision. Such 
guidelines are typically advisory and can be very complex. 
The wide discretion given to decisionmakers at the sentencing stage makes it legally 
permissible for judges and jurors to consider defendant dress and shackling when assigning a 
sentence.65 For example, a judge or juror may see that a defendant is shackled, assume that this is 
based on a determination by the sheriff’s deputies that the defendant is dangerous, and issue a 
higher sentence in response. A judge or juror may see that a defendant is in casual rather than 
formal attire, assume that this is based on a lack of respect for the court, and issue a higher 
sentence in response. Neither of these sentencing decisions are “biased” in the sense that they are 
unconstitutional. Nevertheless, policymakers may prefer sentences to be based on factors other 
than defendant appearance. For that reason, understanding the effects that defendant dress and 
shackling have on sentencing decisions is important in order to inform policy decisions relating 
to the defendant’s ability to control his or her appearance. 
IV. Existing Literature 
There is almost no existing literature on the effects of defendant dress and shackling, but 
appearance literature generally—especially literature on the effect of beauty—is much more 
common, both in and out of the criminal context. In their seminal paper on beauty, Hamermesh 
and Biddle (1994) find that plain looking people earn less than the good-looking. This effect 
holds for both men and women, and is largely independent of occupation, indicating that it may 
be the result of taste-based employer discrimination—i.e., discrimination stemming from 
                                                             
65 Capital sentencing proceedings are an exception to this rule. In Deck, the Court held that indiscriminate shackling 
was not permissible at the penalty phase of a capital murder trial even though the defendant is no longer presumed 
innocent of the crime, because the need for an accurate and unbiased determination of the appropriateness of the 
death penalty is so critical. 544 U.S. at 632.  
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decisions made by persons deriving disutility from interacting with less attractive individuals 
(Becker 1957). In a related paper, Mobius and Rosenblat (2005) decompose the source of the 
beauty premium in a labor market experiment. They find that attractive workers are more 
confident, and confidence increases wages; for a given level of confidence, attractive workers are 
(wrongly) considered to be more able by employers; and controlling for confidence, attractive 
workers have communication and social skills that raise their wages when they interact with 
employers. Other studies confirm the wage and employment effect of beauty both in the United 
States (Fletcher 2009) and other countries (Galarza & Yamada 2016), as well as specifically for 
private-sector attorneys (Biddle & Hamermesh 1998) and managers (Frieze, Olson, and Russell 
1991).  
Beauty has also been shown to impact happiness (Gupta, Etcoff, & Jaeger 2015; 
Hamermesh & Abrevaya 2013), political elections (Berggren, Jordahl, & Poutvaara 2017; Jones 
& Price 2017; Leigh & Susilo 2009), charitable giving (Cryder, Botti, & Simonyan 2017; Price 
2008), instructor ratings (Hamermesh & Parker 2005), profits (Rule & Ambady 2008), academic 
performance (Hernandez-Julian & Peters 2017), and propensity to commit crime (Mocan & 
Tekin 2010). Hamermesh, Meng, and Zhang (2002) find that women’s spending on beauty-
enhancing goods and services increases their perceived beauty, which in turn impacts their 
wages. Nevertheless, such purchases pay back in earnings no more than 15 percent of total 
expenditures.  
In the criminal context, most experimental studies find that defendant beauty impacts 
guilt (Abwender & Hough 2001; Desantis & Kayson 1997; Efran 1974; Leventhal & Kreate 
1977; MacCoun 1990; Patry 2008) and sentencing (Abwender & Hough 2001; Efran 1974; 
Friend & Vinson 1974; Leventhal & Kreate 1977; Piehl 1977; Sigall & Ostrove 1975; Smith & 
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Hed 1997) decisions. Typically, more attractive defendants are better off, but a meta-analysis by 
Mazzella and Feingold (1994) finds that the effect of beauty on both guilt determinations and 
sentencing is small, and the sentencing effects of beauty differ based on the crime charged. 
Attractive defendants receive less punishment for robbery, rape, and cheating; more punishment 
for negligent homicide; and the same amount of punishment as unattractive defendants for 
swindling. Researchers have also studied other aspects of appearance and found that eyeglasses 
reduce the likelihood of a guilty verdict (Brown, Henriquez, & Groscup 2008), and facial tattoos 
increase the likelihood of a guilty verdict but not the severity of sentencing (Funk & Todorov 
2013). Obesity can also lead to increased perceptions of guilt for female defendants (Schvey et 
al. 2013). 
There are two main ways that attractiveness is measured in the existing literature. The 
first is by presenting a group of individuals (in the experimental context this group is often 
different from the experiment participants) with a picture and asking them to rate attractiveness 
on a Likert scale (Biddle & Hamermesh 1998; Efran 1974; Leventhal & Kreate 1977; MacCoun 
1990; Mobius & Rosenblat 2005; Price 2008; Rule & Ambady 2008). The second, used only in 
the experimental context, involves signaling beauty through a written case description (Friend & 
Vinson 1974). For example, the word “attractive” or “unattractive” might be used to describe the 
defendant in a written description of the case.  
Attire is one aspect of appearance that has been shown to correlate with attractiveness 
(Jacobsen & Berger 1974). It is particularly important to study in the context of the criminal 
justice system, not only because the Supreme Court has singled it out for examination,66 but also 
because it is an aspect of appearance that is often within the control of the defendant. There are 
                                                             
66 Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 504 (1976). 
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two existing studies that directly examine the impact of defendant dress on criminal justice 
outcomes. Fontaine and Kiger (1978) conduct an experimental vignette study in which 
respondents watch a videotape of a first-degree murder trial. When it is the defendant’s turn to 
testify, the video displays a still frame of the defendant in one of four conditions: (1) wearing 
personal clothing (sport coat, tie, and slacks) and not accompanied by an armed guard, (2) 
wearing personal clothing (sport coat, tie, and slacks) and accompanied by an armed guard, (3) 
wearing institutional clothing and not accompanied by an armed guard, or (4) wearing 
institutional clothing and accompanied by an armed guard. Defendants in conditions two and 
three are significantly more likely to be found guilty and are given significantly higher sentences 
than defendants in conditions one and four, indicating some bias against defendants who are 
either in institutional dress or accompanied by an armed guard but no bias against defendants 
who are both in institutional dress and accompanied by an armed guard. The authors explained 
this result by noting participants report feeling most sympathetic towards defendants who are in 
institutional dress and accompanied by an armed guard.  
Jacobsen and Berger (1974) conduct an experimental vignette study in which respondents 
are asked to assign a sentence between one and twenty-five years to a defendant who has been 
convicted of negligent vehicular homicide. Photographs of the same male model are attached to 
each questionnaire. In the “high attractiveness” condition the defendant is dressed in a coat and 
tie, wearing glasses, with his hair neatly combed. In the “low attractiveness” condition he is 
wearing a t-shirt and jeans with his hair combed back in a loose style. The authors also 
manipulate the defendant’s repentance level. They do not find a significant effect of defendant 
appearance on sentence length.  
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Although not the principal subject of their study, Conley, Turnier, and Rose (2000) also 
examine the effect of defendant dress indirectly using an experimental vignette study that varies 
the socioeconomic status and race of the defendant in a videotape of a vandalism trial. Upper-
class defendants wear blue blazers, blue shirts, and striped ties. They testify that they are 
engineering students and live with both parents; their mothers work as physicians and their 
fathers own a business. Lower-class defendants wear khaki pants and open-collared shirts. They 
testify that they work as apprentice mechanics in a tire and muffler shop and live in a trailer park 
with single mothers who work as nurses’ aides in a nursing home. The authors find that 
socioeconomic status does not have a significant effect on determinations of guilt. No previous 
studies have looked at the effects of shackling.  
Additionally, no previous literature has examined how the effect of defendant dress and 
shackling on verdict determinations and sentencing differs based on the demographic 
characteristics of the decisionmaker, but there are some studies that examine how the effect of 
defendant beauty interacts with mock juror characteristics. Abwender and Hough (2001) find 
that female mock jurors treat attractive female defendants more harshly than unattractive female 
defendants, and male mock jurors treat attractive female defendants less harshly than unattractive 
female defendants. Similarly, Dumas and Teste (2006) find that female mock jurors sentence 
attractive male defendants to more jail than unattractive male defendants, and male mock jurors 
do the opposite. In contrast, Sigall and Ostrove (1975) find no differences in the effect of 
defendant attractiveness by mock juror gender, and Nemeth and Sosis (1973) find that a sample 
of working class, conservative mock jurors assigned more severe penalties to convicted 
defendants who are white and unattractive as compared to a wealthier and more liberal sample of 
mock jurors.  
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There is also literature finding effects of juror demographics on case outcomes more 
generally, but the results are sometimes mixed. Mills and Bohannon (1980) find that women 
convict more often than men, with black female mock jurors convicting at the highest rate; jurors 
between the ages of 18 and 25 and jurors between the ages of 50 and 65 convict at the highest 
rates; and the frequency of guilty verdicts decreases with education. Conversely, Baldwin and 
McConville (1980) find no effect of juror age, gender, or social class on verdicts. Culhane, 
Hosch, and Weaver (2004) find that mock jurors who have previously been victims of property 
crimes are more likely to convict a property crime defendant, while mock jurors who have 
previously been victims of violent crimes are not, and Miller et al. (2011) find that mock jurors 
are less likely to convict defendants with their same religion. 
Finally, there are some juror characteristics that, despite not having been empirically 
examined, are often assumed to correspond to juror decisionmaking. Rural jurors are often 
assumed to be more “backwards thinking” than urban jurors (Bassett 2006), and jurors with a 
criminal history are often struck from juries for cause or excluded entirely from jury pools (Kalt 
2003; Salyers 1999). Nevertheless, a study by Binnall (2017) indicates that convicted felons are 
particularly committed to serving as conscientious jurors. Overall, this literature suggests that the 
effects of defendant dress and shackling could differ based on a number of juror demographics. 
V. Study Design 
This Chapter uses data from the same pair of experimental vignette studies as Chapter 
One to examine the impact of defendant dress and the presence or absence of shackles on verdict 
and sentencing decisions in four nonviolent criminal case scenarios. Experimental vignette 
studies are particularly valuable in this context because the Supreme Court has banned the 
indiscriminate use of shackling at jury trials and prohibited the state from forcing defendants to 
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appear at jury trials in institutional clothing.67 Observational data on the outcomes of cases where 
the defendant is in institutional clothing are sparse and endogenously attributable to defendant 
choice to remain in institutional dress. Similarly, observational data on the outcomes of cases 
where the defendant was shackled at trial are likely to suffer from extreme selection bias because 
the sample will contain a gross overrepresentation of cases where the judge made a particularized 
finding about the defendant’s dangerousness or propensity to flee. Even testing the effect of 
formal versus casual clothing choices using real world data would be problematic due to 
selection bias and the number of confounding variables—including socioeconomic status—that 
would have to be controlled for to avoid omitted variables bias. 
The two surveys were designed using Qualtrics technology and run using the mTurk 
platform. In total, 8,070 respondents participated in the first survey, which included two separate 
vignette studies68 and took about fifteen minutes to complete. Participants were only allowed to 
complete the survey once69 and were compensated with $1.50 upon successful completion. All 
subjects were over eighteen, resided within the United States, and spoke English. In general, the 
mTurk sample is younger, more educated, and more likely to be employed than the U.S. 
population. The mTurk sample also has a slight overrepresentation of women, an 
underrepresentation of racial and ethnic minorities, and is more urban than the United States 
population.70  
Additionally, 2,561 individuals participated in a second survey, and they were 
compensated $0.25 for about 2.5 minutes of their time. Again, all of the subjects were over 
                                                             
67 Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622 (2005) (banning indiscriminate shackling of adult criminal defendants); Estelle v. 
Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976) (providing adult defendants the right not to be seen by the jury in prison garb). 
68 The other vignette study, which was not related to this project, involved employee hiring scenarios. 
69 This requirement is easily enforced since each participant must be signed up as an mTurk worker and each worker 
is assigned a unique worker ID. 
70 All of these demographic characteristics are typical of mTurk samples (see Ginther et al. 2014; Hersch & Shinall 
2017). 
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eighteen, resided within the United States, and spoke English. Demographic characteristics of 
this sample are provided in Table 1, alongside those of the first mTurk sample and the U.S. 
population according to the 2016 Census. For the most part, the demographic characteristics of 
the second sample mirror those of the first sample. One notable difference is a more 
representative proportion of Hispanic individuals (bringing the percent closer to that of the U.S. 
population). Additionally, as compared to the first study, a greater percentage of the second 
study respondents live in urban areas, identify as Republican, identify as religious, have prior 
jury experience, and trust the justice system. While these differences are large, they are not a 
major concern. The samples are drawn from the same population of mTurk workers, and they are 
rarely combined for analysis in this Chapter. 
Other researchers have found that mTurk workers are comparable to other validated 
panels (Kuziemko et al. 2015), and have used mTurk samples for research on jury 
decisionmaking in the criminal context (Ingriselli 2015; Ginther et al. 2014), reducing concern 
that mTurk workers give systematically different answers than nationally representative samples. 
Table 1. Subject Demographics 
Characteristic Second mTurk Sample 
First mTurk 
Sample 
U.S. Population 
(2016) 
Female 54.5% 55.3% 51.1% 
Age 35.3 35.4 41.8 
US Native 94.4% 95.0% 86.8% 
Hispanic 12.1% 8.1% 14.4% 
White 79.2% 79.0% 76.4% 
Black 8.5% 8.7% 10.2% 
Asian 6.7% 6.3% 5.4% 
Married 46.6% 41.1% 42.6% 
B.A. or Higher (If 25+) 60.7% 57.7% 31.4% 
Employed 84.9% 82.3% 46.2% 
Median Household Income ($2017) $52,500 $52,500 $58,844 
Urban 39.5% 33.7% 21.8% 
Northeast 17.0% 19.1% 17.7% 
Midwest 19.3% 21.3% 21.5% 
South 42.6% 38.5% 37.3% 
West 20.9% 20.9% 23.4% 
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Democrat 40.2% 43.3% N/A 
Republican 30.5% 22.4% N/A 
Religious  34.7% 23.6% N/A 
Prior Jury Service 16.7% 13.6% N/A 
Criminal History 18.8% 17.0% N/A 
Criminal Victimization 41.9% 41.4% N/A 
Distrusts Justice System 31.9% 44.0% N/A 
Notes: Mean values for the U.S. population are calculated from the 2016 U.S. Census Bureau ACS sample. Age 
is calculated for employed persons only; race values are calculated for individuals who report only a single race. 
Individuals who attend church at least once a month are considered religious. Individuals who have a prior 
criminal conviction or have been arrested are considered to have a criminal history. Individuals are considered to 
distrust the justice system if they strongly disagreed or somewhat disagreed with the statement that the criminal 
justice system works well in the United States. 
 
 In the first survey, as discussed in more detail in Chapter One, each respondent was 
randomly assigned to see either an eyewitness or motive variation of the vandalism scenario, and 
then they saw the opposite variation of the arson scenario. At the beginning of each scenario, 
subjects were prompted that they had been selected to serve as a juror in a criminal trial. Then 
they read a written description of the trial, including witness testimony and attorney arguments. 
Most importantly for this experiment, each scenario was accompanied by a picture of a 
defendant. Pictures of two different white defendants and two different black defendants were 
used. The clothing of the defendant was randomly selected to be either a navy suit and tie 
(formal), jeans and a white t-shirt (casual), or an orange jumpsuit (institutional). In addition, the 
defendant was randomly depicted with or without shackles. The shackles consisted of handcuffs 
and anklecuffs connected by a chain. However, only the handcuffs and the chain going towards 
the floor were visible because the pictures were cut off above the ankles to prevent shoe style 
differences from impacting the results. All of the pictures of the defendants were taken in front 
of the same white wall, and participants were instructed that the picture depicted how the 
defendant appeared in court on the day of trial. No participants saw the same defendant twice. 
Figure 2 contains three example defendant pictures—one where the defendant is wearing formal 
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attire without shackles, one where the defendant is wearing casual attire without shackles, and 
one where the defendant is wearing institutional attire with shackles.  
Figure 2. Example Defendant Photographs 
 
Each scenario concluded with jury instructions about the burden of proof, the standard of 
proof, the presumption of innocence, the elements of the crime charged, and the right to remain 
silent. Respondents were asked to find the defendant either guilty or not guilty, rate their 
confidence in that guilt determination on a five point Likert scale, rate the believability of each 
witness and each party’s version of events on a five point Likert scale, recommend a sentence, 
rate their confidence in the sentence determination on a five point Likert scale, and rate the 
likelihood that the defendant would reoffend in the next five years if acquitted on a five point 
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Likert scale.  The questions were asked in this order on separate screens, and respondents could 
not go back and change a previous answer.  
For the sentencing determination, participants were asked to assume the role of a judge 
and, regardless of their answers to the previous questions, assume the defendant had been found 
guilty. They were told that the defendant’s criminal history consisted of one misdemeanor theft 
conviction as a juvenile, and their answers were restricted to between one and five years 
(inclusive) for vandalism and between one and ten years (inclusive) for arson. To simplify the 
decision, there was not an option to impose a non-incarceration sentence, such as probation. At 
the end of the survey, respondents were asked a variety of demographic questions. A complete 
survey outline is attached as Appendix A. 
The second study, also discussed in more detail in Chapter One, was intended to gauge 
the effect of pre-existing appearance bias—as compared to appearance bias that develops based 
on the presentation of evidence—on the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof (see 
Figure 1). Participants were also asked to rate the attractiveness of the various defendants. More 
specifically, each respondent was presented with one criminal case scenario (either arson or 
vandalism) and then one attractiveness question about a different defendant.  
The criminal case scenario began with a prompt informing the participant that they had 
been selected to serve on a jury in a criminal trial, informing them of the charge, and providing 
them with the jury instructions that they would be asked to apply after hearing the evidence. The 
jury instructions were the same as those used in the first survey. The prompt was accompanied 
by a randomly assigned picture of a defendant. The same pictures were used as in the first 
survey, and participants were instructed that the defendant was pictured as he appeared in court 
on the day of trial.  
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Participants were asked how likely they thought it was that the defendant was guilty, on a 
scale of 0 to 100 percent, before seeing any evidence. They were also asked how important (1) 
the crime charged, (2) the defendant’s propensity to commit crime, and (3) their opinions about 
the criminal justice system were in assessing pre-trial guilt on a five point Likert scale. Then, 
participants were asked how certain they would need to be of the defendant’s guilt, on a scale of 
0 to 100 percent, after hearing the evidence in order to return a guilty verdict. Participants were 
also asked to rate how important (1) fear of a wrongful conviction, (2) fear of a wrongful 
acquittal, and (3) whether the prosecution had met the burden of proof would be in deciding 
whether to convict on a five point Likert scale. 
After the criminal case scenario, participants were asked to rate the attractiveness of a 
different defendant on a five point Likert scale. Like the criminal case scenarios, this question 
included a randomly assigned picture of a defendant. The study concluded with a series of 
demographic questions. A complete survey outline is attached as Appendix B.  
VI. Conviction Results 
A. Appearance Does Not Affect Conviction Rates When Mock Jurors Are Pooled  
With all of the mock jurors pooled together, there are no significant effects of defendant 
dress or shackling on verdict decisions. Table 2 summarizes the conviction rates for each of the 
case scenarios in the first study and illustrates how they differ based on the appearance of the 
defendant. Arson cases result in higher conviction rates than vandalism cases and eyewitness 
variations result in higher conviction rates than motive variations. Eighty percent of participants 
are either somewhat confident or very confident that they have reached the legally correct 
verdict. Among those who convict the defendant, about 84 percent are somewhat or very 
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confident about their decision, significantly more than the approximately 77 percent of 
participants who feel the same after acquitting the defendant.  
T-tests were conducted to determine if conviction rates differ significantly based on the 
presence or absence of shackles alone, Pearson’s chi-squared tests were conducted to determine 
if conviction rates differ significantly based on defendant attire alone, and Pearson’s chi-squared 
tests were also conducted to determine if conviction rates differ significantly between any of the 
six appearance conditions, allowing for shackling and attire to interact.71 There are no 
statistically significant differences, indicating that mock jurors as a whole are not influenced by 
the defendant’s attire or the presence or absence of shackles. Figure 3 illustrates the lack of 
disparity in conviction rates by defendant appearance.  
Table 2. Conviction Rates by Defendant Appearance 
 All Case 
Scenarios 
Eyewitness 
Vandalism 
Motive 
Vandalism 
Eyewitness 
Arson 
Motive 
Arson 
All Defendants 35.82% 34.94% 29.08% 46.30% 33.06% 
Institutional, Shackles 36.61% 35. 11% 30.02% 49.20% 31.71% 
Institutional, No Shackles 36.85% 36.34% 29.01% 45.88% 36.18% 
Casual, Shackles 35.06% 34.88% 27.53% 46.04% 32.36% 
Casual, No Shackles 35.72% 36.88% 27.01% 46.58% 32.32% 
Formal, Shackles 35.62% 32.29% 29.29% 46.50% 33.98% 
Formal, No Shackles 35.11% 34.10% 31.54% 43.43% 32.04% 
Notes: T-tests indicate that conviction rates do not differ significantly based on the presence or absence of 
shackles alone. Pearson’s chi-squared tests indicate that conviction rates do not differ significantly based on the 
defendant’s attire alone and that conviction rates do not differ significantly by the defendant’s appearance 
condition (a combination of attire and shackling). 
                                                             
71 In essence, Pearson’s chi-squared tests determine whether the proportion of respondents returning a verdict of 
guilty are equivalent across the three attire conditions and the six appearance conditions. They are appropriate 
because both variables being examined (in this case verdict and appearance/attire) are categorical, and the 
observations in each appearance group are independent. 
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Figure 3. Conviction Rates by Defendant Appearance 
 
The results from Chapter One illustrate that mock jurors’ verdict determinations are 
influenced by the race of the defendant, but appearance does not affect the conviction rates of 
either white or black defendants when all mock jurors are pooled. Tables 3 and 4 contain 
conviction rates by case scenario and defendant appearance for the subsamples of white and 
black defendants, respectively. Again, T-tests were conducted to determine if conviction rates 
differ significantly based on the presence or absence of shackles alone, Pearson’s chi-squared 
tests were conducted to determine if conviction rates differ significantly based on defendant 
attire alone, and Pearson’s chi-squared tests were conducted to determine if conviction rates 
differ significantly between the six appearance conditions, allowing for shackling and attire to 
interact. There are no significant results.  
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Table 3. Conviction Rates of White Defendants by Defendant Appearance 
 All Case 
Scenarios 
Eyewitness 
Vandalism 
Motive 
Vandalism 
Eyewitness 
Arson 
Motive 
Arson 
All Defendants 39.14% 36.73% 31.54% 51.33% 37.12% 
Institutional, Shackles 40.23% 36.11% 34.20% 55.13% 34.92% 
Institutional, No Shackles 39.56% 35.93% 30.27% 52.32% 40.25% 
Casual, Shackles 38.43% 37.64% 30.21% 48.90% 37.68% 
Casual, No Shackles 39.42% 38.73% 30.65% 50.58% 37.28% 
Formal, Shackles 39.47% 35.23% 33.22% 52.24% 36.42% 
Formal, No Shackles 37.76% 36.51% 31.14% 48.31% 36.47% 
Notes: T-tests indicate that conviction rates do not differ significantly based on the presence or absence of 
shackles alone. Pearson’s chi-squared tests indicate that conviction rates do not differ significantly based on the 
defendant’s attire alone and that conviction rates do not differ significantly by the defendant’s appearance 
condition (a combination of attire and shackling). 
 
Table 4. Conviction Rates of Black Defendants by Defendant Appearance 
 All Case 
Scenarios 
Eyewitness 
Vandalism 
Motive 
Vandalism 
Eyewitness 
Arson 
Motive 
Arson 
All Defendants 32.54% 33.05% 26.76% 41.46% 29.02% 
Institutional, Shackles 33.06% 34.14% 26.19% 43.35% 28.32% 
Institutional, No Shackles 34.20% 36.77% 27.79% 40.06% 32.21% 
Casual, Shackles 31.58% 32.07% 24.69% 43.13% 26.92% 
Casual, No Shackles 31.78% 34.87% 23.51% 42.17% 26.84% 
Formal, Shackles 32.04% 29.06% 26.11% 41.03% 31.86% 
Formal, No Shackles 32.57% 31.40% 31.19% 39.32% 27.88% 
Notes: T-tests indicate that conviction rates do not differ significantly based on the presence or absence of 
shackles alone. Pearson’s chi-squared tests indicate that conviction rates do not differ significantly based on the 
defendant’s attire alone and that conviction rates do not differ significantly by the defendant’s appearance 
condition (a combination of attire and shackling). 
B. Institutional Clothing Can Increase the Odds of Conviction and Casual Clothing Can 
Decrease the Odds of Conviction 
Even though there is no effect of defendant dress or shackling on conviction decisions 
sample-wide, it is possible that certain subgroups of mock jurors are significantly influenced by 
defendant appearance. This could happen if the effects of defendant appearance on certain 
subgroups of mock jurors are cancelled out by opposite effects on other subgroups, diluted due to 
the small size of the subgroup, or both. In Chapter One, previous literature suggested that 
defendant race may have a differential effect on case outcomes based on the race and southern 
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residency of the mock juror. In fact, the effect of defendant race on verdict determinations does 
differ significantly based on the race of the mock juror.  
As discussed above, no previous literature has directly examined how the effect of 
defendant dress and shackling on verdict determinations and sentencing differs based on the 
demographic characteristics of the decisionmaker. Nevertheless, studies examining how the 
effect of defendant beauty interacts with mock juror characteristics and studies examining the 
effect of juror demographics on case outcomes more generally illustrate the potential importance 
of heterogeneity by juror demographics. In order to explore the interaction between mock juror 
characteristics and the effect of defendant appearance on conviction rates, Equation 1 is 
estimated using a linear probability model for subgroups of mock jurors from the first study, 
defined by the demographic characteristics listed below. 𝐺𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑦' = 𝛼 + 𝛽,𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑎𝑙' + 𝛽5𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙' + 𝛽:𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑙𝑒𝑠' + 𝛽I𝐴𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛'+ 𝛽L𝐸𝑦𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠' + 𝜖' (1) 𝐺𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑦' is a dummy variable equal to one if the defendant is convicted. 𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑎𝑙' and 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙' are dummy variables equal to one if the defendant is in casual and institutional 
attire, respectively. Formal attire is the omitted clothing category. 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑙𝑒𝑠' is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the defendant is shackled. 𝐴𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛' is a dummy variable equal to one 
when the crime charged is arson, and 𝐸𝑦𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠' is a dummy variable equal to one when the 
case scenario involves eyewitness testimony rather than centering on a motive. In order to 
maintain adequate sample sizes, all four case scenarios are pooled for this analysis. Standard 
errors are clustered at the individual level.   
The subgroups of mock jurors are: (1) men and women; (2) black-only, white-only, and 
Asian-only; (3) Hispanic and non-Hispanic; (4) those ages 18-24, those ages 25-34, those ages 
35-54, and those ages 55 and up; (5) those with and without a bachelor’s degree; (6) those with 
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an income less than the median of $52,500 per year and those with at least the median income of 
$52,500 per year; (7) urban and nonurban residents; (8) Democrats and Republicans; (9) those 
who attend church at least once and month and those who do not; (10) those with some criminal 
history and those with no criminal history;72 and (11) those who have previously been the victim 
of a crime and those who have not. 
Male mock jurors, Republican mock jurors, religious mock jurors, and mock jurors with 
no criminal history are all significantly influenced by defendant dress: They are more likely to 
convict a defendant in institutional attire as compared to a defendant in formal attire. The effect 
is strongest among Republican mock jurors who are just over 5 percentage points more likely to 
convict defendants in institutional attire than defendants in formal attire. Mock jurors who 
identify as Democrat are not significantly influenced by defendant attire but are about 2 
percentage points less likely to convict a defendant that is shackled as compared to a defendant 
that is not shackled. These results are presented in Table 5. 
Table 5. Regression Analyses of Defendant Dress and Shackling on Conviction Decisions 
Made by Democrat, Republican, Male, and Religious Mock Jurors and Mock Jurors Who 
Have No Criminal History 
 Democrat Republican Male Religious No Criminal History 
Casual 1.36% 2.94% -0.01% 2.78% 0.11% 
Institutional 0.99% 5.25%*** 3.47%** 4.91%** 2.35%** 
Shackles -2.27%** 0.56% 0.02% 0.82% 0.08% 
Arson 7.60%*** 9.26%*** 7.47%*** 7.48%*** 7.58%*** 
Eyewitness 8.23%*** 12.04%*** 8.99%*** 9.18%*** 9.48%*** 
Observations 6,716 3,482 7,216 3,714 13,198 
R-Squared 0.015 0.025 0.016 0.017 0.016 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Standard ordinary least squares regressions are used. The outcome variable is a dummy variable equal 
to one if the defendant is found guilty. Casual and Institutional are dummy variables equal to one if the 
defendant is in that attire. Shackles is a dummy variable equal to one if the defendant is shackled. Arson is a 
dummy variable equal to one if the crime charged is arson, and eyewitness is a dummy variable equal to one 
if the crime centers on the testimony of an eyewitness rather than a motive. Standard errors are clustered at 
the individual level.  
                                                             
72 Individuals who report having a prior misdemeanor or felony conviction or having been arrested are considered to 
have a criminal history.  
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The subgroups of mock jurors that are influenced by defendant dress overlap. Political 
affiliation is significantly correlated with religiosity, and men, Republicans, and those who are 
religious are all less likely to have a criminal history than their counterparts. However, that 
overlap does not mean that the effect of defendant dress is duplicative. In fact, when the sample 
of mock jurors who are male, Republican, religious, and have no criminal history are isolated 
(n=518), the effect of defendant dress is about equal to the sum of all the subgroup effects: 
defendants in formal attire are about 16 percentage points less likely to be found guilty than 
defendants in institutional attire.  
While the rest of the subgroups of mock jurors are not significantly affected by defendant 
dress or shackles alone when making their verdict determinations, it is still possible that they are 
significantly impacted by certain combinations of defendant dress and shackling. In order to 
explore these interaction effects, Equation 2 is estimated using linear probability models for the 
same subgroups of mock jurors listed above: 𝐺𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑦' = 𝛼 + 𝛽,𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛' + 𝛽5𝐴𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛' + 𝛽:𝐸𝑦𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠' + 𝜖' (2) 𝐺𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑦 is a dummy variable equal to one if the defendant is convicted, 𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
is vector of dummy variables equal to one for five of the six appearance conditions; formal attire 
with no shackles is the omitted category. 𝐴𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛 is a dummy variable equal to one when the 
crime charged is arson, and 𝐸𝑦𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 is a dummy variable equal to one when the case 
scenario involves eyewitness testimony rather than centering on a motive. In order to maintain 
adequate sample sizes, all four case scenarios are pooled for this analysis. Standard errors are 
clustered at the individual level.   
 In addition to male mock jurors, Republican mock jurors, religious mock jurors, and 
mock jurors with no criminal history, three additional subgroups are affected by the interaction 
 
 
106 
of defendant dress and shackling when making conviction decisions: black mock jurors, mock 
jurors between the ages of 25 and 34, and mock jurors with some criminal history. Black mock 
jurors are only affected by defendant dress when the defendant is not shackled: They are almost 
10 percentage points more likely to convict defendants in institutional attire without shackles 
than defendants in formal attire without shackles. Mock jurors between the ages of 25 and 34 
convict defendants who are in institutional attire without shackles about 5 percentage points 
more often than defendants in casual attire with shackles, indicating a bias against defendants in 
institutional attire in combination with a preference for defendants in casual attire. Finally, mock 
jurors with a criminal history convict defendants in formal attire without shackles at the highest 
rate. They convict such defendants about 7 percentage points more often than defendants in 
institutional attire with shackles and defendants in casual attire without shackles.73  
Two subgroups of mock jurors that are particularly important to examine are those with 
characteristics similar to actual judges and jurors. Table 6 contains conviction rates by defendant 
appearance for mock jurors who have and have not served on a jury, mock jurors with and 
without the education and income levels of a typical judge, and mock jurors with and without the 
characteristics most common among seated jurors. As in Chapter One, based on data from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Occupational Employment Statistics survey, individuals are 
considered to have the education level and approximate income level of judges if they have a 
doctoral or professional degree and an income of $75,000 per year or more (Bureau of Labor 
Statistics 2018). Based on data from a survey administered to seated jurors in four courts by 
                                                             
73 There are only 352 mock jurors in the first study that report having a prior felony conviction, but these individuals 
represent a particularly interesting subgroup of those with some criminal history as they are automatically excluded 
from jury service in many jurisdictions (Kalt 2003). The subgroup of mock jurors who identify as prior felons 
respond to defendant appearance similarly to the larger group of individuals with some criminal history: They 
convict defendants in formal attire without shackles at the highest rate, significantly more than defendants in 
institutional attire (with or without shackles) and significantly more than defendants in casual attire without 
shackles. 
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Hannaford-Agor et al. (2003) and the demographic characteristics of participants who report 
prior jury service in the first study, individuals are considered to have the most common 
characteristics of seated jurors if they have at least some college education and are employed.  
Table 6. Conviction Rates by Defendant Appearance, Judicial and Juror Demographics, 
and Prior Jury Service 
 
Prior 
Jury 
Service 
No 
Prior 
Jury 
Service 
Characteristics 
Similar to 
Seated Jurors 
Characteristics 
Distinct from 
Seated Jurors 
Education 
and 
Income 
Similar to 
Judges 
Education 
and 
Income 
Distinct 
from 
Judges 
All Defendants 34.45% 36.04% 35.32% 37.42% 32.80% 36.06% 
Institutional, Shackles 38.33% 36.36% 35.76% 39.42% 31.34% 37.03% 
Institutional, No Shackles 33.16% 37.47% 36.47% 38.04% 36.41% 36.85% 
Casual, Shackles 33.24% 35.34% 35.17% 34.71% 37.56% 34.74% 
Casual, No Shackles 32.72% 36.13% 36.09% 34.50% 29.32% 36.19% 
Formal, Shackles 35.13% 35.70% 33.78% 41.20% 32.99% 35.87% 
Formal, No Shackles 34.18% 35.27% 34.64% 36.54% 29.33% 35.66% 
Observations 2,200 13,940 12,260 3,880 1,186 14,880 
Notes: Individuals are considered to have education and income similar to a judge if they have a doctoral or 
professional degree and if their income is $75,000 per year or more. Individuals are considered to have characteristics 
similar to seated jurors if they have at least some college education and are employed. Mock jurors who elect not to 
report their income are not included in either the group of mock jurors with education and income similar to judges or 
the group of mock jurors with education and income distinct from judges. 
At first glance, there are a couple raw differences that are notably large. Mock jurors with 
prior jury service convict defendants in institutional attire and shackles at higher rates than other 
defendants, mock jurors without the most common characteristics of seated jurors convict 
defendants in casual attire less often than other defendants, and mock jurors with education and 
income levels similar to judges seem to be impacted by shackling in a way that differs based on 
the attire of the defendant: Shackles increase the odds of conviction for defendants in formal 
attire and casual attire, and shackles decrease the odds of conviction for defendants in 
institutional attire. In order to test the significance of these raw differences, Equations 1 and 2 are 
estimated using linear probability models for the subgroups of mock jurors displayed in Table 6.  
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Only mock jurors without the common characteristics of seated jurors (i.e., no college 
education, unemployed, or both) are significantly influenced by the appearance of the defendant. 
These mock jurors are about 4 percentage points more likely to convict defendants in formal 
attire than defendants in casual attire. This effect is similar to that experienced by mock jurors 
with some criminal history, who convict defendants in formal attire significantly more often than 
defendants in other attire. However, the two effects are not overlapping. Over 80 percent of 
mock jurors without the most common characteristics of seated jurors have no criminal history.  
Overall, the results in this Part indicate that institutional attire can increase the odds of 
conviction. Men, Republicans, religious mock jurors, and mock jurors with no criminal history 
convict defendants in institutional clothing significantly more often than defendants in formal 
attire, and these effects appear to be additive rather than duplicative. Black mock jurors also 
convict defendants in institutional clothing significantly more often than defendants in formal 
attire when no shackling is involved, and, although the difference does not reach significance, 
mock jurors with prior jury service convict defendants in institutional attire and shackles at the 
highest rate.74 Conversely, those with a criminal history convict defendants in formal attire 
without shackles more often than defendants in casual attire without shackles and defendants in 
institutional attire with shackles. These competing effects help explain why there are no 
significant effects of defendant appearance when all mock jurors are pooled together—some of 
the effects cancel each other out in the aggregate.   
The results in this Part also indicate that casual attire can decrease the odds of conviction. 
Mock jurors between the ages of 25 and 34 convict defendants who are in institutional attire 
                                                             
74 Although it is not possible to know for sure, this lack of significance could be the result of a small sample size. 
Besides the group of mock jurors with education and income levels of judges, the group of mock jurors with prior 
jury service is the smallest subsample in Table 6. 
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without shackles significantly more often than defendants in casual attire with shackles, and 
mock jurors without the common characteristics of seated jurors convict defendants in casual 
attire significantly less often than defendants in formal attire.   
Shackles do not have a clear and consistent effect on conviction decisions. While mock 
jurors who identify as Democrats are significantly less likely to convict defendants in shackles, 
mock jurors with education and income levels similar to judges convict defendants in casual or 
formal attire more often if they are shackled (although the effect is not significant).  
C. Differences in Perceptions of the Evidence Do Not Explain the Conviction Results 
In Chapter One, biased perceptions of the evidence proved to be a significant mechanism 
contributing to differences in conviction rates between black and white defendants. That is not 
the case here. Recall that after rendering a verdict, participants in the first study were asked to 
rate the believability of each witness and each party’s version of events. In most instances, 
Pearson’s chi-squared tests75 detect no statistically significant differences in perceptions of the 
evidence by defendant appearance, indicating that mock jurors are typically not influenced by the 
defendant’s attire or the presence or absence of shackles when assessing the evidence presented 
at trial. However, in the motive vandalism case scenario, the percent of respondents who find the 
testimony of the insurance agent and the testimony of the defendant very believable or somewhat 
believable does differ significantly between the six appearance conditions. Figures 4–7 illustrate 
participants’ assessments of the evidence by defendant appearance for each of the case scenarios.  
                                                             
75 In essence, this statistical test determines whether the proportions of respondents finding the relevant aspect of 
trial somewhat or very believable are equivalent across the six appearance conditions. It is appropriate because both 
variables being examined (in this case believability and appearance) are categorical, and the observations in each 
appearance group are independent. 
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Figure 4. Believability of Eyewitness Vandalism Trial Aspects by Defendant Appearance 
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Figure 5. Believability of Eyewitness Arson Trial Aspects by Defendant Appearance 
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Figure 6. Believability of Motive Vandalism Trial Aspects by Defendant Appearance 
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Figure 7. Believability of Motive Arson Trial Aspects by Defendant Appearance 
 
In order to examine what aspects of appearance drive these significant results, Equations 
3 and 4 are estimated using linear probability models with data from the motive vandalism case 
scenario. 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐵𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒' = 𝛼 + 𝛽,𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑎𝑙' + 𝛽5𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙' +𝛽:𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑙𝑒𝑠' + 𝛽I𝐴𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛' + 𝛽L𝐸𝑦𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠' + 𝜖'  (3) 
 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑡𝐵𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒' = 𝛼 + 𝛽,𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑎𝑙' + 𝛽5𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙' + 𝛽:𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑙𝑒𝑠' +𝛽I𝐴𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛' + 𝛽L𝐸𝑦𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠' + 𝜖'  (4) 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐵𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒' and 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑡𝐵𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒' are dummy variables equal to one if 
the mock juror found the testimony of the insurance agent and the defendant somewhat or very 
believable on a five point Likert scale, respectively. 𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑎𝑙' and 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙' are dummy 
variables equal to one if the defendant is in casual and institutional attire, respectively. Formal 
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attire is the omitted clothing category. 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑙𝑒𝑠' is a dummy variable equal to one if the 
defendant is shackled. 𝐴𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛' is a dummy variable equal to one when the crime charged is 
arson, and 𝐸𝑦𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠' is a dummy variable equal to one when the case scenario involves 
eyewitness testimony rather than centering on a motive. Standard errors are clustered at the 
individual level. The results are presented in Table 7. 
Table 7. Regression Analyses of Defendant Dress and Shackling on the Believability of the 
Insurance Agent’s and the Defendant’s Testimony in Motive Vandalism Cases 
 Insurance Agent Defendant 
Casual 0.40% 6.52%*** 
Institutional 0.47% 4.76%** 
Shackles -1.66% 2.13% 
Observations 3,989 3,989 
R-Squared 0.0004 0.004 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Standard ordinary least squares regressions are used. The outcome variable in column one is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the insurance agent’s testimony was somewhat or very believable on a five point 
Likert scale. The outcome variable in column two is a dummy variable equal to one if the defendant’s 
testimony was somewhat or very believable on a five point Likert scale. Casual and Institutional are dummy 
variables equal to one if the defendant is in that attire. Shackles is a dummy variable equal to one if the 
defendant is shackled. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.  
Defendants in formal attire are significantly less likely to have their testimony believed 
than defendants in either institutional or casual attire. This result runs somewhat counter to the 
results of the previous Part—that defendants in formal attire are typically convicted less often 
than defendants in institutional attire. In the motive vandalism case scenario, the defendant 
testifies that he has an insurance policy, he has $30,000 in credit card debt, he was home with his 
wife on the night of the incident and didn’t commit the crime, and the empty paint cans found in 
his home were from an old home improvement project. The only element of this testimony that is 
different from the motive arson cases is the excuse for the paint cans. Therefore, the negative 
effect of formal attire on defendant believability must either be based on a perception that 
defendants who dress up for trial are not the type of people that would engage in home 
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improvement projects or be crime-specific. For example, mock jurors might think that 
defendants who dress up for trial even though they are only charged with a minor crime like 
vandalism are trying to distract or mislead the jury. Whatever the cause of the difference in 
believability, it is not enough to translate into significant differences in conviction rates. In fact, 
for many subsamples of mock jurors, another effect of defendant appearance, which will be 
discussed in the next Part, outweighs this effect such that defendants in formal attire are 
convicted less often than defendants in institutional attire.  
There are no significant effects of defendant dress or shackling alone on the believability 
of the insurance agent’s testimony in the motive vandalism case scenario, indicating that the 
significant difference detected by the Pearson’s chi-squared test must be the result of an 
interaction between defendant dress and shackling. In order to further explore this result, 
Equation 5 is estimated using a linear probability model with the data from the motive vandalism 
cases. 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐵𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒' = 𝛼 + 𝛽,𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛' + 𝜖' (5) 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐵𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒' is a dummy variable equal to one if the respondent found the 
insurance agent’s testimony very or somewhat believable. 𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛' is vector of 
dummy variables equal to one for five of the six appearance conditions; formal attire with no 
shackles is the omitted category. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. 
Mock jurors are significantly more likely to find the insurance agent’s testimony 
believable when the defendant is in either casual attire without shackles or institutional attire 
with shackles than when the defendant is in institutional attire without shackles, casual attire 
with shackles, or formal attire with shackles. The differences in the probabilities that the 
insurance agent’s testimony will be believed are all around 5–6 percentage points. In the motive 
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vandalism cases, the insurance agent testifies that the defendant owns the company that rents the 
filtration system to the pool and that the defendant has an insurance policy on the filtration 
system. Only the fact that the defendant owns a company that rents pool equipment is unique to 
this case scenario. It is possible that respondents have a harder time believing that defendants 
who could not post bail—as evidenced by wearing shackles or institutional clothing—could own 
a company that rents filtration systems. However, this requires mock jurors to understand and be 
thinking about the bail system, and it does not explain why no such effect exists when the 
defendant is in both intuitional attire and shackles. While there is no way to know for sure with 
the data available, it is possible that defendants in both institutional attire and shackles are rated 
as more believable due to a sympathy effect. Whatever the reason, these differences, like the 
differences in the believability of the defendant, do not translate into significant differences in 
conviction rates. 
D. Defendants in Institutional Clothing Are Often Presumed Less Innocent 
As illustrated by Figure 1, theory provides three possible avenues through which 
defendant appearance could influence verdict determinations—by affecting the presumption of 
innocence, by affecting perceptions of the evidence presented at trial, and by affecting the 
application of the burden of proof. The results from the first study illustrate that defendant 
appearance has no significant effect on conviction decisions when all mock jurors are pooled 
together. However, when subgroups of mock jurors are considered independently, they are 
influenced by defendant dress in two ways: Defendants are often convicted at higher rates when 
they are in institutional clothing as compared to formal clothing, and mock jurors sometimes 
convict defendants in casual clothing less often than other defendants. These subgroup effects of 
defendant dress are not explained by mock jurors’ perceptions of the evidence. If anything, mock 
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jurors’ perceptions of the evidence put defendants in formal attire at a disadvantage relative to 
other defendants. These seemingly conflicting results could be explained by effects of defendant 
appearance on the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof, which are examined in the 
second study.  
Recall that in the second study participants were asked how likely they thought it was 
that the defendant was guilty before seeing any evidence. Pooled together, mock jurors’ pre-
evidence assessments of guilt are not significantly influenced by defendant appearance. Table 8 
presents and Figure 8 depicts these assessments by crime charged and defendant appearance. 
One-way ANOVA tests detect no significant differences in average pre-evidence assessments of 
guilt between the six defendant appearance variations in any case scenario or with all of the cases 
scenarios combined.76  
Table 8. Pre-Evidence Assessments of Guilt by Defendant Appearance 
 All Cases Vandalism Arson 
All Defendants 42.01% 42.73% 41.31% 
Institutional, Shackles 42.03% 44.44% 39.95% 
Institutional, No Shackles 42.11% 43.51% 40.65% 
Casual, Shackles 42.02% 42.42% 41.59% 
Casual, No Shackles 42.68% 41.97% 43.29% 
Formal, Shackles 42.39% 44.05% 40.53% 
Formal, No Shackles 40.67% 39.71% 41.59% 
Notes: Pre-evidence guilt assessments are the probabilities of guilt assigned to the defendant before any evidence 
is presented, restricted to between 0 and 100, inclusive. One-way ANOVA tests indicate that pre-evidence guilt 
assessments do not differ significantly based on defendant appearance (a combination of attire and shackling).  
                                                             
76 In essence, this statistical test determines whether average pre-evidence guilt assessments are equivalent across the 
six appearance conditions. It is appropriate because the dependent variable (in this case pre-evidence assessment of 
guilt) is continuous, the independent variable (in this case appearance) is categorical, and the observations in each 
appearance group are independent. 
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Figure 8. Presumption of Innocence by Defendant Appearance 
 
Even though it does not reach significance, there is a difference of almost 5 percentage 
points between the presumption of innocence applied to defendants in institutional clothing and 
shackles and defendants in formal clothing with no shackles in vandalism cases. In order to 
examine whether this difference helps explain the effects of defendant attire on conviction 
decisions made by certain subgroups of mock jurors, Equation 6 is estimated using a linear 
probability model for male mock jurors, Republican mock jurors, religious mock jurors, and 
mock jurors with no criminal history.  𝑃𝑟𝑒𝐸𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝐺𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑡𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡' = 𝛼 + 𝛽,𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑎𝑙' + 𝛽5𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙' +𝛽:𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑙𝑒𝑠' + 𝛽I𝐴𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛' + 𝜖'  (6) 
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𝑃𝑟𝑒𝐸𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝐺𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑡𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡' is equal to the probability of guilt that the mock juror assigned 
to the defendant prior to seeing any evidence. 𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑎𝑙' and 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙' are dummy variables 
equal to one if the defendant is in casual and institutional attire, respectively. Formal attire is the 
omitted clothing category. 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑙𝑒𝑠' is a dummy variable equal to one if the defendant is 
shackled. 𝐴𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛' is a dummy variable equal to one when the crime charged is arson. In order to 
maintain adequate sample sizes, vandalism and arson cases are pooled for this analysis. Robust 
standard errors are used. The results are presented in Table 9.  
Table 9. Regression Analyses of Defendant Dress and Shackling on Pre-Evidence Guilt 
Assessments of Republican, Male, and Religious Mock Jurors and Mock Jurors with No 
Criminal History 
 Republican Male Religious No Criminal History 
Casual 1.19% 2.16% 1.80% 0.14% 
Institutional 2.98% 4.34%** 2.77% 0.49% 
Shackles 1.85% 1.58% 1.83% 0.27% 
Arson -0.39% -2.09% -1.91% -1.88%* 
Observations 745 1,144 854 2,007 
R-Squared 0.004 0.008 0.005 0.002 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Standard ordinary least squares regressions are used. The outcome variable is the probability of guilt 
assigned to the defendant before any evidence is presented, restricted to between 0 and 100, inclusive. Casual 
and Institutional are dummy variables equal to one if the defendant is in that attire. Shackles is a dummy 
variables equal to one if the defendant is shackled. Arson is a dummy variable equal to one if the crime 
charged is arson. Robust standard errors are used.  
Male mock jurors believe that defendants in institutional attire are about 4 percentage 
points more likely to be guilty than defendants in formal attire before seeing any evidence. While 
the effect of institutional attire relative to formal attire is not significant for the other subgroups, 
it is approaching significance for the subgroups of Republican mock jurors and religious mock 
jurors (with p-values of 0.187 and 0.197, respectively). These groups have a fairly small sample 
size, which may be responsible for the lack of significance. Overall, these results provide some 
evidence that at least some of the same subgroups of mock jurors who convict defendants in 
institutional attire significantly more often than defendants in formal attire also assign defendants 
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in institutional attire significantly higher pre-evidence assessments of guilt than defendants in 
formal attire.  
These results suggest that the source of any bias against defendants in institutional attire 
is pre-existing, rather than being formulated based on perceptions of the evidence at trial. These 
subgroups of mock jurors might perceive defendants in institutional attire as more likely to 
commit crime generally, more likely to commit vandalism and arson specifically, or they might 
see institutional attire as a signal of guilt based on their faith in the justice system—in other 
words, they may believe that only actually guilty defendants will appear at trial in prison garb. In 
order to explore these possibilities, Table 10 contains the differences in the percent of mock 
jurors in these subgroups who say that (1) the defendant’s propensity to commit crime is 
important, (2) the crime charged is important, and (3) their beliefs about the criminal justice 
system are important in assessing the likelihood that the defendant is guilty pre-evidence when 
the defendant is in institutional clothing and formal clothing. 
Table 10. Relative Importance of the Defendant’s Perceived Propensity to Commit Crime, 
the Crime Charged, and the Mock Juror’s Beliefs About the Criminal Justice System to the 
Presumption of Innocence Provided to Defendants in Institutional and Formal Attire by 
Republican, Male, and Religious Mock Jurors and Mock Jurors with No Criminal History 
 Republican Male Religious No Criminal History 
Defendant’s 
Propensity 
4.09% -3.60% -5.44% -5.80%** 
Crime Charged 0.14% 1.26% -3.97% -1.92% 
System Beliefs 11.28%** 8.41%** 4.77% 4.41% 
Observations 478 758 550 1,293 
Notes: Numbers represent the difference in the percent of respondents in the various subgroups who said that 
the defendant’s propensity to commit crime, the crime charged, and their beliefs about the criminal justice 
system are somewhat or very important on a five point Likert scale in assessing pre-evidence guilt when the 
defendant is in institutional and formal clothing. Positive percentages indicate that the factor is more 
important when the defendant is in institutional attire, and negative percentages indicate that the factor is 
more important when the defendant is in formal attire. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 The results suggest that the bias against defendants in institutional attire by Republican 
and male mock jurors may be the result of faith in the justice system. Indeed, male mock jurors 
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are about 9 percentage points less likely to say that they distrust the justice system than female 
mock jurors, and Republican mock jurors are more than 25 percentage points less likely to say 
that they distrust the justice system than those who identify as a Democrat or independent. The 
point estimates for religious mock jurors and mock jurors with no criminal history also suggest 
that they rely on justice system beliefs more when assessing the pre-evidence guilt of defendants 
in institutional attire. However, the differences are not significant. Both of these subgroups also 
rely less on the defendant’s propensity to commit crime when the defendant is in formal attire, 
although the difference is only significant for mock jurors with no criminal history. Considered 
together, the results indicate that the bias exhibited by these subgroups may arise from a 
combination of faith in the justice system and a belief that defendants in formal attire have a 
lower propensity to commit crime.  
The presumption of innocence results help explain why some subgroups of mock jurors 
convict defendants in institutional attire more often than defendants in formal attire, but the 
smaller conviction rates of defendants in casual attire are not explained by either perceptions of 
the evidence or pre-existing beliefs that influence the presumption of innocence. The next Part 
will examine whether these differences can be explained by different interpretations of the 
burden of proof. 
E. Defendants in Casual Clothing Receive a Higher Burden of Proof 
So far, the conviction results have illustrated that subgroups of mock jurors are 
influenced by defendant dress in two ways: Defendants are often worse off in terms of 
conviction rates when they are in institutional clothing as compared to formal clothing, and mock 
jurors sometimes convict defendants in casual clothing less often than other defendants. The 
latter of these differences is not explained by differences in the interpretation of the evidence or 
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differences in the presumption of innocence. This Part explores whether differences in the 
numerical interpretation of the burden of proof explain this finding.  
Recall that in the second study participants were asked how sure they would need to be 
about the defendant’s guilt in order to convict. In arson cases, one-way ANOVA tests indicate 
that mock jurors report needing to be significantly more sure in order to convict defendants in 
casual attire with shackles than defendants in formal attire without shackles.77 Table 11 presents 
and Figure 9 depicts the burden of proof results by defendant appearance. In general, defendants 
in casual attire benefit from the highest burden of proof interpretations, and defendants in formal 
attire encounter the difficulty of the lowest burden of proof interpretations. Even in vandalism 
cases where the effect is insignificant, defendants in casual attire have the first and third highest 
burden of proof interpretations. Defendants in formal attire with no shackles have the lowest 
burden of proof interpretation in arson cases by more than 3 percent (although the difference is 
statistically insignificant), and defendants in formal attire with and without shackles have the 
lowest burden of proof interpretation in vandalism cases.  
Table 11. Burden of Proof Interpretations by Defendant Appearance 
 All Cases Vandalism Arson 
All Defendants 80.95% 80.53% 81.36% 
Institutional, Shackles 81.05% 81.77% 80.41% 
Institutional, No Shackles 81.34% 81.14% 81.54% 
Casual, Shackles 82.81% 81.40% 84.36%ª 
Casual, No Shackles 81.78% 81.97% 81.62% 
Formal, Shackles 79.76% 77.37% 82.42% 
Formal, No Shackles 78.35% 79.19% 77.55%ª 
ª different with p<0.05 
Notes: Burden of proof interpretations (i.e., how sure jurors reported needing to be about the defendant’s guilt to 
return a verdict of guilty) are restricted to between 0 and 100, inclusive. One-way ANOVA tests indicate that the 
difference in the burden of proof applied to defendants in formal clothing with no shackles and defendants in 
casual clothing with shackles in arson cases is significantly different at the 5 percent level. 
                                                             
77 In essence, this statistical test determines whether average numerical interpretation of the burden of proof is 
equivalent across the six appearance conditions. It is appropriate because the dependent variable (in this case 
numerical interpretations of the burden of proof) is continuous, the independent variable (in this case appearance) is 
categorical, and the observations in each appearance group are independent. 
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Figure 9. Burden of Proof by Defendant Appearance 
 
These results help explain why mock jurors sometimes convict defendants in casual 
clothing less often than other defendants—they are applying a higher burden of proof, possibly 
out of a feeling of sympathy for the defendant’s financial situation. As illustrated by Figure 1, 
interpretations of the burden of proof could be influenced by the perceived cost of a wrongful 
conviction, the perceived cost of a wrongful acquittal, and the perceived importance of the 
burden of proof. In order to further investigate the source of the higher burden of proof for 
defendants in casual attire, Table 12 contains the differences in the percent of mock jurors who 
said that (1) the cost of a wrongful conviction, (2) the cost of a wrongful acquittal, and (3) 
whether the prosecutor met the burden of proof would be very or somewhat important on a five 
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point Likert scale in determining whether to convict when the defendant was in casual clothing 
and formal clothing. 
Table 12. Relative Importance of Wrongful Conviction Costs, Wrongful Acquittal Costs, 
and the Burden of Proof to the Burden of Proof Applied to Defendants in Casual and 
Formal Attire 
 All Mock Jurors 
Wrongful Conviction Cost 2.14% 
Wrongful Acquittal Cost 2.92% 
Burden of Proof 0.84% 
Observations 1,649 
Notes: Numbers represent the difference in the percent of respondents who said that the cost of a wrongful 
conviction, the cost of a wrongful acquittal, and whether the prosecutor met the burden of proof would be 
somewhat or very important one a five point Likert scale in rendering a verdict when the defendant is in 
casual and formal clothing. Positive percentages indicate that the factor is more important when the 
defendant is in casual attire, and negative percentages indicate that the factor is more important when the 
defendant is in formal attire. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
None of the differences are significant, indicating that the bias in favor of defendants in 
casual attire is probably not the result of conscious concern about a higher cost of wrongful 
convictions, a lower cost of wrongful acquittals, or enforcing the burden of proof. The direction 
of the coefficients indicate that even if wrongful conviction costs are seen as higher for 
defendants in casual attire, wrongful acquittal costs are also seen as higher for these defendants. 
Therefore, the source of the effect of casual attire on the burden of proof is likely either 
unconscious or unreported. 
In summary, when mock jurors are pooled together, there is no significant effect of 
defendant appearance on conviction decisions, and the effect of defendant dress and shackling 
does not differ based on the race of the defendant. However, when demographic characteristics 
are used to isolate subgroups of mock jurors, important effects of defendant dress emerge. Male 
mock jurors, Republican mock jurors, religious mock jurors, and mock jurors with no criminal 
history all convict defendants in institutional attire at higher rates than defendants in formal 
attire, and these results are not duplicative based on overlapping demographics. Black mock 
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jurors also convict defendants in institutional clothing more often than defendants in formal attire 
when no shackling is involved. For male and republican mock jurors, the bias against defendants 
in institutional attire appears to be related to greater faith in the justice system, and for mock 
jurors with no criminal history, the bias against defendants in institutional attire appears to be 
related to a belief that defendants in formal attire have a lower propensity to commit crime.   
Additionally, some subgroups of mock jurors convict defendants in casual attire less 
often than other defendants. Mock jurors between the ages of 25 and 34 convict defendants who 
are in institutional attire without shackles significantly more often than defendants in casual 
attire with shackles, and mock jurors without the common characteristics of seated jurors convict 
defendants in casual attire significantly less often than defendants in formal attire. This effect 
appears to be related to significant differences in the numerical interpretation of the burden of 
proof—mock jurors see “beyond a reasonable doubt” as a stricter standard in cases where the 
defendant is wearing casual clothing, at least when the crime charged is arson. However, these 
differences in the numerical interpretation of the burden of proof are not correlated with 
differences in reported concerns over the cost of wrongful convictions, the cost of wrongful 
acquittals, or the burden of proof threshold being met.  
Results related to the effect of mock juror criminal history may be of particular interest to 
policymakers since these individuals are often struck from the jury during voir dire or prohibited 
from serving on a jury altogether (Kalt 2003; Salyers 1999). Mock jurors with some criminal 
history convict defendants in formal attire without shackles more often than defendants in 
institutional attire with shackles and defendants in casual attire without shackles. This result 
suggests that defendants in formal attire without shackles are relatively better off and defendants 
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in casual attire without shackles or institutional attire with shackles are relatively worse off in 
jurisdictions that prevent convicted felons from serving on the jury. 
The results based on judge and juror demographics are also of particular importance 
because they shed light on the external validity of the overarching results. Only mock jurors 
without the most common characteristics of seated jurors are significantly influenced by 
defendant appearance (they convict defendants in formal attire more often than defendants in 
casual attire), but it is likely that subgroups of actual judges and jurors, just like subgroups of all 
mock jurors, are susceptible to influence by defendant appearance. The next Section will explore 
whether defendant appearance influences sentencing decisions. 
VII. Casual Attire Decreases Sentence Length and Institutional Attire Increases Sentence 
Length 
After rendering a verdict, all mock jurors in the first study were asked to assume the role 
of a sentencing judge, assume a jury had found the defendant guilty, and select a nonzero 
sentence for the defendant, regardless of their verdict decision. In vandalism cases, mock jurors 
rendered a sentence between one and five years, inclusive, and in arson cases, mock jurors 
rendered a sentence between one and ten years, inclusive. This Section will examine the impact 
of defendant appearance on assigned sentence length. 
The motive scenarios result in greater sentences than the eyewitness scenarios, and, 
unsurprisingly, arson cases result in longer sentences than vandalism cases.78 Figures 10 and 11 
display the distribution of sentences in each of the four case scenarios. As discussed in Chapter 
One, the distribution is left-skewed in all of the case scenarios, indicating a preference for lighter 
                                                             
78 Some of this difference could be due to an anchoring effect because the maximum sentence was higher for arson 
than for vandalism (Enough & Mussweiler 2001). Such an anchoring effect is not unique to the experimental 
vignette study context, however, as judges are also exposed to minimum and maximum sentences imposed by 
Congress and sentence recommendations presented by the defense and prosecution. 
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sentences. In the eyewitness vandalism case scenario, around 70 percent of respondents assign 
the minimum sentence of one year. In the motive vandalism case scenario, just over 60 percent 
of respondents assign the minimum sentence of one year. Among mock jurors who found the 
defendant guilty, just over 60 percent return the minimum sentence in the eyewitness vandalism 
case scenario, and about 45 percent return the minimum sentence in the motive vandalism case 
scenario.  
There is significantly more variation in the sentences assigned in arson cases. In the 
eyewitness arson case scenario, just under 25 percent of respondents assign the minimum 
sentence of a year, and the median sentence is two years. In the motive arson case scenario, 
around 16 percent of respondents assign the minimum sentence of a year, and the median 
sentence is 2.9 years. Of the jurors that return a verdict of guilty, about 14 percent assign the 
minimum sentence in the eyewitness arson case scenario, and about 5 percent assign the 
minimum sentence in the motive arson case scenario. About 68 percent of participants feel 
somewhat confident or very confident in their sentencing decision. 
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Figure 10. Distribution of Sentences Assigned in Vandalism Cases 
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Figure 11. Distribution of Sentences Assigned in Arson Cases 
 
Despite the large number of respondents who return the minimum sentence, there is a 
significant effect of defendant dress on sentence length when all of the case scenarios are pooled 
together: Defendants in casual attire receive significantly lighter sentences (by almost 45 days in 
prison) than defendants in institutional attire. Table 13 contains the average sentences assigned to 
defendants overall and in each of the case scenarios by appearance condition. T-tests were 
conducted to determine if the average sentence differs significantly based on the presence or 
absence of shackles alone, one-way ANOVA tests were conducted to determine if sentences 
differ significantly based on defendant attire alone, and one-way ANOVA tests were also 
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conducted to determine if sentences differ significantly between any of the six appearance 
conditions, allowing for shackling and attire to interact.79  
Table 13. Sentence Length by Defendant Appearance 
 All Case 
Scenarios 
Eyewitness 
Vandalism 
Motive 
Vandalism 
Eyewitness 
Arson 
Motive 
Arson 
All Defendants 2.14 1.31 1.45 2.62 3.19 
Institutional, Shackles 2.20ª 1.32 1.48 2.72 3.20 
Institutional, No Shackles 2.20b 1.36 1.47 2.61 3.36 
Casual, Shackles 2.13 1.29 1.42 2.67 3.18 
Casual, No Shackles 2.04ªb 1.30 1.39 2.49 3.04 
Formal, Shackles 2.14 1.28 1.44 2.56 3.25 
Formal, No Shackles 2.15 1.32 1.47 2.69 3.12 
ª different with p<0.01; b different with p<0.01 
Notes: In vandalism cases, sentences are restricted to between 1 and 5 years, inclusive, and in arson cases 
sentences are restricted to between 1 and 10 years, inclusive. One-way ANOVA tests indicate that the differences 
in sentences given to defendants in casual clothing with no shackles and defendants in formal clothing (with and 
without shackles) are significantly different at the 1 percent level when all case scenarios are pooled. 
The average sentences assigned to defendants in formal attire lie between those assigned 
to defendants in casual attire and those assigned to defendants in institutional attire, indicating 
that there is a benefit to being in casual clothing relative to formal clothing as well as a penalty 
for being in institutional clothing relative to formal clothing. When the effects of clothing and 
shackles are allowed to interact, the casual clothing effect becomes more specific—defendants in 
casual attire without shackles receive significantly lighter sentences (by almost 60 days in 
prison) than defendants in institutional attire (with or without shackles).  
The effect of defendant dress on sentence length is primarily concentrated among white 
defendants. Tables 14 and 15 contain the average sentences assigned to white and black 
defendants by case scenario and defendant appearance. The same t-tests and one-way ANOVA 
tests described above were run for white defendants and black defendants. 
                                                             
79 In essence, one-way ANOVA tests determine whether average sentences are equivalent across the three attire 
conditions and the six appearance conditions. They are appropriate because the dependent variable (in this case 
sentence) is continuous, the independent variables (in this case appearance and attire) are categorical, and the 
observations in each appearance group are independent. 
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Table 14. Sentencing of White Defendants by Defendant Appearance 
 All Case 
Scenarios 
Eyewitness 
Vandalism 
Motive 
Vandalism 
Eyewitness 
Arson 
Motive 
Arson 
All Defendants 2.19 1.30 1.48 2.69 3.32 
Institutional, 
Shackles 2.32ª 1.28 1.52 2.92c 3.36 
Institutional, No 
Shackles 2.28b 1.33 1.50 2.79 3.59 
Casual, Shackles 2.16 1.33 1.43 2.65 3.28 
Casual, No Shackles 2.08ªb 1.30 1.45 2.48c 3.13 
Formal, Shackles 2.15 1.25 1.42 2.57 3.40 
Formal, No 
Shackles 2.16 1.32 1.48 2.78 3.18 
ª different with p<0.01; b different with p<0.05; c different with p<0.05 
Notes: In vandalism cases, sentences are restricted to between 1 and 5 years, inclusive, and in arson cases 
sentences are restricted to between 1 and 10 years, inclusive. One-way ANOVA tests indicate that the difference 
in sentences given to white defendants in casual clothing with no shackles and white defendants in formal 
clothing with shackles is significant at the 1 percent level, and the difference in sentences given to white 
defendants in casual clothing with no shackles and white defendants in formal clothing without shackles is 
significant at the 5 percent level when all case scenarios are pooled. One-way ANOVA tests also indicate that the 
difference in sentences given to white defendants in casual clothing with no shackles and white defendants in 
formal clothing with shackles is significant at the 5 percent level in eyewitness arson cases. 
 
Table 15. Sentencing of Black Defendants by Defendant Appearance 
 All Case 
Scenarios 
Eyewitness 
Vandalism 
Motive 
Vandalism 
Eyewitness 
Arson 
Motive 
Arson 
All Defendants 2.10 1.32 1.43 2.56 3.06 
Institutional, 
Shackles 2.09 1.35 1.44 2.53 3.02 
Institutional, No 
Shackles 2.11 1.39 1.45 2.46 3.14 
Casual, Shackles 2.10 1.26 1.41 2.68 3.08 
Casual, No Shackles 1.99 1.29 1.33 2.51 2.94 
Formal, Shackles 2.13 1.32 1.45 2.56 3.12 
Formal, No 
Shackles 2.14 1.32 1.47 2.62 3.06 
Notes: In vandalism cases, sentences are restricted to between 1 and 5 years, inclusive, and in arson cases 
sentences are restricted to between 1 and 10 years, inclusive. One-way ANOVA tests indicate that the sentences 
assigned to black defendants do not differ significantly based on defendant appearance. 
When the effects of defendant dress are considered alone, white defendants are sentenced 
significantly more harshly when they are in institutional clothing than casual clothing in the 
eyewitness arson case scenario (a difference of about 110 days). Additionally, white defendants 
are sentenced significantly more harshly when they are in institutional clothing than casual or 
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formal attire when all of the cases are pooled together: White defendants in casual attire receive 
an average sentence about 66 days shorter than white defendants in institutional attire, and white 
defendants in formal attire receive an average sentence about 52 days shorter than white 
defendants in institutional attire. When the effects of dress and shackling are allowed to interact, 
only the differences in sentences given to white defendants in casual attire without shackles and 
white defendants in institutional attire (with or without shackles) remain significant.  
When the effects of defendant dress are considered alone, black defendants are also 
sentenced significantly more harshly when they are in institutional clothing than casual clothing 
in the eyewitness vandalism case scenario (by about 37 days). However, the effect is only 
present in that one case scenario, and the effect goes away when the effects of clothing and 
shackling are allowed to interact. These results illustrate that white defendants receive the 
shortest sentences when they are in casual clothing and the longest sentences when they are in 
institutional clothing, and black defendants’ sentences are rarely influenced by their attire.  
A. The Sentencing Results are Robust Among Important Subgroups of Mock Jurors 
Recall that after rendering a verdict, all mock jurors in the first study were asked to 
assume the role of a sentencing judge, assume a jury had found the defendant guilty, and select a 
nonzero sentence for the defendant, regardless of their verdict decision. As strange as it may 
seem to sentence a defendant after finding him not guilty, this is a situation that many real-world 
judges may face. In a case where a defendant is found guilty by a jury, the judge might think 
that, had the trial been a bench trial, he or she would have acquitted. Nevertheless, if the verdict 
is reasonable, the judge will need to accept the verdict and assign a sentence.  
It is possible, however, that judges assign sentences differently in cases where they 
believe that the defendant is guilty and cases where they would have acquitted the defendant. In 
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the context of this study, this would equate to defendant appearance having a different effect on 
the assigned sentence depending on whether the mock juror chose to convict.  
In order to examine this possibility, Equations 7 and 8 are estimated for the subsamples 
of mock jurors that found the defendant guilty and not guilty using linear regression models. 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒' = 𝛼 + 𝛽,𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑎𝑙' + 𝛽5𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙' + 𝛽:𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑙𝑒𝑠' + 𝛽I𝐴𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛' +𝛽L𝐸𝑦𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠' + 𝜖'  (7) 
 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒' = 𝛼 + 𝛽,𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛' + 𝛽5𝐴𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛' + 𝛽:𝐸𝑦𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠' + 𝜖' (8) 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒' is equal to the sentence assigned. 𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑎𝑙' and 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙' are dummy variables 
equal to one if the defendant is in casual and institutional attire, respectively. Formal attire is the 
omitted clothing category. 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑙𝑒𝑠' is a dummy variable equal to one if the defendant is 
shackled. 𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛' is vector of dummy variables equal to one for five of the six 
appearance conditions; formal attire with no shackles is the omitted category. 𝐴𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛' is a 
dummy variable equal to one when the crime charged is arson, and 𝐸𝑦𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠' is a dummy 
variable equal to one when the case scenario involves eyewitness testimony rather than centering 
on a motive. In order to maintain adequate sample sizes, all four case scenarios are pooled for 
this analysis. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.  
The effects of defendant appearance on sentencing are entirely concentrated among mock 
jurors who found the defendant guilty. When sentenced by these mock jurors, the Equation 7 
results indicate that defendants are significantly worse off in institutional attire as compared to 
both formal and casual attire. Defendants in institutional attire receive a sentence about 66 days 
longer than defendants in casual attire and about 40 days longer than defendants in formal attire. 
The Equation 8 results, which allow for defendant dress and shackling to interact, illustrate that 
defendants in casual attire without shackles are better off when sentenced by mock jurors who 
convicted. In fact, they receive sentences that are significantly shorter than defendants in all 
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other appearance conditions. Conversely, mock jurors who acquitted the defendant are not 
significantly affected by defendant dress or shackling when assigning sentences.  
It is also important to ensure that the results do not differ for the subgroups of mock 
jurors that have characteristics similar to judges and seated jurors. Table 16 contains the average 
sentences assigned by mock jurors with and without the education and income levels of typical 
judges, mock jurors with and without the most common characteristics of seated jurors, and 
individuals with and without prior jury service experience. As before, based on data from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Occupational Employment Statistics survey, individuals are 
considered to have the education and income levels of typical judges if they have a doctoral or 
professional degree and an income of $75,000 per year or more (Bureau of Labor Statistics 
2018). Based on data from a survey administered to seated jurors in four courts by Hannaford-
Agor et al. (2003) and the demographic characteristics of participants who report prior jury 
service in the first study, individuals are considered to have the most common characteristics of 
seated jurors if they have at least some college education and are employed. In order to maintain 
adequate sample sizes, all four case scenarios are pooled. 
Table 16. Sentence Length by Defendant Appearance, Judicial and Juror Demographics, 
and Prior Jury Service 
 
Prior 
Jury 
Service 
No Prior 
Jury 
Service 
Characteristics 
Similar to 
Seated Jurors 
Characteristics 
Distinct from 
Seated Jurors 
Education 
and Income 
Similar to 
Judges 
Education 
and Income 
Distinct 
from 
Judges 
All 
Defendants 
2.15 2.14 2.14 2.14 2.17 2.14 
Institutional, 
Shackles 
2.44 2.17 2.10 2.21 2.43 2.19 
Institutional, 
No Shackles 
2.15 2.20 2.21 2.14 2.16 2.20 
Casual, 
Shackles 
2.06 2.15 2.15 2.16 2.13 2.13 
Casual, No 
Shackles 
1.98 2.04 2.06 1.96 2.20 2.02 
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Formal, 
Shackles 
2.16 2.14 2.12 2.21 1.99 2.15 
Formal, No 
Shackles 
2.12 2.16 2.15 2.17 2.12 2.16 
Observations 2,200 13,940 12,260 3,880 1,186 14,880 
Notes: Individuals are considered to have education and income similar to a judge if they have a doctoral or 
professional degree and if their income is $75,000 per year or more. Individuals are considered to have 
characteristics similar to seated jurors if they have at least some college education and are employed. Mock jurors 
who elect not to report their income are not included in either the group of mock jurors with education and income 
similar to judges or the group of mock jurors with education and income distinct from judges. 
At first glance, there are a couple raw differences that are notably large. Mock jurors with 
prior jury service and mock jurors with the income and education levels of typical judges appear 
to sentence defendants in institutional attire and shackles more harshly than other defendants, 
and all of the groups except mock jurors with the income and education levels of typical judges 
appear to sentence defendants in casual attire without shackles more leniently than other 
defendants. In order to test the significance of these raw differences, Equations 7 and 8 are 
estimated for the subgroups of mock jurors displayed in Table 16.  
All of the subgroups except mock jurors with the education and income levels of typical 
judges are affected by defendant appearance in some way. The results from Equation 7 illustrate 
that all of the subgroups except those with the income and education levels of typical judges and 
those without the most common characteristics of seated jurors sentence defendants in 
institutional attire to significantly longer sentences than defendants in casual attire. Additionally, 
mock jurors with prior jury service sentence defendants in formal attire to longer sentences than 
defendants in casual attire, and mock jurors with the most common characteristics of seated 
jurors sentence defendants in institutional clothing to longer sentences than defendants in formal 
clothing. Together, these results indicate that real seated jurors may be more likely to be affected 
by defendant dress than mock jurors as a whole when they are asked to assign a noncapital 
sentence.  
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The results from Equation 8, which allow the effects of dress and shackling to interact, 
tell a similar story. Mock jurors with prior jury service sentence defendants in institutional 
clothing with shackles particularly harshly. Mock jurors with no prior jury service sentence 
defendants in casual clothing without shackles particularly leniently. Mock jurors without the 
education and income levels of typical judges sentence defendants in casual attire without 
shackles significantly more leniently than defendants in every other appearance group. Finally, 
despite not being influenced by defendant dress or shackling alone, mock jurors without the most 
common characteristics of seated jurors sentence defendants in formal attire and shackles and 
defendants in institutional attire and shackles significantly more harshly than defendants in 
casual attire without shackles. 
The lack of significant results for mock jurors with the education and income levels of 
typical judges might indicate that judges are better at tuning out defendant dress when assigning 
sentences. However, the sample of mock jurors with the education and income levels of typical 
judges is relatively small, and the raw differences in mean sentences indicate these mock jurors 
at least have an insignificant tendency to favor defendants in casual attire and disfavor 
defendants in institutional attire, like all other mock jurors. Therefore, the lack of significant 
effects for mock jurors with the education and income levels of typical judges should be 
interpreted with caution.  
B. Perceived Recidivism Is Not the Mechanism Through Which Clothing Affects 
Sentencing 
The results presented above suggest that, particularly when they are white, defendants in 
casual clothing receive the lightest sentences and defendants in institutional attire receive the 
harshest sentences from mock jurors who convict. Because decisionmakers are typically given 
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more discretion when assigning a sentence than when reaching a verdict, identifying the channel 
through which this clothing effect occurs requires sifting through many possible explanations. 
One such explanation is recidivism predictions. Decisionmakers might believe that defendants in 
institutional attire are more likely to reoffend and defendants in casual attire are more likely to be 
one-time offenders.  
Because perceived recidivism is one obvious mechanism through which appearance bias 
might work, exploring this relationship further is warranted. Recall that after sentencing the 
defendant in the first study, participants were asked to rate how likely they thought it was that the 
defendant would commit a crime in the next five years if acquitted. Pearson’s chi-squared tests 
indicate that these recidivism predictions do not differ significantly by defendant appearance in 
any of the case scenarios.80 Table 17 summarizes the predictions by case scenario and defendant 
appearance.  
Table 17. Recidivism Predictions by Defendant Appearance 
 All Case 
Scenarios 
Eyewitness 
Vandalism 
Motive 
Vandalism 
Eyewitness 
Arson 
Motive 
Arson 
All Defendants 25.86% 29.43% 17.57% 35.00% 21.44% 
Institutional, 
Shackles 27.37% 30.84% 19.91% 35.81% 22.67% 
Institutional, No 
Shackles 26.22% 32.14% 15.16% 36.03% 21.74% 
Casual, Shackles 26.06% 29.52% 17.10% 33.07% 24.16% 
Casual, No 
Shackles 26.31% 30.52% 17.45% 34.70% 22.15% 
Formal, Shackles 25.26% 25.60% 17.94% 36.88% 20.18% 
Formal, No 
Shackles 23.97% 28.06% 18.02% 32.61% 17.96% 
Notes: Numbers represent the percent of respondents who predict that the defendant is very likely or somewhat 
likely to recidivate in the next five years if acquitted on a five point Likert scale. Pearson’s chi-squared tests 
indicate that these percentages do not differ significantly by the defendant’s appearance overall or in any of the 
case scenarios. 
                                                             
80 In essence, this statistical test determines whether the proportions of respondents predicting that the defendant is 
very likely or somewhat likely to recidivate are equivalent across the six appearance conditions. It is appropriate 
because both variables being examined (in this case recidivism and appearance) are categorical, and the observations 
in each appearance group are independent. 
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 The effect of appearance on sentencing differs based on the race of the defendant: 
Usually, only white defendants’ sentences are significantly affected by appearance. Nevertheless, 
even when white defendants are considered separately from black defendants, recidivism 
predictions do not differ significantly based on the appearance of the defendant. Tables 18 and 
19 contain recidivism predictions by case scenario for white and black defendants, respectively.  
Table 18. Recidivism Predictions for White Defendants by Defendant Appearance 
 All Case 
Scenarios 
Eyewitness 
Vandalism 
Motive 
Vandalism 
Eyewitness 
Arson 
Motive 
Arson 
All Defendants 28.41% 31.35% 18.61% 40.60% 22.94% 
Institutional, 
Shackles 30.60% 33.33% 23.13% 41.35% 24.30% 
Institutional, No 
Shackles 27.13% 32.34% 13.65% 42.41% 20.44% 
Casual, Shackles 29.19% 32.18% 19.06% 38.56% 27.54% 
Casual, No 
Shackles 29.64% 33.16% 18.58% 40.70% 25.14% 
Formal, Shackles 26.70% 26.42% 18.84% 40.30% 19.81% 
Formal, No 
Shackles 27.08% 30.79% 18.86% 40.20% 19.94% 
Notes: Numbers represent the percent of respondents who predict that a white defendant is very likely or 
somewhat likely to recidivate in the next five years if acquitted on a five point Likert scale. Pearson’s chi-squared 
tests indicate that these percentages do not differ significantly by the defendant’s appearance overall or in any of 
the case scenarios. 
 
Table 19. Recidivism Predictions for Black Defendants by Defendant Appearance 
 All Case 
Scenarios 
Eyewitness 
Vandalism 
Motive 
Vandalism 
Eyewitness 
Arson 
Motive 
Arson 
All Defendants 23.33% 27.39% 16.59% 29.59% 19.95% 
Institutional, 
Shackles 24.19% 28.40% 16.96% 30.35% 20.94% 
Institutional, No 
Shackles 25.34% 31.94% 16.62% 30.25% 23.01% 
Casual, Shackles 22.83% 26.82% 15.00% 28.75% 20.71% 
Casual, No 
Shackles 22.77% 27.67% 16.37% 28.12% 18.85% 
Formal, Shackles 23.92% 24.69% 17.22% 33.62% 20.50% 
Formal, No 
Shackles 20.98% 25.00% 17.23% 26.21% 16.09% 
Notes: Numbers represent the percent of respondents who predict that a black defendant is very likely or 
somewhat likely to recidivate in the next five years if acquitted on a five point Likert scale. Pearson’s chi-squared 
tests indicate that these percentages do not differ significantly by the defendant’s appearance overall or in any of 
the case scenarios. 
 
 
139 
These results suggest that mock jurors’ recidivism predictions are not influenced by 
defendant dress or shackling. This means that white defendants in casual attire receive shorter 
sentences and white defendants in institutional attire receive longer sentences than other white 
defendants from mock jurors who convicted despite being perceived as equally likely to 
recidivate if acquitted. In order to verify this result, Equations 9 and 10 are estimated for each of 
the four criminal case scenarios and for all of the case scenarios combined using only the sample 
of cases in which a white defendant was convicted.   𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒' = 𝛼 + 𝛽,𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑎𝑙' + 𝛽5𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙' + 𝛽:𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑙𝑒𝑠' + 𝛽I𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑡' +βL𝐴𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛' + 𝛽M𝐸𝑦𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠' + 𝜖'  (9) 
 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒' = 𝛼 + 𝛽,𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛' + 𝛽5𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑡' + Β:𝐴𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛' +𝛽I𝐸𝑦𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠' + 𝜖'  (10) 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒' is equal to the assigned sentence length. 𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑎𝑙' and 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙' are dummy 
variables equal to one if the defendant is in casual and institutional attire, respectively. Formal 
attire is the omitted clothing category. 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑙𝑒𝑠' is a dummy variable equal to one if the 
defendant is shackled. 𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛' is a vector of dummy variables equal to one for 
five of the six appearance conditions; formal attire with no shackles is the omitted category. 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑡' is a dummy variable equal to one if the respondent said they thought it was very 
likely or somewhat likely that the defendant would recidivate in the next five years if acquitted. 𝐴𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛' is a dummy variable equal to one when the crime charged is arson, and 𝐸𝑦𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠' is a 
dummy variable equal to one when the case scenario involves eyewitness testimony rather than 
centering on a motive. These last two control variables are only included when all of the case 
scenarios are combined. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. The Equation 9 
results are presented in Table 20. 
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Table 20. Regression Analyses of White Defendant Dress, Shackling, and Recidivism 
Predictions on Sentencing by Mock Jurors Who Convicted 
 All Case Scenarios 
Eyewitness 
Vandalism 
Motive 
Vandalism 
Eyewitness 
Arson Motive Arson 
Casual -0.11* 0.05 -0.08 -0.27 -0.17 
Institutional 0.20*** 0.09 0.08 0.37* 0.23 
Shackles 0.05 -0.03 -0.03 0.18 0.05 
Recidivist 0.51*** 0.18*** 0.49*** 0.74*** 0.63*** 
Arson 1.79*** — — — — 
Eyewitness -0.71*** — — — — 
Observations 3,141 772 610 754 1,005 
R-squared 0.273 0.014 0.062 0.044 0.034 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Standard ordinary least squares regressions are used. The outcome variable is the sentence assigned, 
between one and five years, inclusive, for vandalism and between one and ten years, inclusive, for arson. Casual 
and Institutional are dummy variables equal to one if the defendant is in that attire. Shackles is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the defendant is shackled. Recidivist is a dummy variable equal to one if the respondent 
predicted that the defendant is somewhat or very likely to recidivate in the next five years if acquitted on a five 
point Likert scale. Arson is a dummy variable equal to one if the crime charged is arson. Eyewitness is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the evidence revolves around eyewitness testimony rather than a motive. Standard errors 
are clustered at the individual level.  
Even after accounting for recidivism predictions, white defendants in casual attire receive 
the lightest sentences, and white defendants in institutional attire receive the harshest sentences 
from mock jurors who convicted. In motive vandalism cases, eyewitness arson cases, motive 
arson cases, and when all of the case scenarios are pooled, white defendants in casual attire 
receive significantly shorter sentences than white defendants in institutional attire (by 58, 234, 
146, and 113 days, respectively). Additionally, when all of the case scenarios are pooled, white 
defendants in casual attire receive significantly shorter sentences than white defendants in formal 
attire (by 40 days), and in eyewitness arson cases and when all of the case scenarios are pooled, 
white defendants in formal attire receive significantly shorter sentences than white defendants in 
institutional attire (by 135 and 73 days, respectively). 
 The Equation 10 results, which allow the effects of defendant dress and shackles to 
interact, tell a similar story. When all of the case scenarios are pooled, white defendants in casual 
attire without shackles are sentenced particularly leniently and white defendants in institutional 
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attire are sentenced particularly harshly by mock jurors who convicted. In the eyewitness arson 
case scenario, white defendants in casual attire without shackles receive significantly shorter 
sentences than white defendants in institutional attire (with or without shackles) and white 
defendants in formal attire without shackles, and white defendants in institutional attire with 
shackles receive significantly longer sentences than white defendants in formal attire with 
shackles and white defendants in casual attire with shackles. In motive arson cases, white 
defendants in casual attire without shackles receive significantly shorter sentences than white 
defendants in institutional attire (with or without shackles) and white defendants in formal attire 
with shackles, and white defendants in institutional attire (with or without shackles) receive 
significantly longer sentences than white defendants in casual attire with shackles and white 
defendants in formal attire without shackles.  
Again, these results suggest that white defendants in casual attire (specifically, without 
shackles) and white defendants in institutional attire are not receiving significantly different 
sentences from mock jurors who convicted because they are perceived as more or less likely to 
reoffend. Rather, they are receiving significantly different sentences despite being perceived as 
equally likely to reoffend. If decisionmakers are sentencing defendants based on the goals of 
incapacitation, deterrence, retribution, and rehabilitation, and perceived recidivism is not the 
mechanism, then these mock jurors must view white defendants in casual attire without shackles 
as less culpable, more capable of rehabilitation, or less likely to provide general deterrence as 
compared to white defendants in institutional attire. However, this study is not able to tease out 
these potential explanations, so discerning the precise source of this effect remains an important 
area for future research.  
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Importantly, the sentencing results also indicate that black defendants’ sentences are only 
rarely significantly influenced by appearance, mock jurors who acquitted the defendant are not 
influenced by defendant appearance when assigning sentences, and mock jurors with the 
education and income levels of typical judges—who are typically responsible for assigning 
sentences in noncapital cases—may be better at tuning out defendant appearance when assigning 
sentences. However, the sample of mock jurors with the education and income levels of typical 
judges is relatively small, and the raw differences in mean sentences indicate these mock jurors 
at least have an insignificant tendency to favor defendants in casual attire and disfavor 
defendants in institutional attire, like all other mock jurors. 
C. Perceived Attractiveness Is Not the Mechanism Through Which Clothing Affects 
Sentencing 
Attractiveness is a particularly complex aspect of appearance because it interacts with so 
many other aspects of appearance. A defendant wearing a suit may be viewed as less dangerous 
than a defendant wearing jeans and a t-shirt, but it is possible that the defendant in jeans and a t-
shirt is viewed as more attractive than the defendant in a suit. Since previous studies have found 
that defendant attractiveness impacts guilt (Abwender & Hough 2001; Desantis & Kayson 1997; 
Efran 1974; Leventhal & Kreate 1977; MacCoun 1990; Patry 2008) and sentencing (Abwender 
& Hough 2001; Efran 1974; Friend & Vinson 1974; Leventhal & Kreate 1977; Piehl 1977; Sigall 
& Ostrove 1975; Smith & Hed 1997) decisions, it is important to examine how the manipulations 
of defendant dress and shackling in this study relate to attractiveness.  
Appearance and attractiveness are highly correlated such that defendants in formal attire 
(with and without shackles) and defendants in casual attire without shackles are seen as the most 
attractive, and defendants in the other appearance conditions are seen as the least attractive. 
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Recall that second study respondents were asked to rate the attractiveness of one of the twenty-
four defendant pictures on a five point Likert scale. Figure 12 illustrates these attractiveness 
assessments by appearance condition. A respondent is coded as finding a defendant unattractive 
if the respondent said the defendant was very or somewhat unattractive and as finding a 
defendant attractive if the respondent said the defendant was very or somewhat attractive. 
Pearson’s chi-squared tests confirm that there are significant differences in both attractiveness 
and unattractiveness by appearance condition.  
Figure 12. Perceived Attractiveness by Defendant Appearance 
 
 In order to investigate whether the significant effects of appearance on attractiveness 
explain the significant differences in sentencing by appearance, Equations 11-14 are estimated 
using data from the first study.  
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𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒' = 𝛼 + 𝛽,𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑎𝑙' + 𝛽5𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙' + 𝛽:𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑙𝑒𝑠' +𝛽I𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒' + 𝛽L𝐴𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛' + 𝛽M𝐸𝑦𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠' + 𝜖'  (11) 
 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒' = 𝛼 + 𝛽,𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑎𝑙' + 𝛽5𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙' + 𝛽:𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑙𝑒𝑠' +𝛽I𝑈𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒' + 𝛽L𝐴𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛' + 𝛽M𝐸𝑦𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠' + 𝜖'  (12) 
 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒' = 𝛼 + 𝛽,𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛' + 𝛽5𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒' + 𝛽:𝐴𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛' +𝛽I𝐸𝑦𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠' + 𝜖'  (13) 
 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒' = 𝛼 + 𝛽,𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛' + 𝛽5𝑈𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒' + 𝛽:𝐴𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛' +𝛽I𝐸𝑦𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠' + 𝜖'  (14) 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒' is equal to the assigned sentence length. 𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛' is a vector of 
dummy variables equal to one for five of the six appearance conditions; formal attire with no 
shackles is the omitted category. 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒' and 𝑈𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒' are equal to the percent of 
respondents in the second study that find the defendant attractive and unattractive, respectively.81 𝐴𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛' is a dummy variable equal to one when the crime charged is arson, and 𝐸𝑦𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠' is a 
dummy variable equal to one when the case scenario involves eyewitness testimony rather than 
centering on a motive. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. The Equation 11 and 
12 results are presented in Table 21.  
Table 21. Regression Analyses of Defendant Dress, Shackling, and Perceived Attractiveness 
on Sentencing 
 Equation 11 Equation 12 
Casual -0.04 -0.08* 
Institutional 0.06 -0.03 
Shackles 0.02 -0.001 
Attractive 0.001     — 
Unattractive     — 0.004 
Arson 1.53***    1.53*** 
Eyewitness -0.35***     -0.37*** 
Observations 16,140 16,140 
R-squared 0.216 0.216 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
                                                             
81 Controlling for attractiveness using the average scores assigned to pictures by a separate sample of respondents in 
this manner is consistent with other beauty literature (Biddle & Hamermesh 1998). This method assumes common 
standards of beauty in the population. Previous papers that have examined this assumption have found it to hold (see 
Biddle & Hamermesh 1998; Hamermesh 2006; Hatfield & Sprecher 1986).  
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Notes: Standard ordinary least squares regressions are used. The outcome variable is the sentence assigned, 
between one and five years, inclusive, for vandalism and between one and ten years, inclusive, for arson. Casual 
and Institutional are dummy variables equal to one if the defendant is in that attire. Shackles is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the defendant is shackled. Attractive and Unattractive are equal to the percent of 
respondents in the second study that find the defendant somewhat or very attractive and somewhat or very 
unattractive on five point Likert scales, respectively. Arson is a dummy variable equal to one if the crime 
charged is arson. Eyewitness is a dummy variable equal to one if the evidence revolves around eyewitness 
testimony rather than a motive. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.  
 The results in Table 21 illustrate that neither attractiveness nor unattractiveness is 
significantly correlated with assigned sentence length. When attractiveness is controlled for, 
defendants in casual attire still receive significantly shorter sentences than defendants in 
institutional attire, and when unattractiveness is controlled for, defendants in casual attire receive 
significantly shorter sentences than defendants in formal attire (by 37 and 29 days, respectively).  
 The Equation 13 and Equation 14 results, which allow the effects of defendant dress and 
shackles to interact, tell a similar story. When attractiveness is controlled for, defendants in 
casual attire without shackles receive significantly shorter sentences than defendants in casual 
attire with shackles and defendants in institutional attire (with or without shackles), defendants in 
institutional attire without shackles receive significantly longer sentences than defendants in 
either formal attire with shackles or casual attire with shackles, and defendants in institutional 
attire with shackles receive significantly longer sentences than defendants in formal attire with 
shackles. When unattractiveness is controlled for, defendants in casual attire without shackles 
receive significantly shorter sentences than defendants in formal attire (with or without shackles) 
and defendants in institutional attire (with or without shackles).  
These results suggest that the sentencing effects of defendant dress are not the result of 
changes in respondents’ assessments of attractiveness. Again, this study is not able to tease out 
the exact mechanism, but assuming decisionmakers are sentencing defendants based on the goals 
of incapacitation, deterrence, retribution, and rehabilitation, the results suggest that clothing 
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serves as a signal of culpability or susceptibility to rehabilitation. Discerning the precise source 
of the bias remains an important area for future research. 
VIII. Discussion and Conclusion 
The conviction results presented in this Chapter illustrate that certain subgroups of mock 
jurors are more likely to convict defendants in institutional attire than defendants in civilian 
attire, and other subgroups of mock jurors are less likely to convict defendants in casual civilian 
attire than defendants in formal civilian attire. Just as the Court feared in Estelle,82 the bias 
against defendants in institutional attire appears to be the result of differences in the presumption 
of innocence based on either faith in the justice system, a belief that defendants in formal attire 
have a lower propensity to commit crime, or both, depending on the subgroup.  
The effect of casual attire likely stems from the fact that mock jurors interpret the burden 
of proof to be significantly higher in cases where the defendant is in casual attire rather than 
formal attire. However, these differences in the numerical interpretation of the burden of proof 
are not accounted for by reported concerns over the cost of wrongful convictions, the cost of 
wrongful acquittals, or enforcing the burden of proof threshold. One possible explanation is that 
these mock jurors feel sympathy for defendants in casual attire because of their financial 
situation, and they are either unaware of the effect that this sympathy has on their burden of 
proof interpretation, or they do not report the effect in terms of their concern over the costs of a 
wrongful conviction.  
The casual attire results stand in contrast to the results of Conley, Turnier, and Rose 
(2000) who did not find a significant effect of casual attire as compared to formal attire on 
                                                             
82 425 U.S. 501 (1976). 
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verdict decisions when examining the crime of vandalism. The difference in results most likely 
stems from the fact that Conley, Turnier, and Rose (2000) did not examine the effects of 
defendant dress on subgroups of mock jurors. The effect of casual clothing on guilt 
determinations only appears for certain subgroups of mock jurors. It is particularly important to 
study subgroup effects in this context because important case decisions are typically made by 
either a single judge or a jury that may contain a large over or underrepresentation of various 
subgroups depending on the jury selection process and the demographics in the surrounding area. 
Additionally, the sentencing results illustrate that mock jurors who convicted the 
defendant sentence defendants in casual civilian attire the least severely and defendants in 
institutional attire the most severely, particularly when the defendant is white. The effect of 
defendant dress alone on sentencing is large: Defendants in casual attire receive about 45 fewer 
days in prison than defendants in institutional attire. The effect gets even larger when shackles 
and dress are allowed to interact: Defendants in casual attire without shackles receive about 60 
fewer days in prison than defendants in institutional attire (with or without shackles). This 
significant difference is not the result of differences in recidivism predictions. White defendants 
in casual attire receive significantly lighter sentences than white defendants in institutional attire 
from mock jurors who convicted—despite the fact that they are perceived as equally likely to 
recidivate, regardless of dress. The persistence of the difference in sentencing, after controlling 
for recidivism predictions, suggests that decisionmakers may associate defendant appearance 
(and white defendant appearance in particular) with opinions about the defendant’s capacity for 
rehabilitation or the defendant’s culpability. Future research should aim to pinpoint the precise 
mechanism of this effect.  
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This study focuses on the context of nonviolent property crimes. These crimes account 
for about one third of all arrests, making them particularly important to study (Federal Bureau of 
Investigation 2017). However, it is possible that certain features of defendant appearance 
(shackles in particular) have a negative effect on case outcomes only in other kinds of cases, 
such as violent crime cases. The only other study to examine the effects of institutional attire on 
case outcomes may be illustrative on this point, as it focused on the context of a criminal trial for 
first degree murder (Fontaine & Kiger 1978). The findings suggest that defendant appearance 
may have a different effect in violent crime cases—defendants in institutional clothing or 
accompanied by an armed guard were worse off than those in personal clothing without an 
armed guard, but defendants in institutional clothing also accompanied by an armed guard were 
not worse off, apparently because decisionmakers felt sympathetic towards these defendants. It is 
also possible that shackling influences decisions about what type of sentence to impose but not 
decisions about the length of an incarceration sentence. Chapter Three will shed some light on 
this issue by examining the effect of shackling on decisions about what type of sentence to 
impose in juvenile cases. 
As in Chapter One, one potential limitation of this study may be external validity. The 
mock jurors did not witness a real trial with all of its nuances or a real in-person defendant, nor 
did they deliberate with others. The existing evidence on the impact of jury deliberation on 
biases is mixed. Bernard (1979) found white jurors exhibiting bias towards black defendants to 
be uncompromising during deliberations, and Kramer, Kerr, and Carroll (1990) found that the 
biasing effect of emotional publicity increased following jury deliberations. Conversely, 
Sommers (2006) found that deliberations reduce bias against black defendants when the jury is 
racially mixed, and others (Kerwin & Shaffer 1994, London & Nunez 2000, Ruva et al. 2007) 
 
 
149 
have found that the biasing effect of inadmissible information is reduced following deliberations. 
The best evidence that pre-deliberation decisions made by mock jurors are representative of post-
deliberation jury decisions comes from a series of mock jury studies by Davis et al. (1975) that 
compared actual pre-deliberation verdict decisions in criminal cases with the jury verdicts 
reached after deliberations and found that the best way to transform pre-deliberation verdicts to 
post-deliberation verdicts is to predict that any verdict favored by two-thirds of the jurors pre-
deliberation would be returned by a jury post-deliberation and to predict a hung jury if no such 
verdict exists.  
Additionally, mock jurors may behave differently than real world judges. The sample of 
mock jurors with the education and income levels of typical judges in this study is small, making 
it hard to draw clear conclusions about whether bias among them differs significantly from bias 
among mock jurors as a whole. Moreover, there are ways in which real world judges differ even 
from mock jurors with similar demographic characteristics. For example, judges are repeat 
players in the criminal justice system. As such, they can compare defendants and facts across 
cases. Nevertheless, there is some evidence that judges generally suffer from similar biases as 
jurors (Guthrie, Rachlinkski & Wistrich 2007; Rachlinski & Johnson 2009; Rachlinkski, 
Wistrich, & Guthrie 2015; Wistrich, Rachlinski, & Guthrie 2015).   
Even acknowledging these potential limitations, this Chapter provides the first empirical 
evidence on the effect of shackling and the heterogeneous effects of defendant dress. It is also 
the first study to explore possible explanations for the effects of defendant dress. Most 
importantly, this Chapter provides the first empirical support for the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Estelle—that defendants should not be forced to appear before a jury in identifiable prison garb. 
The results illustrate that such attire undermines the presumption of innocence afforded 
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defendants by certain subgroups of mock jurors. Specifically, the bias against defendants in 
institutional attire in terms of conviction rates appears primarily among male mock jurors, 
Republican mock jurors, religious mock jurors, and mock jurors with no criminal history, and the 
effects are additive, such that mock jurors with all of these characteristics are about 16 
percentage points more likely to convict a defendant in institutional attire than a defendant in 
formal attire.  
The fact that this bias is only significant for male mock jurors, Republican mock jurors, 
religious mock jurors, and mock jurors with no criminal history indicates that the bias is 
strongest among these subgroups. It does not mean, however, that every individual who falls into 
one of these subgroups will be biased or that every individual who does not fall into one of these 
subgroups will not be biased. Rather than providing a blueprint for isolating potential jurors who 
will be biased in a particular way, subdividing the sample illustrates that bias is present among 
substantial groups in a way that could influence case outcomes, even though it is not significant 
for the population as a whole.  
While it may be tempting to conclude that male mock jurors, Republican mock jurors, 
religious mock jurors, and jurors with no criminal history should be struck from juries to prevent 
the influence of this bias, such behavior would be over-inclusive, under-inclusive, and 
potentially unconstitutional. Potential jurors can be excused either for cause by a judge or with a 
preemptory strike by the prosecutor or defendant. Membership in a group, even one that openly 
advocates a particular position, is typically not enough to justify exclusion for cause,83 and the 
use of preemptory strikes to intentionally discriminate against members of a particular race or 
                                                             
83 See, e.g., United States v. Salamone, 800 F.2d 1216 (1986) (finding that membership in the National Rifle 
Association was not enough to justify exclusion for cause in a case involving charges under gun control statutes). 
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sex violates the Equal Protection Clause.84 Lower courts are divided about whether the Equal 
Protection Clause also prevents discriminatory use of preemptory strikes against members of 
other protected classes, such as religion.85  
Even if some of these subgroups could constitutionally be targeted for the use of 
preemptory strikes, it would be more accurate for the parties to weed out bias by asking potential 
jurors questions related to the source of the bias. For example, a lawyer could ask potential jurors 
whether there is anything about the defendant’s attire that would make it difficult for them to 
presume that the defendant is innocent before hearing any evidence. An affirmative response 
would not only provide a solid basis for a preemptory strike but would likely justify removal for 
cause. Alternatively, the lawyer could ask jurors whether they have faith in the justice system 
and/or whether they believe crime is concentrated among the poor. The answers to these 
questions are associated with appearance bias and would provide a less discriminatory ground 
for preemptory strikes.  
The conviction results also illustrate that certain subgroups of mock jurors exhibit a bias 
in favor of defendants in casual attire. This effect appears primarily among mock jurors with no 
college education and mock jurors who are unemployed (i.e., mock jurors without the common 
characteristics of seated jurors). These mock jurors are about 4 percentage points more likely to 
convict defendants in formal attire than defendants in casual attire. In light of the fact that no 
subgroup of mock jurors exhibits a counterbalancing bias against defendants in casual attire, 
these results suggest that, at least in nonviolent criminal cases, the current emphasis on dressing 
up for trial may be a bit overblown. To the extent that a defense team is deciding whether to 
                                                             
84 J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (sex); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (race). 
85 United States v. Stafford, 136 F.3d 1109, 1114 (7th Cir. 1998) (“The constitutional status of preemptory 
challenges based on religion is unsettled . . . .”); see also Davis v. Minnesota, 511 U.S. 1115 (1994) (denying 
certiorari in a case raising the issue of the constitutionality of preemptory strikes based on religion). 
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spend resources on formal attire for trial or something like extra investigation, the latter may 
have a greater potential impact on case outcomes. 
Finally, the results illustrate that white defendants in institutional attire receive the 
harshest sentences and white defendants in casual attire receive the most lenient sentences from 
mock jurors who convicted. While considering defendant dress in the context of a sentencing 
hearing is not necessarily unconstitutional, it may not be ideal from a policy standpoint. Prison 
attire may signal dangerousness to the community, but it may also signal poverty. Similarly, 
casual civilian attire in the courtroom may signal a lack of respect for the court process, but it 
may also be the result of financial inability to secure more formal civilian attire. Policymakers 
may therefore prefer that judges focus on other, more relevant factors and avoid using defendant 
dress as a proxy for dangerousness or respect. At least with respect to institutional attire, this 
objective could be achieved by extending the rights afforded to defendants in Estelle to 
sentencing proceedings. Such a policy would prevent the government from forcing criminal 
defendants to appear at sentencing proceedings in identifiable prison garb. As in the context of 
proceedings before a jury, defendants being detained prior to their sentencing would need to be 
given an opportunity to change into civilian attire before entering the courtroom.   
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CHAPTER THREE: NO SYMPATHY FOR THE SHACKLED: BANS ON INDISCRIMINATE JUVENILE 
SHACKLING LEAD TO MORE FAVORABLE CASE OUTCOMES FOR THE ACCUSED 
I. Introduction 
There is no national consensus regarding juvenile defendants’ right to be unshackled in 
the courtroom. In Deck v. Missouri, the Supreme Court extended the right not to be shackled in 
front of a jury absent a compelling state justification to adult criminal defendants,86 but that 
holding does not automatically apply in the juvenile context. Since the juvenile justice system in 
the United States has historically been viewed as civil rather than criminal, the same Due Process 
rights are not always afforded to juvenile defendants.87 For the same reason, even if the ruling 
did apply in juvenile court, juvenile defendants rarely have the right to a jury trial.88 As a result, 
a number of bans on indiscriminate juvenile shackling have been implemented at the state level. 
Importantly, these bans are not complete bans on shackling, but they limit the circumstances 
under which juveniles can be shackled. The prohibitions on indiscriminate shackling that exist 
are based on state statutes, state court rules, state administrative orders, and state court decisions. 
Table 1 contains a list of the states that have adopted a ban, the source of that ban, and the year 
the ban was adopted. Today, thirty-two states and the District of Columbia limit juvenile 
shackling in some way. 
                                                             
86 544 U.S. 622 (2005). 
87 In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 17 (1967) (requiring only that, in proceedings that determine delinquency with a potential 
consequence of incarceration, Due Process rights that are essential to fundamental fairness be afforded to juveniles). 
88 McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (holding that the right to a jury trial is not constitutionally 
required in at the adjudication stage of state juvenile cases). The states that do afford juveniles a right to a jury trial 
are Alaska (ALASKA DELINQUENCY R. 21(a)), Kansas (KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2357), Massachusetts (MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. Ch. 119, § 55A), Michigan (MICH. COMP. LAWS § 712A.17(2)), New Mexico (N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-
2-16(A)), Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7303-4.1), Texas (TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.03(b)(6)), West 
Virginia (W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-5-6(a)), and Wyoming (WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-6-223(c)). 
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Table 1. State-Wide Bans on Indiscriminate Juvenile Shackling 
State Source of Ban Year Adopted 
Alaska ALASKA DELINQ. CT. R. 21.5 2015 
Arizona 17B A.R.S. JUV. CT. RULES OF PROC. 12(E) 2017 
California Tiffany A. v. Super. Ct., 150 Cal. App. 4th Supp. 1334 (2007) 2007 
Connecticut CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-122a 2015 
Delaware DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 10, § 1007B 2017 
Florida FLA. R. JUV. P. 8.100(b) 2010 
Idaho State v. Doe, 333 P.3d 858 (Idaho Ct. App. 2014) 2014 
Illinois ILL. SUP. CT. R. 943  2017 
Indiana IND. CODE § 31-30.5-2-1 2015 
Kentucky KY. JUV. R. PRAC. & PROC. 23  2016 
Maine 2015 ME Rules 20, Maine Rules of Criminal Procedure, Amended 
Rule 43A  
2015 
Maryland In Re D.M. 228 Md. App. 451 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016); Maryland 
Judiciary Resolution Regarding Shackling of Children in Juvenile 
Court  
2015 
Massachusetts Trial Ct. of the Commonwealth, CT. OFFICER PL’Y AND PROCEDURES 
MANUAL, Ch. 4 § VI  
2010 
Nebraska NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-251.03 2015 
Nevada NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 62D.415  2015 
New 
Hampshire 
N.H. REV. STAT. § 126-U:13 2010 
New Jersey N.J. R. Ch. Div. Fam. Pt. 5:19-4 2017 
New Mexico N.M. CHILD CT. R. 10-223A  2012 
New York N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 168.3(a) 2013 
North Carolina N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-2402.1 2007 
North Dakota N.D. R. JUV. P. 20 2017 
Ohio OHIO SUP. R. § 5.01 2016 
Oregon S.B. 846, 2017 Sess. (Or. 2018) 2018 
Pennsylvania 237 PA. CODE §139; 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6336 2011 
South Carolina S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-19-1435  2014 
Tennessee TENN. R. JUV. PROC. 204 2016 
Utah UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-6-122 2015 
Vermont 33 VT. STAT. ANN. Tit. 33, § 5123 2013 
Washington WASH. JUV. CT. R. 1.6 2014 
Washington, 
D.C. 
D.C. Super. Ct. Admin. Order 15-07 2015 
Notes: Where there are two sources for a state-wide ban, only the year for the first is listed.  
The bans on indiscriminate juvenile shackling that exist are far from symbolic. There are 
numerous anecdotal accounts documenting the actual practice of indiscriminate juvenile 
 
 
155 
shackling in a number of states throughout the country.89 Proponents of these bans argue that 
indiscriminate juvenile shackling, like adult shackling, undermines defendants’ presumption of 
innocence and interferes with defendants’ right to effective assistance of counsel (Nabha 2008). 
They also argue that shackling is particularly inappropriate in the juvenile context because it 
undermines the dignity of the juvenile justice system (which is supposed to center around 
rehabilitation) and causes psychological harm to juvenile defendants whose brains are still 
developing (Nabha 2008). The first three of these concerns are similar to the reasoning that the 
Supreme Court relied on in Deck when it held that indiscriminate shackling of adult defendants 
in front of a jury violates Due Process.90 On the other hand, those who oppose bans on 
indiscriminate shackling argue that they undermine the security of the courtroom (Gallagher & 
Lore 2008). 
This paper will provide the first empirical evidence on the impact of state-wide bans on 
indiscriminate juvenile shackling. Using difference-in-differences and difference-in-difference-
in-differences regression analyses and juvenile criminal case data from North Carolina and 
Tennessee, obtained from the National Juvenile Court Data Archive, it will illustrate that North 
Carolina’s legislative ban on indiscriminate juvenile shackling resulted in more favorable case 
outcomes for juvenile defendants, including a 3–4 percentage point decrease in the probability of 
detention and an equally large increase in the probability of treatment.  
In contrast to the experimental results from Chapter Two—finding a very limited effect 
of shackling in the context of an adult criminal trial for a nonviolent property crime—these 
                                                             
89 For example, there are accounts of indiscriminate juvenile shackling in Massachusetts before its ban (McLaurin 
2012), in Florida, North Carolina, and North Dakota prior to their bans (Moore 2007), in New York before its ban 
(Nabha 2008), and in Iowa before its ban (Russell 2017). Additionally, according to a public defender in Colorado (a 
state with no ban on indiscriminate shackling), juveniles in parts of Colorado were being indiscriminately shackled 
as recently as 2018. 
90 544 U.S. 630–32. 
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observational results suggest that shackling may in fact influence the outcomes of juvenile 
criminal cases. The difference in results could indicate that shackling has a unique effect in the 
juvenile context or could stem from differences in the scopes of the two chapters, which I discuss 
in more detail below. Whatever the cause, the results in this Chapter illustrate that there are very 
real consequences of indiscriminate juvenile shackling, providing empirical justification for a 
nationwide ban on the practice. 
II. Literature Review 
Apart from Chapter Two of this dissertation, there is no existing empirical literature on 
the effects of shackling on case outcomes—in the adult or juvenile context. The experimental 
results from Chapter Two illustrate that in the context of a nonviolent property crime in adult 
court, shackling generally does not affect the trial verdict or the length of the assigned sentence. 
Shackling only has an independent significant effect on case outcomes in one instance—mock 
jurors who identify as Democrat are significantly less likely to convict defendants in shackles, 
suggesting that shackling may actually engender a feeling of sympathy among certain 
decisionmakers in some contexts. Shackling does have a significant effect on case outcomes 
when considered in combination with defendant attire, however. Defendants in casual clothing 
are typically better off than other defendants but usually only when they are not shackled.  
There are a number of reasons to suspect that the results in this Chapter may differ from 
the results in Chapter Two. First, this Chapter examines the effect of shackling across all case 
types rather than focusing specifically on nonviolent property crimes. The Chapter Two results 
along with the results from a study by Fontaine and Kiger (1978) suggest that defendant 
appearance may have a different effect on case outcomes in violent crime cases and property 
crime cases. Recall that in Fontaine and Kiger (1978), defendants in a simulated murder trial 
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wearing institutional clothing or accompanied by an armed guard were worse off than those in 
personal clothing without an armed guard, but defendants in institutional clothing also 
accompanied by an armed guard were not worse off—apparently because decisionmakers felt 
sympathetic towards these defendants. The last Section of this Chapter will specifically address 
the issue of heterogeneity by crime type. 
This Chapter also examines the effect of shackling on a variety of case outcomes rather 
than on trial verdicts and prison sentence length alone. At an adult criminal trial, decisionmakers 
are presented with all the evidence available from both sides and, in the case of a jury trial, they 
are given a number of jury instructions to guide their decisionmaking. Case outcomes such as 
dismissals occur in a much less structured environment, where shackling may have a different 
effect. This Chapter also examines categorical sentencing decisions rather than prison sentence 
length decisions. Shackling may have an effect on whether or not a judge feels it is appropriate to 
assign detention or some other type of sentence but not on the length of a prison sentence 
conditional on the defendant being incarcerated.   
Additionally, Chapter Two only manipulated the presence or absence of shackles in a still 
picture of the defendant. All other case-related information was held constant. This Chapter 
examines a state-wide ban on indiscriminate juvenile shackling, which may influence case 
outcomes not only by modifying the appearance of juvenile defendants but also by changing the 
content of the adjudication itself, for example, by allowing juvenile defendants to more 
effectively communicate with their attorneys or making juvenile defendants feel more 
comfortable so they can more effectively advocate on their own behalf. 
Finally, the most obvious difference between this Chapter and Chapter Two is that this 
Chapter focuses on the juvenile context. It is possible that the sight of a child in shackles has a 
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different effect on decisionmakers than the sight of an adult in shackles. A shackled child could 
appear more innocent and sympathetic than a shackled adult, or the sight of a shackled juvenile 
could be more jarring than the sight of a shackled adult, making the child appear more 
threatening and dangerous.  
The empirical literature most closely related to this project is the appearance literature 
discussed in detail in Chapter Two. Outside the context of the courtroom, this literature has 
illustrated that plain looking people earn less than the good-looking and that this effect is largely 
independent of occupation. These findings appear to be the result of taste-based employer 
discrimination—i.e., discrimination stemming from decisions made by persons deriving disutility 
from interacting with less attractive individuals (Becker 1957; Hamermesh & Biddle 1994). 
Some of the gap in wages is also explained by the fact that attractive workers are more confident, 
and confidence increases wages; for a given level of confidence, attractive workers are (wrongly) 
considered to be more able by employers; and controlling for confidence, attractive workers have 
communication and social skills that raise their wages when they interact with employers 
(Mobius & Rosenblat 2005). Beauty has also been shown to impact happiness (Gupta, Etcoff, & 
Jaeger 2015; Hamermesh & Abrevaya 2013), political elections (Berggren, Jordahl, & Poutvaara 
2017; Jones & Price 2017; Leigh & Susilo 2009), charitable giving (Cryder, Botti, & Simonyan 
2017; Price 2008), instructor ratings (Hamermesh & Parker 2005), profits (Rule & Ambady 
2008), academic performance (Hernandez-Julian & Peters 2017), and propensity to commit 
crime (Mocan & Tekin 2010). 
In the criminal context, most experimental studies have found that defendant beauty 
impacts guilt (Abwender & Hough 2001; Desantis & Kayson 1997; Efran 1974; Leventhal & 
Kreate 1977; MacCoun 1990; Patry 2008) and sentencing decisions (Abwender & Hough 2001; 
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Efran 1974; Friend & Vinson 1974; Leventhal & Kreate 1977; Piehl 1977; Sigall & Ostrove 
1975; Smith & Hed 1997). Typically, more attractive defendants are better off, but a meta-
analysis by Mazzella and Feingold (1994) found that the effect of beauty on both guilt 
determinations and sentencing is small, and the sentencing effects of beauty differ based on the 
crime charged. Attractive defendants receive less punishment for robbery, rape, and cheating; 
more punishment for negligent homicide; and the same amount of punishment as unattractive 
defendants for swindling. Chapter Two also illustrates that defendant attire can affect case 
outcomes at trials for nonviolent property crimes—defendants in institutional attire are convicted 
the most and receive the harshest sentences, and defendants in casual clothing are convicted the 
least and receive the lightest prison sentences. 
A couple of studies have examined the effect of other visual cues on case outcomes and 
juror stereotypes. In a recent experimental study in Australia, Rossner et al. (2017) found that 
placement of the defendant in an open dock, a glass dock, or at the bar table next to their attorney 
can affect trial outcomes: Jurors are more likely to convict defendants when they are in a 
traditional or secure dock. Lassiter (2002) uses an experiment to show that videotaped 
confessions where the camera is focused on the suspect as compared to videotaped confessions 
where the camera is focused on both the suspect and interrogator are judged to be more voluntary 
and lead to more guilty verdicts. 
Finally, there are a number of anecdotal accounts about how the presence of shackles 
affects the attitudes and behavior of juvenile defendants in the courtroom. A juvenile judge in 
Massachusetts noted, “[Ending indiscriminate shackling] has improved the atmosphere and the 
culture of the courtroom. When a child can turn and actually say ‘hello,’ and you can see 
somebody smile back, that changes things for the child and the family member. It also makes it 
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easier for the management of the courtroom (National Juvenile Defender Center).” Another 
juvenile judge in New Hampshire noted, “Automatically restraining a juvenile in the courtroom 
deprives that young person of the opportunity to show the court they are capable of self-control. 
To the extent that restraints result in an unnatural posture or gait, or a submissive demeanor, a 
juvenile may feel wholly defeated as he or she enters the courtroom (National Juvenile Defender 
Center).” In an affidavit addressing indiscriminate juvenile shackling and its potential 
psychological costs, child psychologist Dr. Marty Beyer wrote, “In the midst of their identity and 
moral development, demeaning treatment by adults may solidify adolescents’ alienation, send 
mixed messages about the justice system, and confirm their belief that they are all bad, all of 
which undermine the rehabilitative goal of court intervention” (Beyer 2015). 
A number of other experts have also commented on the tendency of shackling to make 
juvenile defendants feel anxious, shameful, and humiliated (Bidwell 2015; Ford 2014; Griffin 
2014; Kraus 2015; Rosenblitt 2015; Wurm 2015). Differences in behavior could lead to 
differences in case treatment. For example, prosecutors may be more willing to informally 
resolve the case of a child who appears engaged with their family and shows self-restraint in the 
courtroom. Additionally, differences in emotion can affect case outcomes. Defensiveness and 
anxiety can be detected by others, such as judges, jurors, prosecutors, and defense attorneys, and 
these decisionmakers may have difficulty distinguishing anxiety and shame related to shackling 
from anxiety and shame related to guilt (Harrigan et al. 1996). This study will provide the first 
empirical evidence on the effect of indiscriminate juvenile shackling on case outcomes by 
examining the effect of a legislative ban on indiscriminate juvenile shackling in North Carolina. 
The next Section provides some background information on the juvenile justice system and its 
unique goals and procedures.  
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III. Background on Juvenile Justice in the United States 
The juvenile justice system in the United States revolves around rehabilitation. It was 
founded at the end of the nineteenth century based on the common sentiments that children who 
commit crimes are less blameworthy than adults, have a larger capacity for rehabilitation, and are 
less deserving of harsh punishments commonly imposed in adult court (Feld 2014; Frank 2017). 
Over time, abuses of the informality of the juvenile justice system resulted in the implementation 
of procedural protections resembling those of the adult system, but rehabilitation has remained 
the foremost ideal.91 
Procedurally, there are a few ways that the juvenile justice systems in each state function 
differently from the adult criminal justice system. After citation or arrest, juvenile defendants go 
through a process called intake. Intake is an informal procedure that provides an opportunity for 
cases to be reviewed and either dismissed or handled informally before formal charges are filed 
(Birkhead 2013; Frank 2017). The intake officer is typically a juvenile probation officer, but 
some jurisdictions authorize prosecutors to serve as intake officers (Birkhead 2013; Frank 2017). 
The intake officer will typically meet with the juvenile and ask him or her a series of questions 
about what happened and about the juvenile’s background and criminal history (Birkhead 2013; 
Frank 2017). The intake officer may have access to additional relevant information, such as a 
complaint statement or the child’s school records (Birkhead 2013; Frank 2017). After the 
                                                             
91 In the 1960s, the Supreme Court began formalizing the juvenile justice system, because it recognized the need for 
procedures to protect the rights of juvenile defendants. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970) (holding that 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt is a requirement during the adjudicatory stage of a delinquency proceeding); In re 
Gault, 387 U.S. at 31–59 (holding that, in proceedings that determine delinquency with a potential consequence of 
incarceration, the right to notice, the right to counsel, the right to confrontation, and the right against self-
incrimination will be afforded to juveniles). In 1980, Congress also got involved, aiming to remedy flagrant abuses 
of power during the detention stage by passing the Criminal Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, which gave the 
Attorney General authority to remedy “egregious or flagrant conditions” that deprive inmates of their “rights, 
privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997(a) 
(2018). 
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meeting, the intake officer will decide whether to (1) dismiss the case; (2) deal with it 
informally—usually by having the child consent to a period of probation, having the child 
consent to some other resolution such as paying restitution, or by referring the child to a 
diversion program involving an education or treatment program; or (3) recommend the filing of 
formal charges, a process known as petitioning (Birkhead 2013; Frank 2017).  
Juveniles can be charged with delinquency offenses or status offenses. Delinquency 
offenses involve actions that would also be criminal if the juvenile was an adult at the time. 
Status offenses, on the other hand, involve actions that are only criminal for juveniles. Underage 
possession of tobacco and running away are examples of status offenses, and trespassing and 
murder are examples of delinquency offenses. 
Once formal charges have been filed in a case, the juvenile court judge must determine 
whether they have jurisdiction to hear the case in juvenile court, and, in most states, juvenile 
court judges may waive juvenile court jurisdiction in certain cases and elect to have those cases 
transferred to adult court (Freitas 1995; Hockenberry & Puzzanchera 2018). Legislative limits on 
the jurisdiction of juvenile courts are typically based on the age of the juvenile and the 
seriousness of the offense (Freitas 1995). Judicial decisions to waive jurisdiction are typically 
based on a determination about whether the juvenile is amenable to treatment in the juvenile 
system (Freitas 1995). A judge might find, for example, that a juvenile who has been adjudicated 
several times in the past is not amenable to treatment or that a juvenile charged with a serious 
offense is not able to be properly rehabilitated in the time period that the juvenile court would 
have jurisdiction over him or her.  
If the juvenile court determines that it has jurisdiction to hear the case and decides not to 
transfer the case to adult court, then the case proceeds in a manner similar to cases in the adult 
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criminal justice system. The juvenile may be detained prior to case resolution if there is reason to 
believe that he or she is a threat to the community, will be at risk if returned to the community, or 
may fail to appear at an upcoming hearing if released (Sickmund 2005). Juveniles may engage in 
plea bargaining, and the option of informal case resolution—avoiding a conviction through 
voluntary probation, restitution, or participation in treatment—remains available (Sickmund 
2005).  
If no agreement can be reached between the parties, an adjudicatory hearing is held to 
establish responsibility for the alleged act (Sickmund 2005). A juvenile defendant being 
adjudicated delinquent is equivalent to an adult defendant being found guilty. However, as 
mentioned earlier, juveniles typically do not have the right to a trial by jury, so adjudicatory 
hearings are almost always presided over by juvenile judges.92 Finally, once a juvenile is 
adjudicated delinquent, the court assigns a disposition (or sentence) (Sickmund 2005). 
Dispositions can involve educational or treatment programs designed to assist with 
rehabilitation; probation; secure detention in a juvenile detention facility; or some other 
punishment, such as a fine, an order to pay restitution, or an order to complete a certain amount 
of community service.  
Figure 1 depicts juvenile case processing as a flow chart and provides summary statistics 
regarding juvenile case resolutions across the United States in 2016 (Hockenberry & 
Puzzanchera 2018). Fifty-six percent of cases in 2016 resulted in the filing of formal charges. Of 
those cases that were petitioned, only 1 percent were judicially transferred to adult criminal 
                                                             
92 The states that do afford juveniles a right to a jury trial are Alaska (ALASKA DELINQUENCY R. 21(a)), Kansas 
(KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2357), Massachusetts (MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 119, § 55A), Michigan (MICH. COMP. 
LAWS § 712A.17(2)), New Mexico (N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-2-16(A)), Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 
7303-4.1), Texas (TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.03(b)(6)), West Virginia (W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-5-6(a)), and 
Wyoming (WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-6-223(c)). 
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court, 52 percent resulted in a delinquency adjudication, and 47 percent were either dismissed or 
handled informally.  
Figure 1. Juvenile Case Processing in the United States in 2016 
 
IV. Methodology 
This Chapter will empirically estimate the effect of a ban on indiscriminate juvenile 
shackling on juvenile case outcomes using state-level juvenile case data obtained from the 
National Juvenile Court Data Archive. Specifically, the study will compare case outcomes for 
juveniles who were and were not incarcerated during the pendency of their cases in North 
Carolina and Tennessee before and after North Carolina adopted a state-wide legislative ban on 
indiscriminate juvenile shackling in 2007. The next parts will discuss the methodology that will 
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be used, provide background on the juvenile justice procedures and relevant laws in North 
Carolina and Tennessee, and describe the data that will be used.  
A. Double-Difference and Triple-Difference Regression Analyses 
Using traditional ordinary least squares regression analyses to investigate the impact of 
indiscriminate juvenile shackling on case outcomes would likely produce biased results, 
because—even were case-level shackling data available—it would be impossible to control for 
all of the case-specific facts that are correlated with shackling and with case outcomes. 
Traditional ordinary least squares regression analyses would also raise reverse causality 
concerns, as juveniles with higher probabilities of guilt and greater culpability may be more 
likely to be shackled—even though shackling is often indiscriminate. In general, the only 
juveniles being shackled are those who are incarcerated during the pendency of their 
proceedings. To avoid these concerns and identify a causal effect, this Chapter will use a two-
state difference-in-differences (hereinafter, double-difference) analysis and a two-state 
difference-in-difference-in-differences (hereinafter, triple-difference) analysis. 
In essence, the two-state double-difference analysis utilizes a state without a ban on 
indiscriminate juvenile shackling as a control and compares it to a state that has adopted a ban on 
indiscriminate juvenile shackling before and after the passage of the ban. The comparison over 
time and between the two states nets out changes in outcomes attributable to shared experiences 
of the states and differences in outcomes based on time-invariant differences between the states. 
As long as (1) there was no other discrete change that occurred around the same time as the 
passage of the ban that would influence juvenile case outcomes in one state and not the other, 
and (2) the outcomes of interest would have progressed in a parallel manner in the two states 
absent the passage on the ban (an assumption often referred to as the parallel trends assumption), 
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the double-difference estimates will represent the causal effect of the ban on juvenile case 
outcomes, alleviating concerns about omitted variables and reverse causality.  
In order to isolate the effects of North Carolina’s ban on indiscriminate juvenile 
shackling, outcomes from Tennessee (a state without a statutory ban on indiscriminate juvenile 
shackling during the relevant time period) will be compared to outcomes in North Carolina (a 
state that adopted a statutory ban on indiscriminate juvenile shackling during the relevant time 
period) between 2004 to 2012, before and after North Carolina’s law became effective in 2007.93 
Equation 1 is the main regression equation of interest. 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒'[\ = 𝛼 + 𝛽,𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠'[\ + 𝛽5𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦[ + 𝛽:𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ\ +𝛽I𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦[ ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑\ + 𝛽L𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑎` ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑆𝑒𝑝𝑡2007\ +𝜖'[\  (1) 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒'[\ is a dummy variable equal to one if the case resulted in the particular outcome being 
examined. 𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠'[\ is a vector of controls for case-level characteristics, discussed in 
more detail below. 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦[ and 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ\ are county- and month-level fixed effects, and 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑎` and 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑆𝑒𝑝𝑡2007\ are indicator variables for whether a case was in North 
Carolina and after September 2007, respectively. County specific linear time trends are also 
included by interacting dummy variables for each county with the variable 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑\ that equals 
one in 2004, two in 2005, and so on. These trends control for a variety of other variables that 
might influence case outcomes (such as the tenure of juvenile court judges), but which trend 
smoothly over time. 𝛽I will represent the causal effect of the ban on indiscriminate shackling on 
case outcomes as long as the two identifying assumptions listed above hold true.  
                                                             
93 For an example of a paper utilizing a similar two-state double-difference model, see Card & Krueger (1994), 
which calculates the impact of an increase in the minimum wage on employment in the fast food industry by 
comparing total employment in fast food restaurants in New Jersey and Pennsylvania before and after the minimum 
wage was increased in New Jersey.  
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 The first identifying assumption—that there was no other discrete change that occurred 
around the same time as the passage of North Carolina’s ban on indiscriminate juvenile 
shackling that would influence juvenile case outcomes in either North Carolina or Tennessee—is 
likely met in this this instance. There are three primary sources of potential changes: state 
juvenile court rules, state juvenile codes, and state court opinions—none of which reveal any 
discrete changes in 2007 that seriously undermine the double-difference methodology.94 
In 2007, there were no juvenile court rule update orders filed in North Carolina. Besides 
the legislative ban on indiscriminate juvenile shackling, there were five other amendments to 
North Carolina’s juvenile code: (1) an act to amend existing child welfare laws to comply with 
federal law and regulations, which, for example, replaces “an opportunity” with “the right” as 
related to the ability of certain parties to be heard and present evidence on issues relating to 
juvenile placement;95 (2) an act to require the department of juvenile justice and delinquency 
prevention to release the identification of certain juveniles who escape from custody;96 (3) an act 
to provide that the court may order secure custody of a juvenile when the juvenile is charged 
with driving while ability impaired or underage drinking and to authorize the legislative research 
commission to study dispositional alternatives for juveniles who are adjudicated delinquent for 
these offenses;97 (4) an act to expand the reach of North Carolina courts in proceedings to 
                                                             
94 The information presented regarding these changes is based on Westlaw search results. For state juvenile court 
rule updates, I searched for the term “juvenile” in rule update orders from January 1, 2007 – December 31, 2007 in 
both Tennessee and North Carolina. For state juvenile code updates, I searched for the term “juvenile” in historical 
enacted legislation from January 1, 2007 – December 31, 2007 in both North Carolina and Tennessee. Finally, for 
state supreme court opinions, I searched for the term “juvenile” in North Carolina and Tennessee Supreme Court 
cases issued from January 1, 2007 – December 31, 2007. There are, of course, other discrete changes that could have 
occurred in North Carolina or Tennessee in 2007. My interviews with individuals involved in the juvenile justice 
systems in North Carolina and Tennessee did not reveal any such events.  
95 H.B. 698, 2007 Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (N.C. 2007). 
96 H.B. 1148, 2007 Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (N.C. 2007). 
97 S.B. 999, 2007 Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (N.C. 2007). 
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terminate the parental rights of nonresident parents of resident children;98 and (5) an act to 
remove barriers to adoption for residents of other states seeking to adopt children in North 
Carolina under the laws pertaining to termination of parental rights and adoption.99 
Additionally, in 2007, the North Carolina Supreme Court issued two opinions related to 
juvenile justice. In one opinion, the court held that an aunt who did not have custody of the 
juvenile and with whom the juvenile had not lived for an extended period of time did not qualify 
as a “guardian” entitled to be present upon the juvenile’s request during police questioning.100 In 
the other opinion, the court held that consensual oral sex between a 14-year-old and a 12-year-
old violated North Carolina’s crime against nature statute and that the crime against nature 
statute was not unconstitutional as applied to those juveniles.101 
In 2007, there were also no juvenile court rule update orders filed in Tennessee. 
However, there were eight amendments to Tennessee’s juvenile code: (1) an act to amend the 
code relative to adoption and guardianship of minors;102 (2) an act that allows for the release of 
certain records related to child sexual abuse in certain instances involving claims under the 
Criminal Injuries Compensation Act;103 (3) an act that makes a parent liable for the offense of 
contributing to the delinquency of a minor if their child is found delinquent for a second or 
subsequent time of vandalism and the property is owned by the government;104 (4) an act that 
requires notifying the juvenile’s school when school attendance is made a condition of 
probation;105 (5) an act to amend the code relative to judicial proceedings affecting juveniles, 
                                                             
98 H.B. 866, 2007 Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (N.C. 2007). 
99 H.B. 865, 2007 Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (N.C. 2007). 
100 State v. Oglesby, 361 N.C. 550 (2007). 
101 In Re R.L.C., 361 N.C. 287 (2007). 
102 H.B. 321, 105th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2007). 
103 S.B. 1568, 105th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2007). 
104 H.B. 1167, 105th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2007). 
105 H.B. 594, 105th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2007). 
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which adds references to the rules of juvenile procedure to clarify that nothing in the law 
supersedes those procedures;106 (6) an act that makes court petitions and orders subject to public 
disclosure in the case of certain serious offenses and establishes a task force to research and 
handle issues related to the submission of juvenile fingerprints and the reporting of juvenile court 
dispositions;107 (7) an act that allows police officers to film or record juveniles they believe are 
involved in a crime for use as evidence,108 and (8) an act that requires state agencies 
administering funds related to the prevention, treatment, or care of delinquent juveniles to only 
expend funds on evidence-based programs and contract with providers of services to only engage 
in evidence-based practices.109 While this last amendment could influence case outcomes by 
affecting the availability of treatment programs for juveniles, the requirement was phased in over 
the course of four years in order to prevent that very issue.  
In 2007, the Tennessee Supreme Court issued only one opinion related to juvenile justice. 
The court held that a directive by a juvenile court judge imposing house arrest on a juvenile was 
invalid because it was never reduced to writing.110 The fact that none of these legal changes seem 
likely to influence system-wide case outcomes for juvenile defendants in either state suggests 
that the double-difference estimates represent the casual effects of North Carolina’s ban on 
indiscriminate juvenile shackling on case outcomes as long as the parallel trends assumption is 
met. The validity of that assumption is discussed below.   
The triple-difference methodology compares outcomes for juveniles incarcerated 
pretrial—making them susceptible to indiscriminate juvenile shackling practices—and juveniles 
                                                             
106 H.B. 320, 105th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2007). 
107 S.B. 2194, 105th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2007). 
108 H.B. 75, 105th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2007). 
109 S.B. 1790, 105th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2007). 
110 State v. Rodgers, 235 S.W.3d 92 (Tenn. 2007). 
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not incarcerated pretrial—who would not have been shackled, regardless of the presence of a 
ban—in North Carolina and Tennessee before and after the passage of North Carolina’s ban in 
2007. The main regression equation of interest is: 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒'[\ = 𝛼 + 𝛽,𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠'[\ + 𝛽5𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦[ + 𝛽:𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ\ +𝛽I𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐷𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛'[\ + 𝛽L𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦[ ∗ 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ\ + 𝛽M𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦[ ∗𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐷𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛'[\ + 𝛽N𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ\ ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐷𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛'[\ +𝛽O𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑎` ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑆𝑒𝑝𝑡2007\ ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐷𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛'[\ +𝜖'[\  (2) 
Again, 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒'[\ is a dummy variable equal to one if the case resulted in the particular 
outcome being examined. 𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠'[\ is a vector of controls for case-level characteristics, 
discussed in more detail below. 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦[ and 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ\ are county- and month-level fixed effects, 
and 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑎` and 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑆𝑒𝑝𝑡2007\ are indicator variables for whether a case was in 
North Carolina and after September 2007, respectively. 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐷𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛'[\ is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the juvenile was held in detention pretrial in Tennessee and if the 
juvenile was charged with a felony offense in North Carolina. The different treatment for cases 
in the two states is based on a data limitation. Only the Tennessee data contain information about 
whether juveniles are detained pretrial. Having a felony charge is used to proxy for pretrial 
detention in North Carolina because juvenile defendants there are more likely to be detained 
when they are charged with a serious offense.111  
This analysis increases the precision of the estimates by reporting the effect on the 
juvenile defendants most likely to be impacted by the ban, rather than the average effect over the 
whole population of juvenile defendants. Regardless of a change in the law, juveniles who were 
                                                             
111 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-1903(b) (stating that a juvenile may be held in secure custody if he or she is charged with 
a felony or certain misdemeanors and has demonstrated that he or she is a danger to property or persons, he or she 
has willfully failed to appear on a pending delinquency charge, there is reasonable cause to believe he or she will not 
appear in court, he or she is an absconder from a residential facility, or there is reasonable cause to believe that he or 
she should be detained for his or her own protection). 
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not detained pre-trial would never have been shackled. The triple-difference analysis also helps 
ensure that any observed changes are indeed the result of North Carolina’s legislative ban on 
indiscriminate juvenile shackling: As long as (1) there was no discrete change that occurred 
around the same time as the ban that differentially affected juvenile defendants incarcerated 
pretrial in either North Carolina or Tennessee, and (2) the parallel trends assumption is met, 𝛽O 
will represent the causal effect of North Carolina’s ban on indiscriminate juvenile shackling on 
case outcomes for juvenile defendants who may have been incarcerated pretrial. 
B. Tennessee as a Control State for North Carolina 
Tennessee was selected as the comparator state for North Carolina because as geographic 
neighbors, they are likely to have shared cultural characteristics and be impacted similarly by 
economic and ecological shocks. While North Carolina is more populous than Tennessee (by 
about 3 million individuals) and slightly more diverse (Tennessee is 79 percent white-only and 
North Carolina is 71 percent white-only), the two states have very similar education levels (both 
states have an 86 percent high school graduation rate among those 25 or older), median incomes 
(about $47,000 per year in Tennessee and $48,000 per year in North Carolina), and average 
commute times (24 minutes in North Carolina and 25 minutes in Tennessee) (U.S. Census 
Bureau b, c). Additionally, both states are predominately Republican with some predominately 
Democrat urban areas.112 In Tennessee, only two of the nine congressional districts are 
represented by a Democrat—the 5th Congressional district, which is home to the most populous 
city in the state (Nashville), and the 9th Congressional District, which is home to the second most 
                                                             
112 Although North Carolina currently has a Democratic governor, both states’ electoral college votes went to 
President Trump in the 2016 presidential election, both states have a majority Republican state house and senate, 
and both states have entirely Republican U.S. senators and majority Republican U.S. house representatives.  
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populous city in the state (Memphis). In North Carolina, only three of the thirteen congressional 
districts are represented by a Democrat—the 12th Congressional District, which is home to most 
populous city in the state (Charlotte), the 4th Congressional District, which is home to two-thirds 
of the second most populous city in the state (Raleigh), and the 1st Congressional District, which 
is home to the fourth most populous city in the state (Durham).113 
Of course, since this paper examines juvenile case outcomes, it is important to understand 
the unique aspects of North Carolina and Tennessee’s juvenile justice systems. The biggest 
difference between the two juvenile justice systems is their jurisdictional boundaries. In North 
Carolina, juvenile courts have jurisdiction to hear delinquency cases involving acts committed by 
individuals between the ages of 6 and 15, inclusive, and status offense cases involving acts 
committed by individuals between the ages of 6 and 17, inclusive.114 North Carolina juvenile 
courts do not have jurisdiction to hear cases involving juveniles who have been emancipated or 
juveniles who have previously been convicted of a crime as an adult.115 If a juvenile is 13 years 
of age or older at the time they commit an offense that would be a Class A felony in adult 
criminal proceedings, the court must transfer jurisdiction to adult court upon a finding of 
probable cause.116 If a juvenile is 13 years of age or older at the time they commit an offense that 
would be a lesser felony offense in adult criminal proceedings, the juvenile court judge has the 
option to transfer the case to adult court.117  
                                                             
113 There do not appear to have been any major political changes in North Carolina or Tennessee in 2007 that could 
bias the results. Neither state had a major election in 2007. 
114 See N.C. GEN STAT. § 7B1501, 7B-1600–1601. 
115 Id. 
116 N.C. GEN STAT. § 7B-2200. Offenses that would constitute a Class A felony in adult criminal proceedings 
include first degree murder, unlawfully and willfully injuring another by the use of a nuclear, biological, or chemical 
weapon of mass destruction, and willfully and maliciously causing the death of an unborn child. 
117 N.C. GEN STAT. § 7B-2203. 
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In Tennessee, juvenile courts have jurisdiction to hear delinquency and status offense 
cases involving acts committed by individuals under the age of 18.118 As in North Carolina, 
Tennessee juvenile courts do not have jurisdiction to hear cases involving juveniles who have 
previously been convicted of a crime as an adult.119 A juvenile court judge can elect to transfer a 
case to adult court if: (1) the juvenile was less than 14 at the time of the offense and is charged 
with first or second degree murder or attempted first or second degree murder, (2) the juvenile 
was at least 14 years old and younger than 17 years old at the time of the offense and is charged 
with “first degree murder, second degree murder, rape, aggravated rape, rape of a child, 
aggravated rape of a child, aggravated robbery, especially aggravated robbery, aggravated 
burglary, especially aggravated burglary, kidnapping, aggravated kidnapping, especially 
aggravated kidnapping, commission of an act of terrorism, carjacking, or an attempt to commit 
any such offenses,” (3) if the juvenile was 16 years or older at the time of the offense and is 
charged with robbery or attempted robbery, or (4) if the juvenile was 17 years or older at the 
time of the offense.120  
Despite these jurisdictional differences, the juvenile justice systems in the two states are 
similar in many other ways. In both states, the juvenile defense systems are organized at the local 
rather than state level.121 Both states have intake procedures and the option for diversion both 
before and after formal charges have been filed.122 Both states allow for secure detention of 
                                                             
118 TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-102–103. 
119 TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-134(c). 
120 TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-134(a). 
121 NATIONAL JUVENILE DEFENSE CENTER, State Profiles: North Carolina (July 2018), http://njdc.info/practice-
policy-resources/state-profiles/northcarolina/; NATIONAL JUVENILE DEFENSE CENTER, State Profiles: Tennessee 
(August 2018), http://njdc.info/practice-policy-resources/state-profiles/tennessee/. This could result in more 
differences in shackling practices by county, because different defenders may be challenging shackling with 
different frequencies and strategies. Heterogeneity in county shackling practices is discussed more below. 
122 N.C. GEN STAT. § 7B-1700, 7B-1706; TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-110. 
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juveniles during the pendency of their cases,123 and both states utilize risk assessment 
instruments to make disposition recommendations, develop probation case plans, and, in the case 
of North Carolina, inform intake decisions.124 In North Carolina, the use of these instruments is 
mandated by statute,125 and in Tennessee, the use of a risk assessment instrument is mandated by 
Department of Juvenile Justice policy.126 
Generally, North Carolina and Tennessee appear to be good comparator states. In order to 
ensure that the main difference in their juvenile justice systems—the age-based definition of a 
juvenile—is not driving the results discussed below, some of the analyses restrict the sample in 
both states to juveniles between the ages of 6 and 15 as a robustness check.127 
C. North Carolina’s Legislative Ban on Indiscriminate Juvenile Shackling 
On June 20, 2007, the North Carolina legislature passed a law banning the use of 
indiscriminate shackling. The law, which became effective on October 1, 2007, states 
At any hearing . . . the judge may subject a juvenile to physical restraint in the 
courtroom only when the judge finds the restraint to be reasonably necessary to 
maintain order, prevent the juvenile's escape, or provide for the safety of the 
courtroom. Whenever practical, the judge shall provide the juvenile and the 
juvenile's attorney an opportunity to be heard to contest the use of restraints 
before the judge orders the use of restraints. If restraints are ordered, the judge 
shall make findings of fact in support of the order.128 
This statutory language is fairly representative of other legislative and administrative bans on 
indiscriminate juvenile shackling. 
                                                             
123 N.C. GEN STAT. § 7B-2204(b); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-114. 
124 JUVENILE JUSTICE: GEOGRAPHY, POLICY, PRACTICE & STATISTICS, North Carolina: Juvenile Justice Services, 
http://www.jjgps.org/juvenile-justice-services/northcarolina/; JUVENILE JUSTICE: GEOGRAPHY, POLICY, PRACTICE & 
STATISTICS, Tennessee: Juvenile Justice Services, http://www.jjgps.org/juvenile-justice-services/tennessee/. 
125 N.C. GEN STAT. § 7B-2501. 
126 JUVENILE JUSTICE: GEOGRAPHY, POLICY, PRACTICE & STATISTICS, Tennessee: Juvenile Justice Services, 
http://www.jjgps.org/juvenile-justice-services/tennessee/. 
127 Age at the time of the offense is only available in North Carolina. Therefore, this restriction is based on age at the 
time of referral, which tends to be very similar to age at the time of the offense. 
128 N.C. GEN STAT. § 7B-2402.1. 
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In order for the comparison of North Carolina and Tennessee around the time of passage 
of this law to be meaningful, the law must have created a real change in the practice of 
indiscriminate juvenile shackling in North Carolina as compared to Tennessee. In other words, 
there must have been at least some counties in North Carolina that were indiscriminately 
shackling juveniles before the law became effective, the law must have been enforced such that 
indiscriminate juvenile shackling ended in those counties after the passage of the law, and there 
must have been at least some counties in Tennessee engaging in indiscriminate juvenile 
shackling between 2004 and 2012. In order to investigate these issues, I conducted informal 
interviews with lawyers practicing juvenile defense in both states and with juvenile court 
counselors in North Carolina. While I was not able to come up with a comprehensive list of 
which counties in which states were shackling juveniles when, I did gain some valuable insight 
about the source of North Carolina’s law, its effect, and the practice of indiscriminate juvenile 
shackling in Tennessee. 
 The passage of the ban on indiscriminate juvenile shackling in North Carolina was 
sparked by a juvenile delinquency case in Greensboro, North Carolina, which is located in 
Guilford County. A juvenile defendant was being shackled, and Legal Aid of North Carolina got 
involved out of fear that the shackling was traumatizing the child due to a history of abuse. The 
result was proposed legislation banning indiscriminate juvenile shackling, which ultimately 
passed with very little opposition. This legislative history suggests that the law was not 
symbolic—it was a response to actual shackling practices in the state. However, shackling 
policies often differ by county, as each county has its own juvenile court and juvenile court 
judge(s).  
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Before the law went into effect, there may have been some counties that did not 
indiscriminately shackle juveniles, and after the law went into effect, counties may have 
implemented it differently. For example, the juvenile court judge in Cumberland county (which 
includes the city of Fayetteville) currently holds a hearing in every case to determine whether the 
wrist and ankle shackles on a juvenile should be removed. In Mecklenburg (which includes the 
city of Charlotte) and Wake (which includes the city of Raleigh) counties, juveniles are 
presumptively brought into court without shackles unless there is a motion by the state 
requesting otherwise, and the juvenile court judge in Durham county (which includes the city of 
Durham) was publically criticized last year for continuing to engage in indiscriminate juvenile 
shackling, apparently in contravention of the state-wide ban (Bridges 2018). This qualitative 
information indicates that the effect of the law was not universal across the state, but there was 
an effect in some parts of the state. This means that the results presented here will underestimate 
the true effect of a meaningful ban on indiscriminate juvenile shackling. 
 The practice of indiscriminate juvenile shackling was also not universal across Tennessee 
during the time period examined here. For example, in Knox county (which includes the city of 
Knoxville), juvenile defendants were indiscriminately brought into court in ankle shackles but 
were never shackled at the wrists. In Hamilton county (which includes the city of Chattanooga), 
juvenile defendants were indiscriminately shackled at both the ankles and wrists, and in Shelby 
county (which includes the city of Memphis), juvenile defendants were never brought into court 
in restraints. Again, this information indicates that the results presented here will underestimate 
the true effect of a meaningful ban on indiscriminate juvenile shackling. In 2016 (four years after 
the end of the NJCDA data), a juvenile court rule banning indiscriminate juvenile shackling 
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became effective in Tennessee.129 A law to ban indiscriminate juvenile shackling was first 
proposed in the state in 2015 (three years after the end of the NJCDA data),130 and the push for a 
change in the law by public defenders began in 2013 (a year after the end of the NJCDA data), 
making it unlikely that any anticipatory effects would exist in the Tennessee data. 
D. National Juvenile Court Data Archive Data 
This project utilizes data on juvenile court cases in North Carolina and Tennessee from 
the year 2004 to the year 2012. The data was generated by the North Carolina Department of 
Public Safety and the Tennessee Administrative Office of the Courts, and the data was made 
available for study by the National Juvenile Court Data Archive, which is maintained by the 
National Center for Juvenile Justice in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and supported by a grant from 
the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Department of Justice.131 Since 
the data are collected by state agencies for their own information and reporting needs, rather than 
based on a data collection mandate, there are differences in the information that Tennessee and 
North Carolina collect and in the states’ methods of recording. This Part will describe how the 
data from the states were combined for analysis and provide summary statistics for each state. 
The data from both states are analyzed at the case level, rather than the charge level or the 
individual level. Some juveniles are present in the data multiple times, and many cases involve 
more than one charge.132 The North Carolina data contain information on the county where the 
case was processed, and the Tennessee data contain information on the court where the case was 
                                                             
129 TENN. R. JUV. PROC. 204 (2016). 
130 S.B. 608, 109th Sess. (Tenn. 2015). 
131 NCJFCJ and NCJJ bear no responsibility for the analyses or interpretations presented herein. 
132 The North Carolina data contain up to three charges per case. The Tennessee data contain up to five referral 
reasons (including dependency and neglect issues) per case. In both data sets, there may be more than one count of 
each charge/referral reason, allowing the total number of charges to exceed these limits. 
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processed. Since both states have one court with juvenile jurisdiction in each county (with the 
exception of a few counties that have two juvenile courts), the Tennessee court information is 
easily converted into county information to match the North Carolina data for analysis. The 
month and year assigned to a case for purposes of the double-difference and triple-difference 
analyses are the month and year of case disposal. Disposal month and year are not necessarily 
the same as case termination month and year. For example, a case is disposed when a court 
orders a term of probation, even though the case remains open pending successful completion of 
that probationary period.133  
Both datasets include cases where formal charges were filed as well as cases that were 
never formally petitioned, either because they were dropped during the intake process or 
resolved through diversion. Each case is coded as (1) dismissed, (2) transferred to adult court, or 
(3) resolved with a sentence. Cases are coded as having been transferred to adult court if any of 
the charges were transferred to adult court. Cases that were directly filed in adult court are not 
included in the data. Cases are coded as receiving a sentence if any of the charges received a 
sentence and none of the charges were transferred to adult court, and cases are coded as having 
been dismissed if all of the charges were dismissed or dropped. Sentences could be part of an 
informal diversion agreement or assigned by a judge after a finding of delinquency. Sentenced 
cases are grouped into four categories based on the most serious aspect of the sentence: 
detention, probation, treatment, and other. Treatment covers a range of medical and educational 
programs such as drug and alcohol counseling, mental health counseling, referrals to alternative 
school programs, and placement in group homes. Other sentences include fines, restitution, no 
contact orders, court defined curfews, public service, and similar court orders.  
                                                             
133 I chose to use disposal month and year instead of termination month and year because, if the dates differ, the date 
of disposition will be closest to when the outcome variables of interest were decided. 
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The Tennessee data contain information on dependency and neglect cases as well as 
delinquency and status offense cases. If a case in the data only involves dependency and neglect 
issues, it is not included in the analyses presented here. Similarly, cases from both states that 
involve only minor infractions or traffic offenses (other than driving under the influence or 
driving while ability impaired) are excluded from the analyses.134  
Following Hockenberry and Puzzanchera (2018), charges are grouped into five 
categories: crimes against persons, property crimes, drug crimes, crimes against public order, and 
status offenses. Crimes against persons include homicide, rape, robbery, assault, other sex 
offenses, kidnapping, harassment, and other similar offenses. Property crimes include arson, 
burglary, larceny, motor vehicle theft, vandalism, trespassing, fraud, and other similar offenses. 
Drug crimes include the possession, distribution, and manufacturing of illicit substances. Alcohol 
offenses are not included in drug crimes. Crimes against public order include obstruction of 
justice, disorderly conduct, weapons offenses, alcohol offenses (other than those which are status 
offenses), driving under the influence and driving while ability impaired, animal abuse, 
gambling, filing false police reports, and violations of wildlife regulations, among others. 
Finally, status offenses are those offenses that would not be a crime if the juvenile engaged in the 
same behavior as an adult. Common examples are underage drinking, possession of tobacco 
                                                             
134 In the North Carolina data, these offenses include those that were coded as an infraction rather than a felony, 
misdemeanor, or status offense, those that were traffic related other than driving under the influence and driving 
while ability impaired, and a few other miscellaneous offenses such as littering. In the Tennessee data, where 
offenses are described at a more general level, these included traffic offenses other than driving under the influence 
and local ordinance violations. Following Hockenberry and Puzzanchera (2018), minor infraction and traffic offense 
cases are excluded because they may be systematically different from other cases. If these cases are instead included 
(along with a dummy control variable equal to one when a minor infraction of traffic offense is charged), the results 
do not change substantially. The most notable difference is that the triple difference results indicate a significant 
increase in dismissals (by about 2 percentage points) and a decrease in sentencings (by about 1 percentage point), 
but only when the sample is not restricted by the age of the juvenile. 
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products, truancy, unruly behavior, and running away. About 10 percent of cases involve more 
than one type of crime.  
Other case-level demographic information is available in addition to the information on 
crimes charged and case outcomes. For example, both states have information on the age of the 
juvenile at the time of referral,135 the race and ethnicity of the juvenile,136 the sex of the juvenile, 
and the length of the case.137 Tennessee also provides information on school enrollment and 
living situation, and North Carolina also provides information on weapon use, whether there was 
a serious injury, and whether the offense was school-related. Only the Tennessee data contain 
information on pretrial detention.138 For variables that are available in both states (and will be 
included in the double-difference and triple-difference analyses), missing values are replaced by 
regression-estimated values.139 Table 2 contains case summary statistics for each state. 
Table 2. Juvenile Case Summary Statistics 
Variable Tennessee North Carolina 
Number of Cases 553,641 240,796 
   
                                                             
135 North Carolina also provides information on age at the time of the offense. In some delinquency cases, the 
reported age exceeds 15 (the oldest age for which the juvenile court would have jurisdiction), and in some status 
offense cases the reported age exceeds 17 (the oldest age for which the juvenile court would have jurisdiction). 
Since only cases with juvenile jurisdiction are included in the data, these must be the result of data entry errors; there 
are 259 such cases, and, while all crime types are represented, the majority of these cases involve person and 
property offenses. Age at offense is never included in the regression analyses (age at referral is used instead), and 
the results which restrict the sample to juveniles between the ages of 6 and 15 exclude these misreported 
observations, ensuring that they are not driving the results presented here.  
136 In Tennessee, race and ethnicity are reported separately, so that a juvenile may be coded as both black and 
Hispanic. In North Carolina, however, Hispanic is considered a race category. This means that a juvenile who is 
both black and Hispanic would be coded as multiracial in North Carolina. In order to make the data comparable, the 
Tennessee data on race and ethnicity are combined, resulting in those who are nonwhite and Hispanic being 
combined with those who are multiracial. 
137 In some instances (118 cases), case length is negative due to data entry errors. In these instances, case length is 
treated as a missing variable and replaced with the regression-estimated case length (see footnote 139). 
138 In the triple-difference analyses, pretrial detention is proxied for in North Carolina by whether the juvenile is 
charged with a felony offense. 
139 Regression-estimated values are calculated using a linear regression of all of the other case characteristics 
available in the state on the missing variable. The estimated regression equation is then used to predict a value of the 
missing variable based on the other case demographics available. This method is also used to replace missing values 
for pretrial detention in Tennessee and felony charges in North Carolina since these variables are used for triple-
difference analyses. 
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Juvenile Demographics   
Age at Referral  14.90 13.87 
Age at Offense  — 13.77 
Female 34.08% 30.33% 
White, Non-Hispanic 59.16% 39.51% 
White, Hispanic 1.31% 5.99% 
Black, Non-Hispanic 37.45% 50.30% 
Asian, Non-Hispanic 0.36% 0.52% 
Native American, Non-Hispanic 0.08% 1.72% 
Multi-Racial or Non-White, Hispanic 1.65% 1.95% 
Living with Biological Parents 16.70% — 
Living with Remarried Parent 6.57% — 
Living with Single Parent 55.39% — 
Living with Relatives 8.51% — 
Living with Adopted Parents 0.69% — 
Placed Living Situation 3.94% — 
Living Independently 0.51% — 
Other Living Situation 1.47% — 
Enrolled in School 93.40 % — 
Enrolled in Special Education Program 8.68% — 
   
Case Demographics   
Weapon Used — 15.33% 
Firearm/ Explosive Used — 1.74% 
Serious Injury — 1.87% 
School-Related Case — 31.50% 
Pretrial Detention 19.99% — 
Felony Charged — 14.09% 
Misdemeanor Charged — 72.81% 
Number of Initial Charges  1.24 1.94 
Multiple Initial Charges  18.10% 73.24% 
Charged with Crime Against Person 15.25% 34.49% 
Charged with Property Crime 19.61% 32.03% 
Charged with Drug or Alcohol Crime 7.56% 8.10% 
Charged with Public Order Crime 29.74% 16.78% 
Charged with Status Offense 36.07% 16.02% 
Length of Case (In Months) 2.48 1.95 
   
Case Outcomes   
Dismissed  35.78% 55.49% 
Transferred to Adult Court 0.54% 0.20% 
Sentenced 53.40% 42.93% 
Missing Case Outcome 10.27% 1.38% 
Harshest Sentence - Detention 8.11% 23.22% 
Harshest Sentence - Probation 39.75% 60.89% 
Harshest Sentence - Treatment 17.41% 12.10% 
Harshest Sentence - Other 34.73% 1.79% 
Missing Sentence — 2.01% 
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Notes: Observations are dropped from the Tennessee data if they do not involve any criminal charge, and 
observations are dropped from both states if they only involve traffic offenses or minor infractions. 
Observations from the North Carolina data are assigned the mean age at offense if the juvenile is over 17 at the 
time of the offense or over 15 at the time of the offense and is not charged with at least one status offense, and 
observations from the North Carolina data are recoded so that the age at offense is equal to the age at referral if 
the age at offense is greater than the age at referral. Case length is treated as missing if it is negative. Missing 
values for non-case outcome variables available in both states, pretrial detention, and felony charged are 
replaced with regression-estimated values, and missing values for variables only available in one state (other 
than pretrial detention and felony charged) are not included in this table. The sentencing percentages are 
calculated only for the sample of cases that result in a sentence. The charge categories are not mutually 
exclusive.  
Unsurprisingly, the average age at referral is higher in Tennessee, where the statutory 
definition of a juvenile is more expansive. Tennessee also has more cases involving female 
juvenile defendants and fewer cases involving minority juvenile defendants than North Carolina. 
At least some of the racial disparity is explained by the fact that North Carolina is more diverse 
than Tennessee (North Carolina is 71 percent white-only and Tennessee is 79 percent white-only 
according to the U.S. Census Bureau (b, c)). In Tennessee, about 20 percent of cases involve 
pretrial detention, which is equal to the national average in 2008 (Puzzanchera, Adams, & 
Sickmund 2011). In North Carolina, only about 14 percent of cases involve a felony charge.  
More cases in North Carolina involve multiple charges, cases take longer to resolve in 
Tennessee, and the distribution of charges between crime categories differs between the two 
states. In North Carolina, more cases involve crimes against persons and property and in 
Tennessee more cases involve status offenses and crimes against public order. Table 3 illustrates 
how the distribution of charges between crime categories in each state compares to the national 
average in 2008 (the midpoint in the data) (Puzzanchera, Adams, & Sickmund 2011). The 
national averages for property crimes and drug crimes lie above those of North Carolina and 
Tennessee, and the national average for status offenses is below those of North Carolina and 
Tennessee.  
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Table 3. Crime Category Distributions in North Carolina, Tennessee, and Nationwide (in 
2008) 
Crime Type Tennessee North Carolina 
Nationwide in 
2008 
Charged with Crime Against 
Person 
15.25% 34.49% 22% 
Charged with Property Crime 19.61% 32.03% 34% 
Charged with Drug or Alcohol 
Crime 
7.56% 8.10% 10% 
Charged with Public Order 
Crime 
29.74% 16.78% 25% 
Charged with Status Offense 36.07% 16.02% 12% 
Notes: Observations are dropped from the Tennessee data if they do not involve any criminal charge, and 
observations are dropped from both states if they only involve traffic offenses or minor infractions. The charge 
categories are not mutually exclusive, except in the nationwide data, which only look at the most serious 
charge. The nationwide information is from Puzzanchera, Adams, and Sickmund (2011). 
North Carolina also has more cases that result in a dismissal than Tennessee. Dismissals 
include voluntary dismissals by the prosecution and involuntary dismissals ordered by the judge. 
Nationwide in 2008, about 32 percent of cases were dismissed (Puzzanchera, Adams, & 
Sickmund 2011), a figure closer to the Tennessee figure than the North Carolina figure. 
Tennessee also has slightly more cases that are transferred to adult court, although transfer is 
fairly uncommon in both states. The national average for jurisdictional waivers to adult court in 
2008 was 0.49 percent, a figure very similar to that of Tennessee (Puzzanchera, Adams, & 
Sickmund 2011).  
Surprisingly few of the differences between North Carolina and Tennessee are explained 
by differences in juvenile court jurisdiction: The differences remain even when the sample is 
restricted to juveniles between the ages of 6 and 15, inclusive, at the time of case referral. 
Appendix Table A3 contains case demographics for the age-restricted sample. 
The differences in case characteristics correspond to differences in case resolutions. In 
North Carolina, where more cases that get to the sentencing stage involve crimes against persons 
and property, more cases result in detention and probation, and in Tennessee, where more cases 
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that get to the sentencing stage involve status offenses and crimes against public order, more 
cases result in treatment or some other sentence. Nationwide in 2008, about 9 percent of cases 
resulted in secure out-of-home placement, and about 21 percent of cases resulted in probation 
(Puzzanchera, Adams, & Sickmund 2011).  
As discussed above, a critical assumption of the double-difference model is that the 
trends in outcomes would have been equivalent in North Carolina and Tennessee absent the 
passage of the ban on indiscriminate juvenile shackling in North Carolina. This is often referred 
to as the parallel trends assumption. Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the raw trends in case outcomes 
and sentencing in each state from 2004 to 2012. Although not perfect, the pre-2007 trends in 
North Carolina and Tennessee appear fairly parallel. The most notable break in the parallel 
trends is when North Carolina experienced a decrease in cases transferred to adult court between 
2005 and 2006 and Tennessee did not. This is unlikely to be a major concern since the event of 
interest is in 2007 and the lines are relatively similar otherwise. The next Section will use the 
data and the methodologies just described to estimate the effects of North Carolina’s ban on 
indiscriminate juvenile shackling on case outcomes. 
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Figure 2. Trends in Case Outcomes 
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Figure 3. Trends in Case Sentencing 
 
V. The Effect of Banning Indiscriminate Juvenile Shackling 
A. Double-Difference Estimates 
Table 4 contains the regression results for Equation 1, the double-difference estimation 
using the full sample of juveniles from both states described in detail above. 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒'[\= 𝛼 + 𝛽,𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠'[\ + 𝛽5𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦[ + 𝛽:𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ\+ 𝛽I𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦[ ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑\ + 𝛽L𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑎` ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑆𝑒𝑝𝑡2007\+ 𝜖'[\ 
 
(1) 
The top row contains the coefficients of interest, representing the causal effect of North 
Carolina’s ban on indiscriminate juvenile shackling on the various case outcomes. Figure 4 
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illustrates these double-difference coefficients for each of the case outcomes. The banning of 
indiscriminate juvenile shackling resulted in more favorable case outcomes for juveniles: 
Juveniles were 0.31 percentage points less likely to have their case transferred to adult court, a 
65 percent decrease relative to the mean. Juveniles who received a sentence were also 4.10 
percentage points less likely to receive probation, 4.99 percentage points more likely to receive 
treatment, and 0.78 percentage points less likely to receive some other sentence. The last result—
that juveniles are less likely to receive some other sentence (such as a fine or community 
service)—is not necessarily a good result from the perspective of juvenile defendants. However, 
the size of this effect is dwarfed by the other, more positive results. Since all of the outcome 
variables are dummy variables equal to one if the case outcome occurred or the sentence type 
was assigned, significant changes in case outcomes represent shifts to or from other case 
outcomes and significant changes in sentence types represent shifts to or from other sentence 
types. 
Importantly, these numbers represent an underestimation of the true effect of the ban for 
a number of reasons.  There are some counties in North Carolina where the passage of the law 
did not change shackling behavior, either because juveniles were not being indiscriminately 
shackled before the law or because the law was not implemented as intended. There are also 
some counties in Tennessee that did not indiscriminately shackle juveniles during this time 
period, despite not having a ban in place. Finally, these numbers represent the average effect on 
all juveniles, including those who would not have been shackled regardless of the passage of the 
law because they were never detained pre-trial.  
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Table 4. Double-Difference Estimates of the Effect of North Carolina’s Indiscriminate 
Juvenile Shackling Ban on Case Outcomes 
        
Variable Dismissed Transferred Sentenced Detention Probation Treatment Other 
        
NC*PostSept2007 -0.0012 -0.0031*** 0.0043 -0.0011 -0.0410*** 0.0499*** -0.0078** 
 (0.0045) (0.0006) (0.0045) (0.0047) (0.0060) (0.0046) (0.0036) 
Referral Age -0.0168*** 0.0015*** 0.0152*** 0.0061*** 0.0094*** -0.0035*** -0.0120*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) 
Female 0.0517*** -0.0049*** -0.0468*** -0.0245*** 0.0037** 0.0100*** 0.0108*** 
 (0.0011) (0.0001) (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0015) (0.0012) (0.0014) 
Black, Non- -0.0246*** 0.0037*** 0.0210*** 0.0382*** 0.0136*** -0.0243*** -0.0275*** 
Hispanic (0.0014) (0.0002) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0020) (0.0015) (0.0017) 
        
Asian, Non- -0.0078 0.0022* 0.0055 0.0083 0.0135 -0.0210** -0.0007 
Hispanic (0.0082) (0.0012) (0.0082) (0.0069) (0.0109) (0.0091) (0.0101) 
        
Native American,  -0.0489*** 0.0022*** 0.0467*** 0.0143 0.0506*** -0.0351*** -0.0298*** 
Non-Hispanic (0.0087) (0.0007) (0.0087) (0.0109) (0.0121) (0.0062) (0.0051) 
        
White, Hispanic -0.0059* 0.0026*** 0.0033 0.0068** 0.0243*** -0.0156*** -0.0154*** 
 (0.0034) (0.0004) (0.0034) (0.0031) (0.0044) (0.0032) (0.0033) 
Non-White,  -0.0444*** 0.0019*** 0.0425*** 0.0341*** 0.0174*** -0.0219*** -0.0297*** 
Hispanic/Multiracial (0.0041) (0.0005) (0.0041) (0.0038) (0.0052) (0.0040) (0.0044) 
        
Number of Charges -0.0804*** 0.0053*** 0.0750*** 0.0252*** 0.0095*** 0.0133*** -0.0480*** 
 (0.0010) (0.0003) (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0014) (0.0010) (0.0010) 
Length of Case 0.0019*** 0.0001*** -0.0019*** 0.0005*** -0.0014*** -0.0016*** 0.0025*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
Person Crime -0.0010 0.0090*** -0.0080*** 0.0403*** 0.0259*** -0.0429*** -0.0233*** 
 (0.0020) (0.0004) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0027) (0.0021) (0.0021) 
Property Crime -0.0679*** 0.0011** 0.0668*** 0.0217*** 0.0302*** -0.0701*** 0.0182*** 
 (0.0021) (0.0004) (0.0021) (0.0019) (0.0027) (0.0021) (0.0022) 
Drug Crime -0.0688*** -0.0004 0.0692*** -0.0058*** 0.1065*** 0.0039 -0.1047*** 
 (0.0024) (0.0005) (0.0024) (0.0021) (0.0031) (0.0026) (0.0024) 
Public Order Crime 0.0225*** -0.0025*** -0.0200*** 0.0598*** 0.0335*** -0.0703*** -0.0230*** 
 (0.0019) (0.0004) (0.0019) (0.0018) (0.0025) (0.0019) (0.0020) 
Status Offense 0.0650*** -0.0030*** -0.0620*** -0.0120*** -0.0429*** -0.0277*** 0.0826*** 
 (0.0019) (0.0004) (0.0019) (0.0017) (0.0026) (0.0021) (0.0021) 
Constant 0.7178*** -0.0284*** 0.3107*** 0.1037*** 0.3552*** 0.2925*** 0.2486*** 
 (0.0179) (0.0012) (0.0179) (0.0164) (0.0230) (0.0178) (0.0179) 
        
Observations 728,773 728,773 728,773 393,987 393,987 393,987 393,987 
R-squared 0.2070 0.0180 0.2062 0.1982 0.2181 0.1261 0.2157 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: All estimations also include county and month fixed effects, dummy variables for whether the case demographics are 
missing, and county-specific linear time trends. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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Figure 4. Double-Difference Results 
 
The results only change slightly when the sample is restricted to juveniles between the ages of 6 
and 15, inclusive, to account for state differences in the legislative definition of a juvenile. There is still a 
significant decrease in the probability of receiving a sentence of probation (now 4.51 percentage points), 
a significant increase in the probability of receiving a sentence involving treatment (now 5.34 percentage 
points), and a significant decrease in the probability of receiving some other sentence (now 1.03 
percentage points). The decrease in the probability of transfer to adult court also remains, although it is 
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only marginally significant: Juveniles are 0.08 percentage points less likely to have their case 
transferred, a 67 percent decrease relative to the mean. Table 5 contains these age-restricted regression 
results, and Figure 5 illustrates the double-difference coefficients for each of the case outcomes.  
Table 5. Double-Difference Estimates for Juveniles Ages 6-15 
        
Variable Dismissed Transferred Sentenced Detention Probation Treatment Other 
        
NC*PostSept2007 -0.0011 -0.0008* 0.0018 0.0021 -0.0451*** 0.0534*** -0.0103** 
 (0.0052) (0.0004) (0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0070) (0.0054) (0.0049) 
Referral Age -0.0324*** 0.0004*** 0.0320*** 0.0105*** 0.0117*** -0.0043*** -0.0179*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0000) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0006) 
Female 0.0634*** -0.0013*** -0.0620*** -0.0221*** 0.0102*** 0.0034** 0.0085*** 
 (0.0014) (0.0001) (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0020) (0.0016) (0.0017) 
Black, Non- -0.0369*** 0.0013*** 0.0357*** 0.0308*** 0.0045* -0.0137*** -0.0217*** 
Hispanic (0.0018) (0.0001) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0024) (0.0019) (0.0019) 
        
Asian, Non- 0.0023 0.0033** -0.0056 -0.0020 0.0269* -0.0336*** 0.0087 
Hispanic (0.0105) (0.0014) (0.0105) (0.0093) (0.0143) (0.0108) (0.0114) 
        
Native American,  -0.0615*** -0.0000 0.0616*** 0.0132 0.0390*** -0.0299*** -0.0223*** 
Non-Hispanic (0.0091) (0.0005) (0.0091) (0.0117) (0.0125) (0.0064) (0.0046) 
        
White, Hispanic -0.0111*** 0.0013*** 0.0098** 0.0032 0.0237*** -0.0122*** -0.0147*** 
 (0.0038) (0.0003) (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0051) (0.0038) (0.0033) 
Non-White,  -0.0619*** 0.0005 0.0613*** 0.0261*** 0.0129** -0.0131*** -0.0258*** 
Hispanic/Multiracial (0.0051) (0.0003) (0.0051) (0.0046) (0.0063) (0.0051) (0.0049) 
        
Number of Charges -0.0886*** 0.0017*** 0.0868*** 0.0260*** -0.0018 0.0099*** -0.0341*** 
 (0.0013) (0.0002) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0017) (0.0013) (0.0011) 
Length of Case -0.0020*** 0.0001*** 0.0020*** 0.0013*** -0.0003 -0.0018*** 0.0008*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Person Crime  -0.0144*** 0.0016*** 0.0127*** 0.0331*** 0.0171*** -0.0235*** -0.0267*** 
 (0.0027) (0.0003) (0.0027) (0.0026) (0.0034) (0.0027) (0.0023) 
Property Crime -0.0786*** -0.0016*** 0.0802*** 0.0146*** 0.0207*** -0.0419*** 0.0065** 
 (0.0028) (0.0003) (0.0028) (0.0027) (0.0036) (0.0028) (0.0026) 
Drug Crime -0.0787*** -0.0018*** 0.0805*** 0.0006 0.0758*** 0.0094*** -0.0858*** 
 (0.0034) (0.0003) (0.0034) (0.0031) (0.0043) (0.0035) (0.0029) 
Public Order Crime  0.0070*** -0.0018*** -0.0053** 0.0432*** 0.0255*** -0.0482*** -0.0206*** 
 (0.0025) (0.0003) (0.0026) (0.0025) (0.0033) (0.0025) (0.0023) 
Status Offense 0.0265*** -0.0012*** -0.0254*** -0.0238*** -0.0227*** -0.0151*** 0.0616*** 
 (0.0027) (0.0002) (0.0027) (0.0025) (0.0035) (0.0028) (0.0027) 
Constant 0.9092*** -0.0065*** 0.0973*** 0.0144 0.4392*** 0.2809*** 0.2655*** 
 (0.0252) (0.0005) (0.0252) (0.0217) (0.0316) (0.0245) (0.0237) 
        
Observations 460,801 460,801 460,801 234,474 234,474 234,474 234,474 
R-squared 0.1871 0.0063 0.1868 0.2552 0.2499 0.1498 0.2614 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: All estimations also include county and month fixed effects, dummy variables for whether the case demographics 
are missing, and county-specific linear time trends. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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Figure 5. Age-Restricted Double-Difference Results 
 
B. Triple-Difference Estimates 
The double-difference estimates represent the causal effects of North Carolina’s ban on 
indiscriminate juvenile shackling as long as there was no other discrete change around the same 
time that affected case outcomes in either North Carolina or Tennessee. Even though background 
research revealed no such change, a triple-difference estimation can help increase confidence in 
the causal nature of the results, as well as make the results more precise, by estimating the 
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average effect on only juveniles most likely to be treated (those detained pretrial or charged with 
a felony) rather than the average effect on the entire population of juvenile defendants—some of 
whom would never have been shackled in the absence of a ban on indiscriminate shackling.  
Table 6 contains the regression results for Equation 2, the triple-difference estimation 
described in detail above.  𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒'[\= 𝛼 + 𝛽,𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠'[\ + 𝛽5𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦[ + 𝛽:𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ\+ 𝛽I𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐷𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛'[\ + 𝛽L𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦[ ∗ 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ\ + 𝛽M𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦[∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐷𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛'[\ + 𝛽N𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ\ ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐷𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛'[\+ 𝛽O𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑎` ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑆𝑒𝑝𝑡2007\ ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐷𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛'[\ + 𝜖'[\ (2) 
Again, the top row contains the coefficients of interest, representing the causal effect of North 
Carolina’s ban on indiscriminate juvenile shackling on the case outcomes of juveniles most 
likely to be impacted by the ban, and Figure 6 illustrates these triple-difference coefficients for 
each case outcome. Again, the results illustrate that the banning of indiscriminate juvenile 
shackling resulted in more favorable case outcomes for juveniles: Juveniles are 0.39 percentage 
points less likely to have their cases transferred to adult court (an 81 percent decrease relative to 
the mean). Additionally, juveniles who receive a sentence are 3.42 percentage points less likely 
to receive detention and 4.04 percentage points more likely to receive treatment.  
Table 6. Triple-Difference Estimates of the Effect of North Carolina’s Indiscriminate 
Juvenile Shackling Ban on Case Outcomes 
        
Variable Dismissed Transferred Sentenced Detention Probation Treatment Other 
        
NC*PostSept2007*  0.0099 -0.0039** -0.0060 -0.0342*** -0.0045 0.0404*** -0.0017 
Pretrial Detention (0.0063) (0.0016) (0.0063) (0.0067) (0.0084) (0.0065) (0.0056) 
        
Referral Age -0.0154*** 0.0015*** 0.0139*** 0.0051*** 0.0075*** -0.0036*** -0.0090*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) 
Female 0.0394*** -0.0043*** -0.0351*** -0.0207*** 0.0005 0.0112*** 0.0090*** 
 (0.0011) (0.0001) (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0016) (0.0013) (0.0015) 
Black, Non- -0.0168*** 0.0031*** 0.0137*** 0.0361*** 0.0125*** -0.0248*** -0.0238*** 
Hispanic (0.0014) (0.0002) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0020) (0.0015) (0.0017) 
        
Asian, Non- -0.0036 0.0027** 0.0008 0.0077 0.0051 -0.0155* 0.0027 
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Hispanic (0.0080) (0.0012) (0.0080) (0.0068) (0.0110) (0.0091) (0.0104) 
        
Native American,  -0.0448*** 0.0018** 0.0430*** 0.0044 0.0489*** -0.0299*** -0.0234*** 
Non-Hispanic (0.0086) (0.0008) (0.0086) (0.0113) (0.0125) (0.0067) (0.0053) 
        
White, Hispanic -0.0016 0.0024*** -0.0008 0.0066** 0.0203*** -0.0150*** -0.0119*** 
 (0.0033) (0.0004) (0.0033) (0.0031) (0.0045) (0.0033) (0.0034) 
Non-White,  -0.0360*** 0.0017*** 0.0343*** 0.0325*** 0.0117** -0.0194*** -0.0248*** 
Hispanic/Multiracial (0.0040) (0.0005) (0.0041) (0.0037) (0.0053) (0.0040) (0.0045) 
        
Number of Charges -0.0619*** 0.0056*** 0.0563*** 0.0180*** 0.0205*** 0.0107*** -0.0492*** 
 (0.0011) (0.0003) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0015) (0.0011) (0.0012) 
Length of Case 0.0023*** -0.0000 -0.0023*** 0.0005*** -0.0013*** -0.0016*** 0.0024*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
Person Crime -0.0199*** 0.0080*** 0.0119*** 0.0361*** 0.0042 -0.0359*** -0.0043* 
 (0.0020) (0.0005) (0.0021) (0.0020) (0.0028) (0.0022) (0.0022) 
Property Crime -0.0540*** -0.0011** 0.0551*** 0.0145*** 0.0214*** -0.0656*** 0.0297*** 
 (0.0021) (0.0005) (0.0021) (0.0019) (0.0028) (0.0022) (0.0023) 
Drug Crime -0.0675*** -0.0021*** 0.0696*** -0.0092*** 0.0918*** 0.0086*** -0.0912*** 
 (0.0024) (0.0005) (0.0024) (0.0021) (0.0032) (0.0027) (0.0026) 
Public Order Crime  0.0106*** -0.0041*** -0.0065*** 0.0578*** 0.0127*** -0.0621*** -0.0084*** 
 (0.0019) (0.0004) (0.0019) (0.0018) (0.0026) (0.0020) (0.0021) 
Status Offense 0.0403*** -0.0035*** -0.0368*** -0.0061*** -0.0630*** -0.0228*** 0.0920*** 
 (0.0020) (0.0004) (0.0020) (0.0018) (0.0027) (0.0022) (0.0023) 
Constant 0.7651*** -0.0245*** 0.2594*** -0.0103*** 0.3113*** 0.2518*** 0.4471*** 
 (0.0040) (0.0006) (0.0040) (0.0035) (0.0058) (0.0047) (0.0059) 
        
Observations 727,935 727,935 727,935 392,517 392,517 392,517 392,517 
R-squared 0.2820 0.0546 0.2795 0.2872 0.2971 0.2139 0.2848 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: All estimations also include county and month fixed effects, county-by-month fixed effects, month-by-pretrial detention 
fixed effects, county-by-pretrial detention fixed effects, and dummy variables for whether the case demographics are missing. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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Figure 6. Triple-Difference Results 
 
The results change slightly when the sample is restricted to juveniles between the ages of 
6 and 15, inclusive, to account for legislative differences in the definition of a juvenile. Juvenile 
defendants are marginally significantly less likely to receive a sentence (by 1.27 percentage 
points), and there is no longer a significant effect on the likelihood of transfer to adult court, 
suggesting that this result is driven by the older juveniles present in the Tennessee data. Juveniles 
who are sentenced are still less likely to receive detention (by 3.63 percentage points) and more 
likely to receive treatment (by 4.13 percentage points), but they are also significantly less likely 
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to receive some other sentence (by 1.88 percentage points). Again, the decrease in the probability 
of some other (relatively minor) sentence may not be a good outcome from the perspective of 
juvenile defendants, but the size of the effect is small relative to the decrease in the probability of 
detention and the increase in the probability of treatment. Table 7 contains the regression results, 
restricting the sample to juveniles between the ages of 6 and 15, inclusive, at the time of case 
referral, and Figure 7 depicts the triple-difference coefficients for each case outcome. 
Table 7. Triple-Difference Estimates for Juveniles Ages 6-15 
        
Variable Dismissed Transferred Sentenced Detention Probation Treatment Other 
        
NC*PostSept2007*  0.0117 0.0010 -0.0127* -0.0363*** 0.0139 0.0413*** -0.0188** 
Pretrial Detention (0.0075) (0.0013) (0.0075) (0.0077) (0.0105) (0.0086) (0.0079) 
        
Referral Age -0.0298*** 0.0004*** 0.0294*** 0.0092*** 0.0091*** -0.0040*** -0.0144*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0000) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0006) 
Female 0.0481*** -0.0008*** -0.0473*** -0.0182*** 0.0058*** 0.0043*** 0.0081*** 
 (0.0014) (0.0001) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0021) (0.0017) (0.0018) 
Black, Non- -0.0302*** 0.0011*** 0.0292*** 0.0297*** 0.0058** -0.0159*** -0.0196*** 
Hispanic (0.0018) (0.0001) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0025) (0.0020) (0.0020) 
        
Asian, Non- 0.0041 0.0036** -0.0076 -0.0025 0.0250* -0.0330*** 0.0105 
Hispanic (0.0102) (0.0014) (0.0103) (0.0094) (0.0145) (0.0110) (0.0118) 
        
Native American,  -0.0585*** 0.0000 0.0585*** 0.0052 0.0405*** -0.0264*** -0.0193*** 
Non-Hispanic (0.0091) (0.0006) (0.0091) (0.0124) (0.0131) (0.0070) (0.0048) 
        
White, Hispanic -0.0065* 0.0012*** 0.0052 0.0043 0.0219*** -0.0132*** -0.0131*** 
 (0.0038) (0.0003) (0.0038) (0.0039) (0.0053) (0.0038) (0.0035) 
Non-White,  -0.0527*** 0.0004 0.0523*** 0.0248*** 0.0086 -0.0113** -0.0221*** 
Hispanic/Multiracial (0.0051) (0.0004) (0.0051) (0.0046) (0.0066) (0.0052) (0.0052) 
        
Number of Charges -0.0625*** 0.0011*** 0.0614*** 0.0201*** 0.0119*** 0.0027* -0.0347*** 
 (0.0015) (0.0002) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0019) (0.0014) (0.0013) 
Length of Case -0.0013*** 0.0000** 0.0013*** 0.0013*** -0.0004 -0.0017*** 0.0008*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Person Crime -0.0448*** 0.0025*** 0.0423*** 0.0326*** -0.0087** -0.0146*** -0.0094*** 
 (0.0027) (0.0003) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0036) (0.0028) (0.0025) 
Property Crime -0.0657*** -0.0022*** 0.0679*** 0.0077*** 0.0091** -0.0329*** 0.0161*** 
 (0.0029) (0.0003) (0.0029) (0.0028) (0.0038) (0.0029) (0.0027) 
Drug Crime -0.0774*** -0.0018*** 0.0792*** -0.0032 0.0610*** 0.0160*** -0.0738*** 
 (0.0034) (0.0003) (0.0034) (0.0032) (0.0045) (0.0036) (0.0031) 
Public Order Crime -0.0169*** -0.0010*** 0.0180*** 0.0441*** 0.0007 -0.0380*** -0.0068*** 
 (0.0026) (0.0003) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0035) (0.0027) (0.0025) 
Status Offense -0.0077*** -0.0003 0.0081*** -0.0179*** -0.0449*** -0.0075** 0.0702*** 
 (0.0028) (0.0002) (0.0028) (0.0026) (0.0037) (0.0029) (0.0029) 
Constant 1.0304*** -0.0055*** -0.0249*** -0.0399*** 0.3443*** 0.2420*** 0.4537*** 
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 (0.0057) (0.0004) (0.0057) (0.0058) (0.0090) (0.0075) (0.0084) 
        
Observations 459,504 459,504 459,504 232,415 232,415 232,415 232,415 
R-squared 0.2821 0.0725 0.2803 0.3613 0.3506 0.2627 0.3517 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: All estimations also include county and month fixed effects, county-by-month fixed effects, month-by-pretrial detention 
fixed effects, county-by-pretrial detention fixed effects, and dummy variables for whether the case demographics are missing. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Figure 7. Age-Restricted Triple-Difference Results  
 
VI. Heterogeneous Effects Across Crimes and Juveniles 
The results presented above illustrate that North Carolina’s ban on indiscriminate 
juvenile shackling improved case outcomes for juveniles. It is possible, however, that the 
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majority of these benefits are concentrated among certain juveniles or certain types of cases. The 
results from Chapter Two revealed that shackling has very little effect on trial outcomes in the 
context of a nonviolent property crime in adult court. If this finding carries over to the juvenile 
context, it would suggest that the majority of the effects are concentrated among non-property 
crime cases. Moreover, the effects in different cases for different types of defendants could be 
counteracting. For example, seeing a 15 year old male defendant accused of assault in shackles 
may lead decisionmakers to make assumptions about dangerousness—resulting in harsher case 
outcomes—while seeing a 10 year old female defendant accused of truancy in shackles may 
engender feelings of sympathy in decisionmakers—resulting in more lenient case outcomes.  
In order to examine whether the effects of the ban on indiscriminate juvenile shackling 
are heterogeneous across juveniles and case types, Equation 2 is estimated for (1) female 
defendants, (2) male defendants, (3) white defendants, (4) black defendants, (5) defendants 
between the ages of 6 and 13, inclusive, (6) defendants 14 or 15 years old, (7) defendants 
charged with a crime against a person, (8) defendants charged with a property crime, (9) 
defendants charged with a drug crime, (10) defendants charged with a crime against public order, 
and (11) defendants charged with a status offense. In order to maintain adequate sample sizes, 
juveniles of all ages are included (except where heterogeneity by age is being examined). The 
triple-difference coefficients of interest are presented in Table 8.   
Table 8. Triple-Difference Estimates for Various Subsets of Cases 
        
Variable Dismissed Transferred Sentenced Detention Probation Treatment Other 
        
Male  0.0143** -0.0034* -0.0109 -0.0352*** 0.0039 0.0239*** 0.0075 
 (0.0072) (0.0019) (0.0072) (0.0077) (0.0097) (0.0075) (0.0066) 
Female 0.0090 -0.0018 -0.0072 -0.0246 -0.0049 0.0536*** -0.0241* 
 (0.0180) (0.0026) (0.0180) (0.0178) (0.0220) (0.0161) (0.0127) 
White 0.0110 -0.0053*** -0.0057 -0.0242** -0.0265** 0.0256** 0.0251*** 
 (0.0103) (0.0016) (0.0104) (0.0099) (0.0132) (0.0102) (0.0077) 
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Black 0.0103 -0.0024 -0.0079 -0.0682*** 0.0401*** 0.0689*** -0.0408*** 
 (0.0088) (0.0025) (0.0089) (0.0102) (0.0127) (0.0104) (0.0097) 
Ages 6–13 -0.0198 0.0009 0.0188 -0.0283* -0.0316 0.0422** 0.0177 
 (0.0150) (0.0008) (0.0150) (0.0147) (0.0213) (0.0182) (0.0158) 
Ages 14–15 0.0262*** 0.0008 -0.0271*** -0.0407*** 0.0392*** 0.0493*** -0.0478*** 
 (0.0090) (0.0017) (0.0090) (0.0093) (0.0126) (0.0102) (0.0096) 
Person 0.0015 0.0040 -0.0054 -0.0853*** 0.0326 0.0419*** 0.0109 
Crime (0.0142) (0.0066) (0.0149) (0.0174) (0.0207) (0.0158) (0.0138) 
        
Property  -0.0247** -0.0083*** 0.0330*** -0.0439*** 0.0451*** 0.0568*** -0.0580*** 
Crime (0.0108) (0.0025) (0.0109) (0.0115) (0.0149) (0.0116) (0.0114) 
        
Drug Crime -0.0009 0.0047 -0.0038 -0.0522** 0.0797** -0.0386 0.0111 
 (0.0225) (0.0044) (0.0226) (0.0239) (0.0313) (0.0243) (0.0186) 
Public Order  -0.0353* -0.0021 0.0374* -0.0148 -0.0364 0.0067 0.0445*** 
Crime (0.0206) (0.0034) (0.0208) (0.0238) (0.0273) (0.0192) (0.0115) 
        
Status  -0.0759 -0.0009 0.0768 -0.4417*** 0.3790*** 0.1183* -0.0556* 
Offense (0.0871) (0.0017) (0.0870) (0.1101) (0.1389) (0.0704) (0.0338) 
        
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: All estimations also include county and month fixed effects, county-by-month fixed effects, month-by-pretrial 
detention fixed effects, county-by-pretrial detention fixed effects, controls for the same case demographics presented in 
Table 5, and dummy variables for whether the case demographics are missing. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
The results suggest that older males benefit the most from bans on indiscriminate juvenile 
shackling. Female juveniles are significantly more likely to receive a treatment-based sentence 
(by almost 6 percentage points), but the only other marginally significant result for female 
juveniles is that they are significantly less likely to receive some other (relatively minor) 
sentence. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the sample of female juvenile defendants is 
smaller than the sample of male juvenile defendants, which could be responsible for some of the 
lack of significance. Similarly, juveniles ages 6–13 are significantly more likely to receive a 
treatment-based sentence, and marginally significantly less likely to receive a detention sentence, 
but these effects are smaller in magnitude than those for older juveniles, who also experience 
additional significant benefits. 
The race-based comparison is more complex. White juveniles are significantly less likely 
to have their cases transferred to adult court, significantly less likely to be sentenced to detention 
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or probation, and significantly more likely to be sentenced to treatment or some other sanction 
(like a fine or community service). All of the sentencing effects are between 2 and 3 percentage 
points. The effects on the likelihoods of receiving a detention sentence and a treatment-based 
sentence are much larger for black juveniles—almost seven percentage points. However, black 
juveniles are also significantly less likely to receive some other (relatively minor) sentence and 
significantly more likely to be sentenced to probation (each by about 4 percentage points). They 
also do not experience a significant decrease in the probability of transfer to adult court.  
The effects also differ by crime type. The ban resulted in a decrease in the probability of 
receiving a sentence of detention and an increase in the probability of receiving a treatment-
based sentence in cases involving crimes against people. Similarly, in drug crime cases, the ban 
resulted in a decrease in the probability of receiving a sentence of detention and an increase in 
the probability of receiving a sentence of probation. In property crime cases and cases involving 
crimes against public order, however, the effects are not universally positive for juvenile 
defendants. For property crime cases, the probability of a case being transferred to adult court 
decreased, the probability of receiving a sentence of detention decreased, and the probability of 
receiving a treatment-based sentence increased. In contrast, the probability of a case being 
dismissed decreased, the probability of a case resulting in a sentence increased, and the 
probability of receiving some other sentence (such as a fine) decreased. These results, in 
combination with those from Chapter Two, suggest that there is something unique about property 
crime cases in terms of the effects of defendant appearance. In cases involving a crime against 
public order, the probability of receiving some other sentence (such as a fine) went up, but the 
probability of dismissal went down, and the probability of receiving some kind of sentence went 
up (although both of these effects are only significant at the 10 percent level).  
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Finally, the effect of the ban on outcomes of cases involving status offenses is enormous. 
The probability of receiving a sentence involving detention decreased by 44.17 percentage 
points, the probability of receiving a sentence of probation increased by 37.9 percentage points, 
the probability of receiving a treatment-based sentence increased by 11.83 percentage points, and 
the probability of receiving some other sentence decreased by 5.56 percentage points. The 
relative size of these coefficients may be based on the relatively small number of cases (118) in 
North Carolina that involve a status offense as well as a felony offense (the variable used as a 
proxy for pretrial detention in North Carolina). Nevertheless, these results suggest that shackling 
in status offense cases—arguably the cases where shackling is most likely to be extraneous—is 
particularly harmful for juvenile defendants.  
VII. Discussion and Conclusion 
The results presented above illustrate that North Carolina’s ban on indiscriminate 
juvenile shackling resulted in more favorable case outcomes for juveniles. Specifically, the 
triple-difference results show a decrease in the probability of detention and an increase in the 
probability of treatment among juveniles who receive a sentence. These effects are large—
representing changes of three to four percentage points. The size and significance of the effects 
are particularly striking, given the fact that the estimates represent lower bounds on the actual 
size of the effects. Some counties in North Carolina may not have been indiscriminately 
shackling juvenile defendants even prior to the passage of the law, and some counties in 
Tennessee were not indiscriminately shackling juveniles even though it was legal.  
There are at least two reasons why a ban on indiscriminate juvenile shackling could lead 
to better outcomes for juveniles. First, decisionmakers may be influenced by the appearance of 
shackled juvenile defendants. If decisionmakers associate shackling with dangerousness, for 
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example, then a ban on indiscriminate juvenile shackling would lead to more favorable case 
outcomes for juveniles. In order to cause the results presented here, the shackles themselves (and 
not the fact that they signal pretrial detention, for example) must bias the decisionmaker. North 
Carolina’s legislative ban on indiscriminate juvenile shackling did nothing to change 
decisionmakers’ access to other information (such as that related to pretrial detention); the law 
only narrowed the circumstances under which a judge could allow shackling, necessarily 
reducing the percentage of defendants actually shackled.  
The results could also be caused by changes in juvenile defendant behavior brought about 
by the banning of indiscriminate juvenile shackling. For example, if juveniles feel less ashamed 
and are better able to communicate with their attorneys and the judge when they are not 
shackled, that behavior could lead to more favorable case outcomes. Exploring which of these 
mechanisms is primarily responsible for the results presented here remains an important issue for 
future research.  
The results are primarily concentrated among older, male juveniles who are 
disproportionately represented in the juvenile justice system, and the effects on the probability of 
detention and treatment-based sentences are largest (about 7 percentage points) for black 
juveniles. This heterogeneity either means that older, black, male juveniles’ behavior is more 
affected by shackles or that decisionmakers are more biased against older, black, male juveniles 
when they see them in shackles. It also suggests that a nationwide ban on indiscriminate juvenile 
shackling may reduce some of the race, gender, and age-based disparities currently present in the 
juvenile justice system. 
The effects also differ based on the crimes charged. While outcomes universally improve 
in cases involving drug crimes, crimes against persons, and status offenses, the results are mixed 
 
 
202 
in cases involving property crimes and crimes against public order. Sentencing outcomes 
improve for juveniles that receive a sentence, but fewer cases are dismissed and more cases 
result in a sentence. If the ban is primarily affecting case outcomes by changing juvenile 
behavior, this would indicate that juvenile defendants charged with drug offenses, status 
offenses, and crimes against persons are more impacted by the presence of shackles (and 
therefore gain the most from the passage of the ban). If instead the ban is primarily affecting case 
outcomes by reducing appearance bias, this would indicate that decisionmakers are more biased 
against juvenile defendants charged with drug offenses, status offenses, and crimes against 
persons based on the presence of shackles.   
The results presented here stand in contrast to the results of Chapter Two, which found a 
very limited effect of shackles in the context of an adult criminal trial for a nonviolent property 
crime. There are a few possible explanations. First, shackling may simply have a greater effect in 
the juvenile context. This could be because the sight of a shackled juvenile defendant serves as a 
greater signal of dangerousness than the sight of a shackled adult defendant or because juvenile 
defendants’ behavior is more affected by shackling than adult defendants’ behavior.  
Alternatively, and perhaps more likely, the effects of shackling may be parallel in the 
adult and juvenile contexts, and the difference in results may be explained by differences in the 
scopes of the studies. This could be the case if the effect of shackling in the adult context—like 
in the juvenile context—is heterogeneous based on the crime charged. Chapter Two focuses 
exclusively on nonviolent property crime cases, which the results in this Chapter suggest may be 
one of a few types of cases in which shackling does not influence case outcomes in a clear-cut 
direction. This could also be the case if shackling only influences case outcomes outside the 
structured environment of a trial (for example, through dismissals) or if shackling only 
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influences decisionmakers choice between types of punishment and not the length of punishment 
given a sentence of incarceration. Finally, this could be the case if shackling influences case 
outcomes by influencing defendant behavior, as Chapter Two focuses exclusively on the 
appearance effect of shackling.  
Whatever the cause of the results and the difference between the findings presented here 
and in Chapter Two, the results from this Chapter suggest that shackling is inappropriately 
influencing juvenile case outcomes, providing strong empirical support for a national ban on 
indiscriminate juvenile shackling, either through an extension of the Due Process rights 
recognized in Deck v. Missouri or through legislative or regulatory action.140  
While the holding of Deck does not directly apply to the context examined here—these 
are juvenile proceedings before a judge rather than a jury and many of the results relate to 
sentencing decisions rather than determinations of guilt—some of the concerns expressed by the 
Court in Deck may have similar force here. As in Deck, the government is taking action to 
restrain defendants in a way that could undermine the presumption of innocence at the guilt 
determination phase, interfere with communication between defendant and counsel, and 
undermine the dignity and rehabilitative goals of the juvenile system.141 The results in this 
Chapter may indicate that shackling undermines the presumption of innocence—in some 
specifications the ban significantly reduced the odds that a juvenile received any sentence, which 
is the case outcome most directly related to the determination of guilt. More definitively, the 
results presented here illustrate that indiscriminate shackling undermines the rehabilitative goals 
of the juvenile system—juveniles had a significantly higher probability of being sentenced to 
detention and a significantly lower probability of receiving a treatment-based sentence when 
                                                             
140 544 U.S. 622 (2005). 
141 Id.  
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indiscriminate juvenile shackling was permitted. The results also support an argument that Due 
Process protections are necessary to fundamental fairness, as required by the Court in In Re 
Gault.142 State intervention through shackling results in harsher case outcomes specifically for 
juveniles detained pretrial. This means that, on average, indiscriminate juvenile shackling results 
in juveniles who are detained pretrial being worse off in terms of their case outcomes than they 
would be absent pretrial detention.  
Even if the Court were to hold that indiscriminate juvenile shackling is not 
unconstitutional, the results in this Chapter provide sufficient justification for more legislative or 
regulatory state-wide bans. In considering whether to adopt these bans and how to design them, 
however, policymakers should consider both the costs and the benefits.143 A complete cost-
benefit analysis is beyond the scope of this paper and will likely be state-specific, but a 
generalized taxonomy of potential costs and benefits may be illustrative.  
First, this paper illustrates three distinct benefits stemming from a state-wide ban on 
indiscriminate juvenile shackling: (1) greater equality and fairness, (2) increased opportunity for 
rehabilitation, and (3) either a decrease in the impact of appearance bias or a change in juvenile 
behavior leading to more lenient case outcomes. As discussed briefly above, the results represent 
an increase in equality and fairness because only juveniles who are subject to pretrial detention 
will experience the harsher case outcomes associated with indiscriminate juvenile shackling. 
Increased fairness is a benefit of the ban in and of itself, and it may also lead to increased faith in 
                                                             
142 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
143 Cost-benefit analyses are increasingly being applied in the criminal justice realm. For example, Abrams (2013) 
conducts cost-benefit analyses on three types of sentencing and release policies, Abrams and Rohlfs (2011) 
determine optimal monetary bail amounts for felony defendants in Philadelphia using a cost-benefit analysis, Yang 
(2017) analyzes bail systems more generally using a cost-benefit framework, and Brown (2004) argues for a greater 
use of cost-benefit analyses in the criminal realm generally. 
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the juvenile justice system by society at large.144 Such an effect could in turn encourage reporting 
of juvenile crimes, which may increase community safety and reduce crime in the long run by 
rehabilitating youth—the intended purpose of the system.145  
The results also indicate that a state-wide ban on indiscriminate juvenile shackling can 
further the rehabilitative goals of the juvenile system by increasing the probability that a juvenile 
is sentenced to treatment and decreasing the probability that a juvenile is sentenced to detention. 
This shift in case outcomes not only represents a benefit in terms of recommitting to the goals of 
the juvenile justice system, but it is also likely to lead to large and concrete benefits for society. 
Of course, the rehabilitative benefits of treatment as compared to detention will depend on the 
type of treatment and the detention system in the state, but research suggests that effective 
treatment programs can significantly reduce juvenile recidivism, whereas institutional placement 
may not.146 Moreover, prior research indicates that effective treatment can have long-term 
positive effects on juveniles, such as increasing graduation rates and reducing mortality rates, 
which may create positive externalities for communities with at-risk youth (Heller et al. 2017). 
Finally, regardless of whether a decrease in the effect of appearance bias or a change in juvenile 
                                                             
144 Previous research has illustrated that public trust and confidence in the legal system is strongly influenced by 
judgements about the fairness of procedures (Tyler & Fagan 2008), even more than assessments of effectiveness or 
beliefs about the fairness of the distribution of services (Tyler 2005).  
145 Studies have linked legal cynicism in communities to decreased criminal reporting and increased violent self-help 
alternatives, such as homicide (Kirk & Matsuda 2011; Kirk & Papachristos 2011). 
146 One study using longitudinal data from a large sample of serious juvenile offenders in two large cities found a 
null effect of institutional placement on future rates of re-arrest and self-reported offending when compared to 
probation (Loughran et al. 2009), while a study of juvenile correctional facilities in Ohio found that facilities that 
served higher risk youth, targeted dynamic risk factors with cognitive behavioral modalities, and employed trained 
and qualified staff were most effective at reducing recidivism (Lowenkamp et al. 2010). Conversely, meta-analyses 
of treatment programs typically report positive effects on recidivism (see Lipsey 1999). Specifically, some studies 
have found positive effects of youth summer employment programs, which decreased violence among 
disadvantaged youth in Chicago by 43 percent over 16 months (Heller 2014) and programs that help youth slow 
down and reflect on their automatic thought processes and resulting behaviors, which decreased readmission rates 
among juvenile detainees by 21 percent (Heller et al. 2017).   
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behavior explain the results in this Chapter, either mechanism represents a direct benefit from the 
state-wide ban on indiscriminate juvenile shackling.  
Of course, any policy, no matter how beneficial, comes with some costs. The potential 
costs of a state-wide ban on indiscriminate juvenile shackling include (1) the cost of holding 
additional hearings to determine which juveniles should be shackled, (2) increased administrative 
and security costs to maintain order in the courtroom, (3) the costs of type I (shackling non-
dangerous juveniles) and type II errors (failing to shackle dangerous juveniles), and (4) the cost 
of decreased deterrence due to a reduction in the seriousness of case outcomes. The cost of 
additional hearings will depend on the default option adopted in the statute or regulation (or by 
the court in the absence of clear guidance). To minimize this cost, juveniles could be 
presumptively unshackled absent a motion by the prosecution to hold a hearing on the issue. 
Alternatively, a hearing could be held in every case to determine whether shackling is 
appropriate. The latter method may result in fewer type II errors, which are discussed in more 
detail below. Given existing qualitative evidence that type II errors are relatively uncommon in 
states that have adopted a ban, however, the additional costs of holding a proceeding for every 
juvenile are probably not justified (Shaddox 2016).  
The precise size of the administrative and security costs associated with bans on 
indiscriminate juvenile shackling may also vary between states, but they arguably do not exceed 
the benefits of a ban. Juveniles who are considered to be serious security threats can be shackled 
even after indiscriminate juvenile shackling is banned, limiting the need to hire additional 
security and administrative personnel. Nevertheless, a state may elect to hire more security and 
administrative personnel to minimize the impact of type II errors (failures to shackle dangerous 
defendants, discussed below). Again, these costs are likely to be minimal. According to Shaddox 
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(2016), New Orleans Parish, Louisiana actually reduced staffing after indiscriminate juvenile 
shackling was banned due to budget cuts. Despite holding roughly 4,000 juvenile hearing a year, 
it had had no security incidences as of 2016 (Shaddox 2016). Conversely, Clayton County in 
Georgia (which encompasses a portion of the greater Atlanta area) hired an additional deputy to 
be stationed outside the court after indiscriminate juvenile shackling was banned (Shaddox 
2016). After more than a year, the deputy’s services had never been required due to a lack of 
incidences (Shaddox 2016).  
The largest costs associated with state-wide bans on indiscriminate juvenile shackling are 
likely to be those associated with type I and type II errors. Wrongfully ordering the shackling of 
a juvenile (a type I error) may be more costly than indiscriminately shackling a juvenile for a 
couple of reasons. First, the appearance bias effects and juvenile behavior effects of shackling 
may be exaggerated in this instance. Rather than appearing in shackles along with every other 
juvenile who is detained pretrial, the juvenile will be one of only a select few juveniles in 
shackles. Additionally, the juvenile will know that the court ordered them to appear in shackles 
specifically, which may cause them even more shame and humiliation. The shackling 
determination may also have an anchoring effect on future decisions in the case. If the juvenile is 
shackled based on a finding by the judge that he or she is dangerous, for example, a prosecutor 
may be less willing to negotiate a favorable plea bargain.  
Failing to shackle a dangerous defendant (a type II error) can also be costly. The juvenile 
may escape, cause property damage, or harm another individual. Qualitative evidence from states 
that have passed a ban indicate that costly errors of this sort are infrequent (Shaddox 2016). For 
example, Miami-Dade County in Florida (which contains the city of Miami) banned 
indiscriminate juvenile shackling in 2006 (Shaddox 2016). As of 2016, more than 25,000 
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juveniles had appeared in court post-ban without injury or escape (Shaddox 2016). Similarly, 
Connecticut limited juvenile shackling in 2015. Post-ban, 94 percent of juveniles appeared in 
court without shackles, and only one escape attempt had occurred as of 2016—a youth walked 
out of court and turned himself in later that day (Shaddox 2016).  
Nevertheless, there is a natural tradeoff between type I and type II errors that cannot be 
avoided. Policymakers can control this tradeoff by manipulating the amount of evidence required 
to justify shackling. For example, North Carolina’s ban allows for shackling in cases where a 
judge finds it is “reasonably necessary to maintain order, prevent the juvenile's escape, or 
provide for the safety of the courtroom.”147 Alternatives include a broader exception such as 
“whenever the judge finds that shackling is reasonable,” and a narrower exception requiring a 
compelling state justification, as the Court did in Deck.148 The evidence suggesting that type II 
errors are infrequent indicates that a narrower exception is more appropriate. A narrower 
exception will also minimize type I errors and maximize the benefits that stem from a ban. 
Finally, there is a possibility that a state-wide ban on indiscriminate juvenile shackling 
could increase juvenile crime rates by decreasing deterrence. In order for this to be the case, 
juveniles must be making rational decisions about whether to commit crime and be informed 
about the probabilities of receiving various case outcomes and how they change after the passage 
of a ban. There is some evidence that juvenile offenders are rational decisionmakers—in the 
sense that salient risks and costs of crime reduce offense rates—but mental health and 
developmental maturity moderate these effects (Fagan & Piquero 2007; Levitt1998; Mocan & 
Rees 2005). Yet it is unclear whether changes in the distribution of sentence types, like those that 
result from the passage of a ban on indiscriminate juvenile shackling, would be salient enough to 
                                                             
147 Id. 
148 544 U.S. 622 (2005). 
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change behavior. Even if bans did reduce deterrence, the rehabilitative effects of increased 
reliance on treatment discussed above arguably cancel out at least some of the effect on crime 
rates.  
Overall, a first pass at a cost-benefit analysis of a juvenile shackling ban indicates that the 
increased fairness, rehabilitation, and improved case outcomes for juveniles through either a 
reduction in appearance bias or changes in juvenile behavior outweigh the administrative, error-
related, and deterrence costs. Even if indiscriminate juvenile shackling is not unconstitutional, 
states should stop focusing on whether or not a state-wide ban is necessary and start focusing on 
the best way to design and implement a ban to maximize social welfare, given the costs and 
benefits discussed above. 
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APPENDIX 
I. Appendix A: First Survey Outline 
First, all respondents viewed a consent screen and confirmed that they were over the age 
of 18. Then, all respondents viewed a random version of an employment hiring scenario 
unrelated to this dissertation. Next, all respondents viewed a random version of the vandalism 
trial question. There were 24 versions: the two different case variations below accompanied by a 
picture of the defendant who is either white or black; shackled or not; and in a suit, jeans and a t-
shirt, or a jumpsuit.  
A. Vandalism Variation 1 
You have been selected to serve on a jury in a criminal trial. The defendant is Michael Jones, 
pictured below as he appears in court on the day of trial. The sole charge against Mr. Jones is 
vandalism, and he has pleaded not guilty. After reading the trial materials, you will be asked to 
decide whether the prosecution has proven that Mr. Jones is guilty of vandalism beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
[picture of defendant] 
 
The object of the vandalism was a cement statue that is owned by the city and depicts the city’s 
founder. The city had not given anyone permission to paint the statue. 
 
The first prosecution witness was working at a store across the street from the statue. He testifies 
that around 9:30pm he heard someone laughing loudly. When he looked through the store 
window, he saw a man painting yellow pants on the statue. The witness then went outside and 
saw the man run over to a green truck with a broken right taillight. The man was approximately 
5’ 10’’, normal weight, and wearing a red jacket, jeans, and sneakers. The man entered the truck 
and sped away. 
 
The second prosecution witness is a police officer. He testifies that he canvassed the area after 
receiving the above description from the eyewitness. At a house about five blocks away, he 
noticed a green truck with a broken right taillight, knocked on the door, and saw Mr. Jones 
wearing a red jacket, jeans, and sneakers. There were two other men at the house. Mr. Jones told 
the officer he had been with them at the house playing video games all night. Later, the police 
officer searched the house and found an open can of yellow paint in the basement. The police 
officer testifies that, based on a visual comparison, the paint in the basement is the same shade as 
that used on the statue. However, during cross-examination, he admits that he did not see any 
paint on Mr. Jones’s hands or clothing. 
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The defense presents two alibi witnesses. They both testify that they went over to Mr. Jones’s 
house around 8pm on the night of the incident. They made a frozen pizza and played video 
games with Mr. Jones for about two hours before the police officer arrived. 
 
During closing arguments, the prosecutor stresses that Mr. Jones’s clothes and car match the 
description given by the eyewitness, that Mr. Jones was found only five blocks from the crime 
scene, and that Mr. Jones had an open can of yellow paint in his basement that matches the paint 
used on the statue. The defense attorney stresses that the eyewitness never saw the suspect’s 
face, that there are two individuals who verify Mr. Jones’s alibi, and that there was no paint on 
Mr. Jones’s hands or clothing. 
 
You must apply the following rules of law:  
1. Every person charged with a crime is presumed innocent. 
2. Every defendant has a constitutional right not to testify. The decision not to testify cannot 
be used as an inference of guilt and cannot prejudice the defendant. 
3. You may have to decide what testimony to believe. You may believe all of the testimony 
of a witness, or part of it, or none of it. 
4. The prosecution has the burden of proving every element of the crime charged beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
5. The elements of the crime of vandalism are: 
a. That the defendant, 
b. knowingly, 
c. damaged property of another, 
d. without the owner's consent. 
Which verdict do you return? 
o Guilty 
o Not guilty 
[Page break] 
How confident are you that this is the legally appropriate verdict? 
o Very confident 
o Somewhat confident 
o Neither confident nor unconfident 
o Somewhat unconfident 
o Very unconfident 
[Page break] 
How believable did you find the following aspects of the trial? 
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[Page break] 
Now assume that you are the judge presiding over this case. Regardless of your answers to the 
previous questions, assume that the jury found the defendant guilty. 
  
The defendant’s criminal history consists of one misdemeanor theft conviction when he was a 
juvenile. 
  
You are asked to impose a sentence within the range of one to five years in prison. Your 
sentence can include fractions of years. What sentence do you impose? 
 
 
[Page break] 
How confident are you that this is the legally appropriate sentence? 
o Very confident 
o Somewhat confident 
o Neither confident nor unconfident 
o Somewhat unconfident 
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o Very unconfident 
[Page break] 
Regardless of your answers to the previous questions, assume the defendant is found not guilty. 
How likely do you think it is that the defendant will commit a crime in the next five years? 
o Very likely 
o Somewhat likely 
o Neither likely nor unlikely 
o Somewhat unlikely 
o Very unlikely 
B. Vandalism Variation 2 
You have been selected to serve on a jury in a criminal trial. The defendant is James Williams, 
pictured below as he appears in court on the day of trial. The sole charge against Mr. Williams is 
vandalism, and he has pleaded not guilty. After reading the trial materials, you will be asked to 
decide whether the prosecution has proven that Mr. Williams is guilty of vandalism beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
 
[picture of defendant] 
 
The object of the vandalism was a community center pool. The owner had not given anyone 
permission to pour paint in the pool. 
 
The first prosecution witness is a police officer. He testifies that on the night of the incident, it 
appears someone poured a large amount of red paint in the pool. Based on the amount of paint, 
he does not believe that this was an accident. The police officer also testifies that Mr. Williams 
consented to a search of his home, and five empty, one-gallon cans of red paint were found in his 
basement. 
 
The second prosecution witness is an insurance agent. He testifies that although Mr. Williams is 
not the owner of the pool, he owns the aquatic equipment company that rents the pool’s filtration 
system to the community center. Mr. Williams carries a $50,000 insurance policy on this 
filtration system. 
 
The first defense witness is Mr. Williams's wife. She testifies that he was at home with her all 
night on the night of the incident. She says that they made dinner and watched a movie. She also 
testifies that the empty paint cans are from an old home improvement project, but she can’t 
remember why they kept the cans. 
 
Mr. Williams also testifies on his own behalf. He admits that he owns an insurance policy on the 
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pool’s filtration system but denies dumping the paint into the pool. He says that the empty paint 
cans are from an old home improvement project, but he also can’t remember why they kept the 
cans. On the night of the incident, he says he was home with his wife, and they made dinner and 
watched a movie. On cross-examination, Mr. Williams admits that he currently has about 
$30,000 of outstanding credit card debt that he is struggling to pay off. 
 
During closing arguments, the prosecutor stresses the empty paint cans found in Mr. Williams's 
basement, the insurance policy, and Mr. Williams’s financial situation. The defense attorney 
stresses that there is no direct evidence linking Mr. Williams to the vandalism, that the paint cans 
are explained by an old home improvement project, and that Mr. Williams’s wife verifies his 
alibi. 
 
You must apply the following rules of law:  
1. Every person charged with a crime is presumed innocent. 
2. You may have to decide what testimony to believe. You may believe all of the testimony 
of a witness, or part of it, or none of it. 
3. The prosecution has the burden of proving every element of the crime charged beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
4. The elements of the crime of vandalism are:  
a. That the defendant, 
b. knowingly, 
c. damaged property of another, 
d. without the owner's consent. 
 
Which verdict do you return? 
o Guilty 
o Not guilty 
[Page break] 
How confident are you that this is the legally appropriate verdict? 
o Very confident 
o Somewhat confident 
o Neither confident nor unconfident 
o Somewhat unconfident 
o Very unconfident 
[Page break] 
How believable did you find the following aspects of the trial? 
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 [Page break] 
Now assume that you are the judge presiding over this case. Regardless of your answers to the 
previous questions, assume that the jury found the defendant guilty. 
  
The defendant’s criminal history consists of one misdemeanor theft conviction when he was a 
juvenile. 
  
You are asked to impose a sentence within the range of one to five years in prison. Your 
sentence can include fractions of years. What sentence do you impose? 
 
[Page break] 
How confident are you that this is the legally appropriate sentence? 
o Very confident 
o Somewhat confident 
o Neither confident nor unconfident 
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o Somewhat unconfident 
o Very unconfident 
[Page break] 
Regardless of your answers to the previous questions, assume the defendant is found not guilty. 
How likely do you think it is that the defendant will commit a crime in the next five years? 
o Very likely 
o Somewhat likely 
o Neither likely nor unlikely 
o Somewhat unlikely 
o Very unlikely 
 
After viewing a random version of the vandalism trial question, all respondents viewed a 
random version of another employment hiring scenario unrelated to this dissertation. Then, all 
respondents viewed a version of the arson trial question. There were 24 versions: the two 
difference case variations below accompanied by a picture of the defendant who was either white 
or black; shackled or not; and in a suit, jeans and a t-shirt, or a jumpsuit. If the participant viewed 
the first variation of the vandalism question, they viewed a random version of the second 
variation of the arson question, and if the participant viewed the second variation of the 
vandalism question, they viewed a random version of the first variation of the arson question. 
C. Arson Variation 1 
You have been selected to serve on a jury in a criminal trial. The defendant is David Jackson, 
pictured below as he appears in court on the day of trial. The sole charge against Mr. Jackson is 
arson, and he has pleaded not guilty. After reading the trial materials, you will be asked to decide 
whether the prosecution has proven that Mr. Jackson is guilty of arson beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
 
[picture of defendant] 
  
The fire took place inside an unoccupied building at a construction site. The property owner had 
not given anyone permission to start a fire. 
 
The first prosecution witness was working at a store across the street from the construction site. 
He testifies that around 9:30pm he heard popping noises that sounded like fireworks. When he 
looked through the store window, he saw a man setting off fireworks at the construction site, 
which caused one of the buildings to catch fire. The witness then went outside and saw the man 
run towards a green truck with a broken right taillight. The man, who was laughing loudly, was 
approximately 5’ 10’’, normal weight, and was wearing a red jacket, jeans, and sneakers. He 
entered the truck and sped away. 
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The second prosecution witness is a police officer. He testifies that he canvassed the area after 
receiving the above description from the eyewitness. At a house about five blocks away, he 
noticed a green truck with a broken right taillight, knocked on the door, and saw Mr. Jackson 
wearing a red jacket, jeans, and sneakers. There were two other men at the house. Mr. Jackson 
told the officer he had been with them at the house playing video games all night. Later, the 
police officer searched the house and found an open package of fireworks in the basement. The 
police officer testifies that based on his examination of the label on the fireworks, they could 
have caused the fire in the building. However, on cross-examination, he admits that he did not 
see any burn marks or soot residue on Mr. Jackson’s hands or clothing.  
 
The defense presents two alibi witnesses. They both testify that they went over to Mr. Jackson’s 
house around 8pm on the night of the fire. They made a frozen pizza and played video games 
with Mr. Jackson for about two hours before the police officer arrived. 
 
During closing arguments, the prosecutor stresses that Mr. Jackson’s clothes and car match the 
description given by the eyewitness, that Mr. Jackson was found only five blocks from the crime 
scene, and that Mr. Jackson had fireworks in his basement that could have caused this fire. The 
defense attorney stresses that the eyewitness never saw the suspect’s face, that there are two 
individuals who verify Mr. Jackson’s alibi, and that there were no burn marks or soot residue on 
Mr. Jackson's hands or clothing. 
You must apply the following rules of law: 
1. Every person charged with a crime is presumed innocent. 
2. Every defendant has a constitutional right not to testify. The decision not to testify cannot 
be used as an inference of guilt and cannot prejudice the defendant. 
3. You may have to decide what testimony to believe. You may believe all of the testimony 
of a witness, or part of it, or none of it. 
4. The prosecution has the burden of proving every element of the crime charged beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
5. The elements of the crime of arson are: 
a. That the defendant, 
b. By means of fire or explosives, 
c. knowingly 
d. damaged property of another, 
e. without the owner's consent. 
Which verdict do you return? 
o Guilty 
o Not guilty 
[Page break] 
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How confident are you that this is the legally appropriate verdict? 
o Very confident 
o Somewhat confident 
o Neither confident nor unconfident 
o Somewhat unconfident 
o Very unconfident 
[Page break] 
How believable did you find the following aspects of the trial? 
 
[Page break] 
Now assume that you are the judge presiding over this case. Regardless of your answers to the 
previous questions, assume that the jury found the defendant guilty. 
  
The defendant’s criminal history consists of one misdemeanor theft conviction when he was a 
juvenile. 
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You are asked to impose a sentence within the range of one to ten years in prison. Your sentence 
can include fractions of years. What sentence do you impose? 
 
[Page break] 
How confident are you that this is the legally appropriate sentence? 
o Very confident 
o Somewhat confident 
o Neither confident nor unconfident 
o Somewhat unconfident 
o Very unconfident 
[Page break] 
Regardless of your answers to the previous questions, assume the defendant is found not guilty. 
How likely do you think it is that the defendant will commit a crime in the next five years? 
o Very likely 
o Somewhat likely 
o Neither likely nor unlikely 
o Somewhat unlikely 
o Very unlikely 
D. Arson Variation 2 
You have been selected to serve on a jury in a criminal trial. The defendant is Joshua Thomas, 
pictured below as he appears in court on the day of trial. The sole charge against Mr. Thomas is 
arson, and he has pleaded not guilty. After reading the trial materials, you will be asked to decide 
whether the prosecution has proven that Mr. Thomas is guilty of arson beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
 
[picture of defendant] 
 
The fire took place inside an unoccupied clothing shop. The property owner had not given 
anyone permission to start a fire. 
 
The first prosecution witness is a police officer. He testifies that on the night of the incident, it 
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appears someone intentionally started a fire in the building using an open flame and some kind of 
liquid accelerant. Based on an examination of the electrical and mechanical components of the 
building, he does not believe the fire started accidentally. The police officer also testifies that Mr. 
Thomas consented to a search of his home, and five empty, 8-ounce cans of lighter fluid were 
found in his basement. 
 
The second prosecution witness is an insurance agent. He testifies that although Mr. Thomas is 
not the owner of the building, he rents the space for his clothing shop. Mr. Thomas carries a 
$50,000 insurance policy on the shop’s contents. 
 
The first defense witness is Mr. Thomas’s wife. She testifies that he was at home with her all 
evening on the night of the fire. She says that they made dinner and watched a movie. She also 
testifies that the lighter fluid cans are from old camping trips, but she can’t remember why they 
kept the cans. 
 
Mr. Thomas also testifies on his own behalf. He admits that he owns an insurance policy on the 
shop’s contents but denies starting the fire. He says that the lighter fluid cans are from old 
camping trips, but he also can’t remember why they kept the cans. He testifies that he was home 
with his wife all evening on the night of the fire, and they made dinner and watched a movie. On 
cross-examination, Mr. Thomas admits that he currently has about $30,000 of outstanding credit 
card debt that he is struggling to pay off. 
 
During closing arguments, the prosecutor stresses the empty lighter fluid cans found in Mr. 
Thomas's basement, the insurance policy, and Mr. Thomas’s financial situation. The defense 
attorney stresses that there is no direct evidence linking Mr. Thomas to the fire, that the lighter 
fluid cans are explained by old camping trips, and that Mr. Thomas’s wife verifies his alibi. 
You must apply the following rules of law: 
1. Every person charged with a crime is presumed innocent. 
2. You may have to decide what testimony to believe. You may believe all of the 
testimony of a witness, or part of it, or none of it. 
3. The prosecution has the burden of proving every element of the crime charged 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
4. The elements of the crime of arson are:  
a. That the defendant, 
b. By means of fire or explosives, 
c. knowingly 
d. damaged property of another, 
e. without the owner's consent. 
Which verdict do you return? 
o Guilty 
o Not guilty 
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[Page break] 
How confident are you that this is the legally appropriate verdict? 
o Very confident 
o Somewhat confident 
o Neither confident nor unconfident 
o Somewhat unconfident 
o Very unconfident 
[Page break] 
How believable did you find the following aspects of the trial? 
 
 [Page break] 
Now assume that you are the judge presiding over this case. Regardless of your answers to the 
previous questions, assume that the jury found the defendant guilty. 
  
The defendant’s criminal history consists of one misdemeanor theft conviction when he was a 
juvenile. 
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You are asked to impose a sentence within the range of one to ten years in prison. Your sentence 
can include fractions of years. What sentence do you impose? 
 
[Page break] 
How confident are you that this is the legally appropriate sentence? 
o Very confident 
o Somewhat confident 
o Neither confident nor unconfident 
o Somewhat unconfident 
o Very unconfident 
[Page break] 
Regardless of your answers to the previous questions, assume the defendant is found not guilty. 
How likely do you think it is that the defendant will commit a crime in the next five years? 
o Very likely 
o Somewhat likely 
o Neither likely nor unlikely 
o Somewhat unlikely 
o Very unlikely 
Finally, all respondents answered a series of demographic questions, including questions 
about gender, age, race, ethnicity, family, residence, education, income, political preference, 
dedication to religion, prior arrest experience, prior criminal conviction experience, prior jury 
service, prior crime victimization, height, weight, eating and exercise habits, and prior employee 
hiring experience. There were also two opinion questions that asked participants to rate how well 
they think the criminal justice system works in the United States and how big of a problem they 
think employment discrimination still is in the United States. 
II. Appendix B: Second Survey Outline 
First, all respondents viewed a consent screen and confirmed that they were over the age 
of 18. Then, all respondents viewed a random version of the criminal scenario question. There 
were 48 different versions: a crime of either vandalism or arson with a picture of one of four 
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defendants, two of whom were black and two of whom were white, shackled or not, and in a suit, 
jeans and a t-shirt, or a jumpsuit.  
A. Crime Question Version 1 
You have been selected to serve on a jury in a criminal trial. The defendant is [Michael 
Jones/James Williams], pictured below as he appears in court on the day of trial. The sole 
charge against Mr. [Jones/Williams] is vandalism, and he has pleaded not guilty. At the end of 
the trial, you will be asked to apply the following rules of law: 
1. Every person charged with a crime is presumed innocent. 
2. You may decide what testimony to believe. You may believe all of the testimony of a 
witness, or part of it, or none of it. 
3. The prosecution has the burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
4. The elements of the crime of vandalism are: 
1. That the defendant, 
2. knowingly, 
3. damaged property of another, 
4. without the owner's consent. 
[picture of defendant] 
Before hearing any evidence, how likely do you think it is that the defendant is guilty? 
 
Please rate the importance of the factors below in answering the previous question. 
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After hearing the evidence, how sure will you need to be that the defendant is guilty in order to 
return a verdict of guilty? 
 
Please rate how important the factors below will be in deciding whether to convict. 
 
B. Crime Question Version 2 
You have been selected to serve on a jury in a criminal trial. The defendant is [David 
Jackson/Joshua Thomas], pictured below as he appears in court on the day of trial. The sole 
charge against Mr. [Jackson/Thomas] is arson, and he has pleaded not guilty. At the end of the 
trial, you will be asked to apply the following rules of law: 
1. Every person charged with a crime is presumed innocent. 
2. You may decide what testimony to believe. You may believe all of the testimony of a 
witness, or part of it, or none of it. 
3. The prosecution has the burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
4. The elements of the crime of arson are: 
1. That the defendant, 
2. by means of fire or explosives, 
3. knowingly, 
4. damaged property of another, 
5. without the owner's consent. 
[picture of defendant] 
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Before hearing any evidence, how likely do you think it is that the defendant is guilty? 
 
Please rate the importance of the factors below in answering the previous question. 
 
After hearing the evidence, how sure will you need to be that the defendant is guilty in order to 
return a verdict of guilty? 
 
Please rate how important the factors below will be in deciding whether to convict. 
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Next, all the respondents saw a random version of the attractiveness question. There were 
24 different versions: a picture of one of four defendants, two who were black and two who were 
white, shackled or not, and in a suit, jeans and a t-shirt, or a jumpsuit. Participants never saw a 
picture of the same defendant that they saw in the crime question. 
C. Attractiveness Question  
[defendant picture] 
How would you rate the attractiveness of the individual above? 
o Very attractive 
o Somewhat attractive 
o Neither attractive nor unattractive 
o Somewhat unattractive 
o Very unattractive 
Finally, all respondents answered a series of demographic questions, including questions 
about gender, age, race, ethnicity, residence, education, income, political preference, dedication 
to religion, prior arrest experience, prior criminal conviction experience, prior jury service, and 
prior crime victimization. There was also an opinion question that asked participants to rate how 
well they think the criminal justice system works in the United States. 
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APPENDIX TABLES 
Table A1. First Study Subject Demographics by Race/Ethnicity 
 
Characteristic White, Non-Hispanic Hispanic Black Asian 
Female 56.6% 45.4% 63.5% 41.9% 
Age 36.3 32.5 34.8 32.3 
US Native 97.8% 90.5% 93.7% 69.2% 
Married 44.2% 38.6% 28.4% 34.4% 
B.A. or Higher (If 25+) 57.2% 52.3% 51.6% 82.0% 
Employed 82.3% 85.0% 82.1% 81.0% 
Median Household Income 
($2017) 
$52,500 $52,500 $37,500 $52,500 
Urban 28.9% 49.1% 48.7% 47.6% 
Northeast 20.1% 16.2% 16.6% 18.2% 
Midwest 24.4% 9.6% 15.6% 11.9% 
South 37.1% 42% 55.0% 27.7% 
West 18.4% 31.4% 12.6% 42.3% 
Democrat 39.9% 47.4% 63.2% 57.0% 
Republican 26.1% 17.6% 5.9% 14.0% 
Religious  21.7% 23.8% 38.5% 28.1% 
Prior Jury Service 13.6% 13.1% 16.6% 11.5% 
Criminal History 17.8% 19.7% 16.2% 6.1% 
Criminal Victimization 43.0% 39.5% 39.1% 22.8% 
Distrusts Justice System 42.3% 45.6% 57.9% 35.6% 
Notes: Age is calculated for employed persons only; values are calculated for individuals who report only a single 
race. Individuals who attend church at least once a month are considered religious. Individuals who have a prior 
criminal conviction or have been arrested are considered to have a criminal history. Individuals are considered to 
distrust the justice system if they strongly disagree or somewhat disagree with the statement that the criminal 
justice system works well in the United States. 
 
Table A2. Second Study Subject Demographics by Race/Ethnicity 
 
Characteristic White, Non-Hispanic Hispanic Black Asian 
Female 54.9% 51.0% 59.9% 50.3% 
Age 36.4 32.3 33.7 34.1 
US Native 97.8% 92.9% 92.5% 61.7% 
Married 48.0% 47.6% 33.5% 50.9% 
B.A. or Higher (If 25+) 59.7% 65.0% 51.4% 77.2% 
Employed 84.5% 89.1% 83.5% 81.4% 
Median Household Income 
($2017) 
$52,500 $52,500 $37,500 $67,500 
Urban 33.5% 61.2% 54.2% 42.5% 
Northeast 17.8% 12.6% 14.6% 21.6% 
Midwest 23.4% 6.5% 13.7% 8.4% 
South 41.6% 44.9% 56.1% 28.1% 
West 17.1% 33.7% 15.6% 41.9% 
Democrat 38.6% 38.5% 58.7% 43.4% 
Republican 34.1% 30.1% 9.7% 13.8% 
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Religious  32.8% 42.7% 41.7% 31.1% 
Prior Jury Service 16.7% 20.4% 17.0% 15.6% 
Criminal History 18.9% 25.8% 17.5% 7.2% 
Criminal Victimization 44.3% 38.0% 36.7% 26.9% 
Distrusts Justice System 31.0% 28.2% 47.2% 25.7% 
Notes: Age is calculated for employed persons only; values are calculated for individuals who report only a single 
race. Individuals who attend church at least once a month are considered religious. Individuals who have a prior 
criminal conviction or have been arrested are considered to have a criminal history. Individuals are considered to 
distrust the justice system if they strongly disagree or somewhat disagree with the statement that the criminal 
justice system works well in the United States. 
 
Table A3. Case Demographics for Cases Involving Juveniles Ages 6–15 
Variable Tennessee North Carolina 
Number of Cases 264,967 226,040 
   
Age at Referral  13.48 13.72 
Age at Offense  — 13.65 
Female 36.07% 29.26% 
White, Non-Hispanic 56.60% 38.85% 
White, Hispanic 1.30% 6.07% 
Black, Non-Hispanic 39.85% 50.89% 
Asian, Non-Hispanic 0.32% 0.52% 
Native American, Non-Hispanic 0.08% 1.72% 
Multi-Racial or Non-White, Hispanic 1.85% 1.95% 
Living with Biological Parents 16.01% — 
Living with Remarried Parent 6.51% — 
Living with Single Parent 57.80% — 
Living with Relatives 8.47% — 
Living with Adopted Parents 0.71% — 
Placed Living Situation 3.47% — 
Living Independently 0.31% — 
Other Living Situation 1.16% — 
Enrolled in School 97.08 % — 
Enrolled in Special Education Program 9.41% — 
   
Weapon Used — 15.95% 
Firearm/ Explosive Used — 1.77% 
Serious Injury — 1.95% 
School-Related Case — 33.05% 
Pretrial Detention 19.43% — 
Felony Charged — 14.28% 
Misdemeanor Charged — 75.88% 
Number of Initial Charges  1.20 1.94 
Multiple Initial Charges  15.39% 72.45% 
Charged with Crime Against Person 17.18% 36.00% 
Charged with Property Crime 19.98% 33.01% 
Charged with Drug or Alcohol Crime 5.30% 8.37% 
Charged with Public Order Crime 27.63% 17.55% 
Charged with Status Offense 37.38% 14.89% 
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Length of Case (In Months) 2.63 1.95 
   
Dismissed  37.91% 55.13% 
Transferred to Adult Court 0.06% 0.17% 
Sentenced 52.47% 43.64% 
Missing Case Outcome 9.55% 1.06% 
Harshest Sentence - Detention 7.29% 23.63% 
Harshest Sentence - Probation 39.86% 60.27% 
Harshest Sentence - Treatment 18.49% 12.47% 
Harshest Sentence - Other 34.36% 1.73% 
Missing Sentence — 1.90% 
Notes: Observations are dropped from the Tennessee data if they do not involve any criminal charge, and 
observations are dropped from both states if they only involve traffic offenses or minor infractions. 
Observations from the North Carolina data are assigned the mean age at offense if the juvenile is over 17 at the 
time of the offense or over 15 at the time of the offense and is not charged with at least one status offense, and 
observations from the North Carolina data are recoded so that the age at offense is equal to the age at referral if 
the age at offense is greater than the age at referral. Case length is treated as missing if it is negative. Missing 
values for non-case outcome variables that are available in both states, pretrial detention, and felony charged 
are replaced with regression-estimated values, and missing values for variables only available in one state 
(other than pretrial detention and felony charged) are not included in this table. The sentencing percentages are 
calculated only for the sample of cases that result in a sentence. The charge categories are not mutually 
exclusive, except in the nationwide data, which only consider the most serious charge.  
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